

The State of Russian Studies in the United States: 2022

An Assessment by the Association for Slavic, East
European, and Eurasian Studies ASEEES

August 2023



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I. OVERVIEW

This report presents the findings from an assessment of Russian studies in the United States conducted on behalf of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), with funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York, from May 2022-January 2023. The study was originally planned for early 2022 as a follow-up to a previous assessment completed by the senior author in 2015. The initial impetus for repeating the study was to take stock of how the field had responded to challenges posed by external forces since 2015: the COVID19 pandemic, spiraling tensions between the governments of Russia and the United States, and the accelerating crackdown on civil liberties and academic freedom in Russia. These developments were widely perceived as limiting opportunities for US-based scholars to conduct research in Russia and hindering research collaborations and exchanges between US-based and Russia-based scholars.

Then, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has had a far more sweeping impact on US-based Russian studies than any development since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The authors and the ASEEES Advisory Committee for the study decided to proceed with the assessment, but to focus much of it on the effects of the war. It is important for the Russian studies field to systematically assess how Russia's war on Ukraine affects scholarship and graduate training about Russia in the United States in order to inform efforts to mitigate the damage to the field. Doing so requires tracking longer-term trends and situating the war's impact within them. The research was pushed back for several months, to give time for US-based scholars studying Russia time to recover from the initial shock of the war and begin making sense of how it has affected US-based Russian studies.

Naturally, today the war dominates perceptions of the challenges facing the field. Yet, to fully understand that impact it is necessary to understand where the field was heading in the years leading up to February 24, 2022. To that end, we sought to address the following four sets of questions:

- 1) *Prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, what had been the main trends in Russian studies in the US since 2015?* Had the quality and quantity of research on Russia been increasing or decreasing? Were perspectives on Russia growing more diverse and nuanced, or were they unifying around conventional wisdom or competing sides in polarizing debates? Were US universities training enough young specialists to have a broad, deep understanding of Russia? To what extent did academic research on Russia inform US government policy via think tank specialists and efforts by scholars to address policy issues? Had research collaborations between US- and Russia-based scholars and linkages between US and Russian institutions been on the rise or on the wane?
- 2) *How did the COVID19 pandemic, spiraling tensions between Russia and the US, and rising authoritarianism within Russia affect Russian studies?* These three phenomena are inter-related, to be sure, and they do not exhaust all the factors that potentially influenced the field prior to Russia's full-scale invasion. But they were clearly candidates for the most important external developments for Russian studies until February 2022.
- 3) *What have been the impacts on Russian studies of Russia's February 2022 invasion and its (ongoing) full-scale war against Ukraine?* Does the effect of the war vary by discipline? Is it greater for younger scholars than for more senior scholars? Are there solutions to the many issues that the war has posed?

- 4) *How have US-based scholars who conduct research on Russia responded to growing calls from various stakeholders to “de-colonize” Russian studies and to “de-center” Russia within Slavic or Eurasian studies?* The war has lent urgency and force to a range of disparate but related criticisms of the field that fall under the broad label of “de-colonization,” including the view that scholars of Russia have been insufficiently attentive to the colonial, expansionist, and exploitative nature of the Russian empire (both past and present); ignored minority ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities within Russia; over-emphasized the study of Russia to the exclusion of other countries and populations in the broader Eurasian region; and helped to justify Russia’s aggression toward its neighbors by implicitly or explicitly adopting Russo-centric, Moscow-framed narratives.

To address these questions, three forms of data were collected: 1) in-depth interviews (in-person and virtual) and virtual focus groups with US-based researchers in Slavic studies, history, and the social sciences who study Russia to obtain qualitative data on perceived challenges and opportunities in the field (conducted May 18-September 30, 2022); 2) a survey of United States university-based centers for Russian/Slavic studies to assess trends in programming and enrollments (conducted October 17-December 18, 2022); and 3) a survey of US-based scholars in the disciplines who have conducted research on Russia in the last 5 years (conducted December 6, 2022-January 3, 2023).

This is a strictly *internal* assessment of the state of Russian studies in late 2022 in the US, in the sense that the population under consideration consists of scholars, policymakers, and think tank analysts who have worked on Russia while based in the United States at some point during the five years preceding the study. As such, the assessment does not directly consider how the field is perceived by those who do not work on Russia, nor does it address Russian studies in other countries.

The report is organized in five parts: an Executive Summary, qualitative findings (from the sixteen interviews and three virtual focus groups), findings from the individual survey of scholars, findings from the institutional survey, and a conclusion with policy recommendations. The survey instruments themselves are included in the Appendix.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Given that most of the period covered by this assessment occurred prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, we start by considering how research and graduate training about Russia in the United States had been faring up to the time of the invasion. At that point, Russian studies already faced several external challenges and unfavorable long-term trends. Heightened tensions between Russia and the United States, which, already strained in the aftermath of the 2011 Duma elections and ensuing protests in Russia, have been escalating sharply since Russia's seizure of Ukrainian territory in 2014, were accompanied by a concerted crackdown on civic and academic freedom within Russia. These two factors combined to raise barriers to collaboration between US- and Russia-based researchers, pose growing limitations on US-based scholars' access to sources of historical and contemporary data within Russia, and polarize discussions of Russia in policy and public opinion circles. The COVID19 pandemic, with its shutdowns, travel restrictions, and vaccine nationalism, added more obstacles still. Such challenges developed at a time when the broad field was already grappling with declining enrollments in Russian language courses, waning interest from PhD students in the disciplines, diminishing faculty coverage, and a tendency for scholars to move away from conducting research on Russia as their careers proceeded.

The impact of the external challenges confronting the field and the long-term trends is evident in several findings from the assessment. Compared to the period covered by the previous evaluation (2009-2014), 2017-2022 witnessed declines in all of the following: the intake of students interested in Russia into PhD programs in the disciplines, numbers of Russia-focused PhDs supervised, numbers of faculty with Russia expertise in the corresponding departments, the average numbers of Russia-related language and substantive courses taken by graduates during their PhD training, the average quantity of publications about Russia in all but two out of eleven categories (including research monographs and policy memos/op-eds) by research-active scholars, the average number of briefings of policymakers, and the number and average duration of research trips taken to Russia. Russia scholars showed a greater tendency to move away from than toward research on Russia over the course of the careers, and the rate of this "drift" increased somewhat. While some of this "drift" may involve shifting focus to other countries in the region (which would be less of a concern for Russian studies than a shift away from work on the larger Eurasian region), our data do not allow us to assess the extent to which this is the case.

At the same time, there were signs of resilience: collaborations with Russian scholars held steady, as did levels of tenure-line academic employment of Russia researchers with PhDs, the rate of publications in peer-reviewed disciplinary outlets, grant funding for Russia-related research projects, and measures of methodological and topical diversity. Fewer Russia scholars perceived widespread anti-Russian bias among social scientists and the mass media. Subjective perceptions of the quality of research on Russia produced were consistently high, even if there was somewhat less of it.

Given the severity of the challenges facing the field and the unfavorable trends from the prior period, it is in fact somewhat surprising that the field did not suffer more sweeping declines than it did in the years preceding Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Perhaps this explains why the qualitative interviews and focus groups tended to emphasize positive achievements and trends in Russian studies within the disciplines prior to February 2022. The overall picture in early 2022 remained one of impressive Russia-related research activity by US-based scholars, despite the challenges posed by the COVID19 pandemic and growing US-Russia tensions. They continued to publish a robust (if declining) quantity of different types of works about Russia in a variety of venues on a wide range of topics using diverse methods and

data sources. Almost three quarters of the active researchers in our sample received grant funding for their work, with the US federal government being the most common source. In sum, despite some understandable struggles the interdisciplinary Russian studies community more-or-less maintained course in the face of considerable headwinds in 2017-2021.

Compared to the troubled waters that Russian studies had to navigate previously, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 hit the field like a tsunami. Public and political opinion in most countries of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and its allies in Asia and the Pacific was immediately appalled by the Russian government's actions, and many commentators blamed not only the regime, but also the Russian people for perpetrating an unprovoked, unjustified, and inexcusably brutal war on Russia's neighbor. Within Russia, the invasion was quickly followed by a severe intensification of government crackdowns on dissent, a mass exodus of scholars and other highly educated professionals, and a broad retreat of the society into a world defined by state propaganda, with economic, educational, and cultural ties to the West all but completely severed. These developments made collecting reliable historical and social science data within Russia impossible and research travel to Russia inconceivable, imperiled Russia-based scholars who had been conducting research about Russia in the social sciences and humanities, raised questions about how well US-based Russian experts (who largely failed to predict the full-scale invasion) understood Russia's political trajectory, and spurred urgent calls to "de-colonize" Slavic, East European, and Eurasian studies and "de-center" Russia within them.

Among US policymakers and the think tanks who seek to provide them with options and perspectives regarding Russia, the exigencies of responding to the full-scale invasion quickly crowded out all other considerations. A long-standing process of polarization of calcified viewpoints regarding Russia only intensified, leading many to despair of the chances of invigorating policy discussions with arguments rooted in the type of nuanced, deep, and innovative perspectives on Russia that scholars in the field have often aspired to offer. Some interviewees suggested that the best—perhaps only—effective way for scholars to bring their Russia expertise to policymakers is by teaching them in the classroom while they are undergraduate or master's degree students.

Both the qualitative and quantitative components of the assessment demonstrated that Russia's war on Ukraine left many scholars of Russia reeling, upending the way they had become accustomed to practicing their trade, which had already become more difficult before the full-scale invasion. Despair is evident in the tone and content of many statements from the interviews and focus groups, and also in findings from the survey of Russia researchers, where 89% assessed the impact of the war on research on Russia in their discipline as "very negative" (3% "somewhat negative") and 86% gave that assessment of the war's impact on the ability to do research about Russia moving forward (12% "somewhat negative"), dwarfing the (still considerable) percentages who saw COVID19, US-Russia tensions, and other factors as adverse factors for research on Russia. There is little or no variation in the extent of such perceived negative impacts across disciplines, apart from a more limited effect on access to data for Slavists than for historians and social scientists. Younger scholars just entering the field are understood to be especially affected. The data show that the war has indeed pushed some US-based researchers away from doing research on Russia, and many have ended ongoing collaborations with Russian scholars and institutions.

These tendencies have been offset slightly by researchers initiating new projects on Ukraine and other countries in the region and by starting new collaborations with Russian scholars who have been displaced from Russia following the launch of the full-scale invasion. Similarly, while enrollments in

Russian-language courses declined by about 7% from Fall 2021 to Fall 2022 according to the institutional survey, enrollments in Ukrainian language courses more than doubled in the same period. Some researchers anticipate that the war may actually increase interest in Russia on the part of graduate students, policymakers, and the general public.

Perhaps because most scholars in the field are horrified by Russia's actions since February 2022, they are largely sympathetic with the specific goals that have been linked to "de-colonizing" Slavic/Eurasian studies. Some believe that de-colonization of the field has been underway for some time (especially in the social sciences), and about half of the individual survey respondents support allocating more resources to studying other countries and peoples in the region only if doing so does not result in decreased funding for studies of Russia and Russians. But apart from these caveats, there is widespread support within Russian studies for de-colonization goals: especially for devoting more scholarly attention to non-Russian peoples within Russia, but also for greater focus on other countries in the region (de-centering Russia), Russia's past and present imperial and expansionist tendencies, and the work of indigenous scholars who have yet to receive adequate international recognition.

Broad support for these goals *within* the Russian studies community is a welcome sign that the field is rising to the challenges posed by the war and seeking ways to address those challenges moving forward, as are the efforts underway in the various disciplines to identify new sources of data and new methods through which Russia can still be studied, as well as to continue collaborating with Russian scholars in exile. These efforts remain nascent, and much work remains to understand both their potential and their limitations, as well as to formulate concrete strategies for effectively engaging with and adopting de-colonization perspectives.

Based on the assessment, we conclude the report by recommending five goals for scholars, donors, and other stakeholders in the Russian studies domain to adopt, as well as specific policies to achieve them: 1) Maintain as much access as possible to data on Russian history, culture, economy, politics, and society by making existing data more widely available and developing new approaches. 2) Protect Russian scholars in exile and provide them with the means to continue their scholarship and teaching, even while prioritizing support for Ukrainian scholars who have been displaced by Russia's war on Ukraine and, also, assisting scholars fleeing authoritarian repression in Belarus and other countries in Eurasia. 3) Continue to educate the U.S. public and policymaking community (including think tank experts) about Russia's complexity. 4) Embrace the multiple aims of those who call for de-colonizing Slavic and Eurasian studies and work to engage constructively with the corresponding debates and discussions. 5) Help young scholars entering the field. The first four goals can be pursued by funding within- and cross-institutional efforts explicitly devoted to achieving them, while the fifth requires paying special attention to the needs of graduate students and recent PhDs within the context of that enhanced programming.

The challenges to the field are significant. But a wide range of programs and initiatives are underway, both in the United States and abroad, to address these goals. The creativity and resourcefulness that the interdisciplinary community of scholars who conduct research on Russia has shown thus far, is cause for some optimism.

III. QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

Methodology

The qualitative component of the assessment consisted of 16 individual interviews and three online focus groups, which were conducted from May 18- September 30, 2022. Most of the 16 interviewees currently work in government, in think tanks, or in Washington DC-based academic institutions that forge active connections with policymaking circles. Others are faculty members at non-DC universities who were interviewed to round out coverage of different institutions and disciplines in the qualitative phase. Seven interviews were conducted in person (in Washington DC), nine by Zoom. Each of the three focus groups included scholars who study Russia from different disciplines but who are at roughly the same career stage: one group of current PhD students, one of junior scholars (assistant professors or just-tenured associate professors), and one of senior scholars (advanced associate or full professors).

Overall, 38 people participated in either individual interviews or focus groups. All are now based in the United States and work on Russia (though not necessarily exclusively) in some professional capacity. Some informants were drawn from the personal contacts of the PI and referrals provided by those contacts; others were purposively recruited from outside those contacts and referrals to ensure coverage of a wide range of perspectives. Within this sample, there is some representation (at least 3 individuals) of sectors of employment (universities, think tanks, current US government agencies), types of academic institutions (public and private research universities, smaller liberal-arts colleges, and US government-linked universities), career stages (from PhD students to emeritus professors), ethnic Russians who are Russian citizens, natives of Russia who are now US citizens, women, and non-white people.

Interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity as a condition of their participation, so care has been taken to avoid reporting any identifying information in this report. The Zoom interviews and focus groups were recorded. The in-person interviews were not recorded, but the PI took detailed notes during them, including some verbatim statements.

Findings

The interviews and focus groups covered the full range of topics addressed in this assessment, with different emphases depending on the position of the informant: the state of the field prior to Russia's February 2022 invasion, in terms of the quality and quantity of research about Russia and its integration with academic disciplines, the integration of Russia-based scholars into US-based academic communities through communication, exchanges, and collaborations, the diversity of perspectives on Russia within academic disciplines and policy circles, the influence of research on policy discussions and public understanding of Russia, the recruitment of young scholars into the field, trends in job markets for Russia experts in different fields, and the effects of the COVID19 pandemic, US-Russia tensions, Russia's growing authoritarianism, and Russia's war on Ukraine, and the meaning and consequences of efforts to "de-colonize" the field. We organize presentation of the key findings regarding five broad topics: research (quality, quantity, diversity) on Russia within academic disciplines, replenishment of the ranks with young scholars and job market trends, integration of Russia-based scholars in US-based academic communities, the role of academic research on Russia in policy debates and public understanding about Russia, and the meaning and consequences "de-colonization."

We encountered diverse views of stakeholders on nearly all of the issues addressed by the assessment, and, by their nature, the in-depth interviews and focus groups are not intended to be representative. Yet they offer insights into detailed logics and reasoning, as well as (in some cases) emotions, regarding the issues we cover. We cannot report on every point made by every informant on the topics of concern. We

focus on salient patterns observed in multiple interviews, though we do note some key exceptions and departures from broad tendencies. In some cases, we sought evidence from the survey of individual researchers as to how widespread some of the views we encountered in the qualitative phase are in the broader field.

Despite the relatively broad range of views we heard, one essential point of consensus stands out: *the field finds itself in an exceptionally fraught and challenging moment, mainly due to Russia's war on Ukraine*. As a historian who has worked in the field since the 1970s put it during a focus group:

“The problem is that everything since February 24 has totally changed the whole profession and people's attitudes towards Russia in very radical ways. I think it's the biggest change since the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. And having watched all these things, moving from the Cold War to détente, and then now to hot war—it's been extraordinary.”

This sentiment was shared, explicitly or implicitly, by all interviewees and focus group participants, who are unified in the view that Russia's full-fledged invasion of Ukraine has had a momentous, “game-changing” impact on the entire field. Although the manifold repercussions of the war in Russian studies will likely unfold for years to come and take at least as long to understand, it is nonetheless worth considering some emergent patterns in what, at this early stage, practitioners within the field see as the main ramifications for Russian studies. At the same time, the state of affairs immediately prior to the war merits examination, as a baseline for understanding the impact of the war.

Quality and quantity of research about Russia, integration with academic disciplines, diversity of perspectives in academic research

Most interviewees generally assessed trends in the quality of research on Russia, at least in the years preceding the war, in very positive terms. Senior scholars in history stated that many exceptionally high-quality books on Russian history had appeared in recent years, and some have won awards in general historical categories (that is, from the broader historical field, not in competitions exclusive to histories of Russia or Eurasia.) One noted a surge of important scholarship by younger scholars and Russia-based scholars:

“In general, I think, you know, the historical field has been very vibrant, because there's a lot of new people coming into the field. There are the major centers. There are retirements and hires. But they're pretty much all, I think, doing pretty well, and you see a lot of [members of the] new generation coming up. So, in general, in the journals, area studies journals, historians dominate or do very well. [Historians of Russia] compare well to other fields of history.”

Slavic languages and literatures practitioners described a welcome and fruitful expansion of their field in terms of both disciplinary orientation (incorporation of anthropology, history, and sociology) and topical themes (increased emphases on transnational comparisons, social media analysis, digital methods, sexuality, religion, and post-colonialism). Social scientists often cited the growing contributions of Russia-based scholars (especially in political science and anthropology) and of new cohorts of US-trained heritage speakers of Russian. They noted improvements in the extent to which studies of Russia had embraced advanced quantitative research designs such as causal identification and survey experiments, and had made increasing inroads into disciplinary journals, while at the same time increasing the quality of social science contributions to area studies journals. Several political scientists explicitly expressed appreciation for how Russia-focused research in the discipline had come to reflect the entire range of methodologies and theoretical concerns in the broader field. In sum, the quality and

diversity of Russia-focused research and the extent of its integration in history and political science was generally portrayed in quite positive terms.

Informants tended to be more circumspect about the quantity of research, with some noting a modest trend of decreasing numbers of papers or books about Russia, while others perceived no particular trend at all. Thus, the overall sense among interviews was that in the last five years the quantity of research about Russia in their disciplines was static or in moderate decline, but the quality of research output and the integration of research on Russia within the broader disciplines were both flourishing.

Some nuances and exceptions to this broad picture deserve mention. Practitioners of social science disciplines outside of political science still perceive, as they did in the 2015 assessment, that their disciplines are intrinsically hostile to “area studies” research in general (in the case of sociology, economics, and geography) or indifferent at best toward Russia as a case (anthropology). Thus, among social sciences, only in political science has there been perceived progress in integrating studies of Russia into the discipline, and that progress apparently pertains more to presence in mainstream journals than to hiring (see below). Within political science, some informants expressed concerns that, especially in the areas of foreign policy and strategic studies, US-based academic experts had failed to understand the Russian perspective, which ultimately made the outbreak of war more surprising than it should have been. Some historians, despite an overall positive assessment of the quality of recent historical studies of Russia, shared mild reservations about a perceived trend in the field favoring comparative, transnational, and contemporary historical studies, as well as a growth of historical interest in non-Russian former Soviet countries, which they fear might limit progress in studies of Russian history proper, especially prior to the 20th Century. Others voiced various criticisms of social science research on Russia as being too dominated by political science and valorizing complex quantitative methodology or abstract theoretical frameworks over deep insights about developments within Russia’s society, economy, and polity.

Several informants, in different disciplines, noted that both the growing hostilities between the United States and Russia since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military aggression in Donbas in 2014, as well as the COVID19 pandemic, had already started to pose major challenges to research on Russia prior to the current war. Most prominently, these developments limited opportunities to travel to Russia. But some informants observed that growing US-Russia tensions began to increase political polarization with respect to Russia in the academic community starting in 2014, perhaps especially among political scientists based in Washington DC:

“I think there was ideological-level political polarization already before the war. That is, it was creating some noise in the Russian studies field.... DC-based universities are very much disturbed by the noise of the policy aspect. If you are somewhere else, it's probably not as visible. I think it was [influential] on the production of research; I think you could feel the political aspect kind of dividing the field, and the field having more debates on the political aspect.”

Nearly everyone agreed, however, that Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine poses a wide array of very serious challenges to ongoing and future academic research about Russia. The nature and extent of the challenges vary by discipline. For social scientists, the first-order problem is the impossibility of collecting forms of data that had become very much the stock-in-trade for political scientists, anthropologists, and others. Although survey research had already become more difficult prior to the war due to growing limits on freedom of expression and persecution of dissent by the Russian government, the dramatic ramping up of domestic repression within Russia connected to the military

assault on Ukraine now makes it hard to trust survey data coming out of Russia at all, and virtually impossible for US-based researchers to commission surveys. Meanwhile, the war also makes field visits to conduct interviews with officials or other stakeholders impossible: “I am worried about continuing my style of research. I usually rely on interviews and contacts, and I fear I can no longer do that without potentially endangering people.”

Anthropologists, who already faced major obstacles to conducting fieldwork in Russia before the war, now have no opportunity to carry out ethnographic research. As one anthropologist put it, “fieldwork now must be entirely outsourced to natives.” Moreover, there are concerns that even Russia-based anthropologists will not be able to conduct fieldwork without running afoul of the authorities. Historians find it impossible to travel to Russia to conduct original archival research, and even (US-based) Russian citizens who in the past managed to negotiate access to archives now fear that doing so may get them into trouble with Russian security services. The impact of the war on access to data for Slavic literatures and languages scholars appears to be considerably less significant, given that literary texts and other cultural products (like films) are their main sources. But Slavists also lament the closing off of the possibility of traveling to Russia, and they fear that cultural analysis and understanding will suffer in the long run unless the possibility of visiting Russia is restored and that heightened censorship will undermine current cultural production within Russia.

Academic researchers have not simply resigned themselves to hand-wringing and despair about the prospects for continuing to do research on Russia in light of the war (though, to be clear, pessimism was the predominant mood in most of these conversations, and some do appear to find the situation hopeless, in terms of prospects for future research.) Many are actively considering research strategies to circumvent the challenges posed by the situation, such as using “bridge” organizations (firms with contacts within Russia whom they engage via contracts to conduct field research, archival research, surveys, and interviews on behalf of foreign clients), the exploration of archival resources outside Russia (such as KGB archives in places like Kyiv or Riga or holdings in places like Finland or Armenia) and newly digitized archives, digital ethnography (which became increasingly salient and popular as a research method for anthropologists and cultural analysts during the COVID19 pandemic), social media analyses using big data and machine learning techniques, and studies of Russian emigres.

Still, although such methods offer promise, informants note that they also are problematic. For example, the use of bridge services potentially exposes the Russian employees to major risks for cooperating with Americans. Archives outside of Russia can be of use, but can hardly substitute in the long term for archives within Russia:

“Without [Russian] archives, what do you do? I mean, not every history has to be totally archivally based, but it has been very archive-centered for thirty years... The danger is that, added to the previous trends [away from histories focused narrowly on Muscovite Russia and late 19th/early 20th century] and added to the lack of long-term perspectives, you're not going to have as strong a field in specifically Russian studies at a moment when Russia is a major world power.”

Social media analyses can capture certain trends rapidly, but also may become unrepresentative to the extent that the Russian government bans or restricts certain platforms. Digital ethnography is inadequate for addressing many issues of core interest. Altogether, while scholars are already devoting considerable energy and ingenuity to coming up with new research strategies to overcome the obstacles posed the war and the attendant domestic situation in Russia, it will take time for a new set of best practices to emerge. A number of informants, especially those at earlier career stages, called for efforts by ASEES and

donor organizations to support systematic, collective appraisals of new methodological approaches, in the form of conferences, workshops, working groups, and formal networks.

A substantial number of interviewees and focus group participants opined that the war had drastically accelerated a prior movement in the direction of decreasing diversity of perspectives in scholarship about Russia, mostly in the form of outright rejection of scholarship that might in any way be construed as pro-Russian, or perhaps even neutral toward Russia. For example, one political scientist cited a worrying trend of anonymous peer reviews for academic journals applying political litmus tests when assessing article submissions. An anthropologist reported encountering very hostile responses to their research at conferences on purely political grounds; audience members claimed that their findings based on fieldwork in a part of Ukraine occupied by Russia since 2014 were tainted by pro-Russian bias, when in fact they were just reporting what they observed and been told in the field:

“There is so much ideology put onto academic research these days that it is very hard to talk about issues in an open way— that is, without lots of [qualifying] remarks like ‘I know it is wrong, I do not know how this happened, but this is what I got [from my data collection.]’ So I am in a really challenging situation right now.”

A mid-career political scientist said their main concern for the future was the potential rise of a form of “McCarthyism” in academia, where only certain topics and arguments are deemed acceptable and any deviation from (“anti-Russian”) ideological orthodoxy is punished.

In a similar vein, a historian fears that the pariah status of Russia following the war will lead to bias in research unless the research community actively seeks to counter a tendency toward over-generalization about Russians’ intrinsic (“essential,” in the sense of representing the essence) characteristics:

“We are in a delicate, dangerous position now. The way people talk about Russians, essentialize them, is very concerning.... I am not saying we should apologize for what Putin has done, but the war is an earthquake, a game-changer. But because we are students of Russia, we know how diverse Russia is, we know the different pockets and regions and social classes and ethnic groups. That diversity has to be conveyed.”

Thus, academic practitioners in Russian studies are concerned that various forms of anti-Russian bias may be ascendant in response to Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine, and the imposition of political or ideological criteria in the assessment of arguments and empirical findings bodes poorly for sustaining high-quality research on Russia. At the same time, many feel that now it is more important than ever to resist sweeping, over-generalizing, “essentializing” portrayals of Russia’s population and society in general, and ethnic Russians in particular, to instead do justice to the diversity they perceive within these populations.

Another concern raised is that, since February 2022, the American media has given undue attention to non-specialists on Russia who, through their pronouncements, have therefore had an inordinate impact on American public opinion and policy discussions, crowding out those with deeper understanding and more nuanced views on Russia. For others, day-to-day developments in the war itself have become such a central focus of US-based social scientists who work on Russia that they have neglected to engage in much-needed broader strategic thinking about the US-Russia relationship:

“I don't see much discussion on: Where are we going to next? Like, what's the [US-Russia] relationship going to be like? That's another big void. Where's the creative thinking about what that architecture is going to be like? I have not seen really any of that. I mean, there are some

voices here and there, but no systematic understanding.... We, the United States, have very little direct impact on the course of battle. And in fact, we're deferring to the actors on the ground to make those decisions. We don't want to take the decision out of Ukraine's hands. But then, what's our role other than to provide military assistance, to react to whatever is going on and provide economic embargoes and sanctions? What's the big design like? Where's our leadership in this? And then, simply, where are the academics creating that intellectual edifice [for understanding future scenarios]? I don't see very much of that. And so that's another area that really both the academic, but also the think tank community, I think, is totally [missing]. You know, everybody's trying to discern what's going on the ground [in Ukraine], and, I mean, that's not our strength.”

Replenishment of the field with young scholars and state of the job market

With a few exceptions (such as the historian whose optimism about new people entering Russian history was cited above), informants from all academic fields expressed concerns about the rate of intake of new generations of scholars into their disciplines who study Russia, even before the war. They observed declining numbers of applications to PhD programs in the disciplines from students with Russian language background, though one political scientist said that their department had experienced a notable uptick in high-quality applications from Russians who had received quality undergraduate training in Russian institutes and who out-competed the small number of American applicants who indicated they hoped to study Russia for their PhD research. A historian commented that falling applications for ASEEES' Cohen-Tucker Dissertation Research and Dissertation Completion fellowships also pointed to a growing shortage of PhDs working on Russia. Several informants mentioned recent sharp declines in the numbers of applicants to MA programs in Russian studies. Others noted decreases in the quantity (and, for some, the quality too) of applications to post-doctoral fellowship programs to support research on Russia. The sense that fewer PhD students across the board are interested in Russia was fairly uniform. Practitioners of social science disciplines apart from Political Science despair of the possibility of anyone at all entering their PhD programs, and some informants in such fields said they are themselves planning to end their research on Russia entirely and take up other topics.

Although Russia's war on Ukraine is viewed by many as likely to further decrease interest among PhD students, the trend of declining interest pre-dated the war in the views of most informants. But the dim prospect of falling numbers can be brightened by a sense many expressed that the fall-off in the quantity of new entrants has not entailed a corresponding drop off in their quality: “It's quality, not quantity, right? So the number of students who want to study Russia, I think, is diminishing, but we still have good people.” However, one historian fears that the drop they sense in the numbers of young historians interested in conducting research on Russia, which they attribute to an active campaign within the field to dissuade would-be students from entering PhD programs in Russian history due to the long-standing decline in the number of tenure-track jobs available, will also lead to decreasing demographic and socioeconomic diversity in the community of historians of Russia.

Indeed, most informants said the job markets for Russia specialists were very challenging in all of the relevant disciplines in the years preceding the war. This, of course, was a much-cited factor in discouraging young people interested in Russia from entering PhD programs in the first place. As was the case in the early 2010s, the shrinking academic job market for Russian experts appears to be especially evident in political science. As one (tenured) focus group participant put it:

“There are no jobs for Russianists [in Political Science] and have not been for a very long time, and it is hard to compete with comparativists or with Latin Americanists; the issues are just

different. There is overlap in terms of [the research theme of] authoritarianism, but Russia is different. And so it was hard even before the pandemic and the war. It is very hard to make a career in Political Science as someone who studies Russia, or even [another country] plus Russia.”

But historians and Slavists also bemoaned a long-standing dearth of jobs for Russianists. Several from each broad discipline observed a trend in recent years of newly minted PhDs entering non-academic professions, such as therapy, consulting, or government service. One historian feels there is high demand for Russian expertise in government circles, which means that the field should reverse its long-standing tendency to discourage young people from pursuing PhDs in Russian history:

“People in the institutions in DC, the agencies, the government branches, and NGOs—they're looking for good experts. And so I think it's a message that needs some pushback, because at least in history the message for a good two decades has been to reduce the number of graduate students, to dissuade talented students from going into the field, where there are no academic jobs, because it's hopeless.”

Proponents of this view called for ASEES and other organizational players in the field to develop advising programs to help PhD students in fields like history and Slavic studies who work on Russia pursue non-academic career paths (something which, in fact, ASEES has been actively doing since 2016). Others said that the last two years had seen a notable uptick in tenure track job listings for Russian specialists, particularly in History, and to some degree Slavic. They attributed this to demographic processes within their disciplines and the restoration of some searches that had been put on hold during the COVID19 pandemic. But they were not sure whether the uptick represented a sustainable trend, as opposed to a short-term blip.

Several think tankers noted a lack of “new blood” in the Russia expert community in Washington DC policy circles. If, in the 2000s, concerns about Islamic extremism and the threat of terrorism drew young people aspiring to a career in foreign policy into Middle East studies at the expense of Russian studies, since the 2010s the focus has shifted to the threat of China; correspondingly, until the full-scale war the ranks of Russian experts in policy circles (government and think tanks) were being steadily depleted, and when the current older generation retires it will “wipe out 80% of the Russian experts in DC.” However, others said that the war had led some think tanks in DC to hire more Russia specialists (as discussed further below).

Finally, despite the generally pessimistic outlook on the replenishment of the ranks with young specialists on Russia, some informants expressed cautious optimism that Russia's war on Ukraine might reverse the pre-war trend of declining interest in Russia. One interviewee noted that enrollments in their course on contemporary Russia had surged since in Fall 2022, even as they commented that there has been a lack of younger specialists on the region in all disciplines for the last decade. However, such optimism that the war could spur renewed interest in Russia and the broader region often was tempered by a concern that it would mainly draw in “security and military types,” rather than people motivated by genuine interest in learning about Russia. One government official said, moreover, that the Russian military's poor performance in Ukraine convinced American military leaders that Russia poses far less of a security threat to the United States and its allies than China, so there is, if anything, diminished need for national expertise on Russia.

Integration of Russia-based scholars

The issue of promoting direct research collaborations between US- and Russia-based scholars is most salient for social scientists, because direct collaborations in the production of scholarship are less common in History and Literary studies. Yet, it is worth noting that several historians and Slavists said that the quality of the work of their Russian colleagues had been impressive in the period preceding the war, leading to heightened exchanges with Western colleagues:

“If we were to look at, you know, Russia itself, [we might] have a kind of inferiority complex vis-à-vis, say, other fields like European history. But if you're a German historian, you rest on the state of German history in Germany, and they have a huge establishment. The Russians have produced a ton in the last thirty years, and we can rely on a lot of new interactions – of course, before February 24th, that is. So, in general the quality [is impressive]. If you look at dissertations considered for prizes across disciplines, the Russians do extremely well. So, I mean, all those are good signs.”

A number of informants in the social sciences also said that their Russian colleagues, especially in political science and anthropology, had been doing very important and high-quality work in recent years. One attributed recent advances in the study of Russian culture and society largely to contributions by Russia-based researchers:

“I think some elements of Russian studies were improving. I think there has been great production in term of cultural anthropology and cultural studies of Russia. I think the Russian researchers are doing great work, they have really fabulous schools, and books that have been published on the grassroots, you know, the society-cultural level. I think in the West you have some big names or some [new] names, but it's not so developed. I think globally, especially in the US, the field is too much political science-centered and not enough [focused on] society and culture. And the political scientists tend to be largely too obsessed by theory and concept and not enough by what is happening on the ground. So there is a disconnect. But I think those doing cultural studies and anthropology, they are very much connected to the field [i.e. what is happening in Russia].”

Not surprisingly, most informants see Russia's war on Ukraine as likely to cause great harm to Russia-based scholarship and to severely constrain possibilities for collaborations between them and US-based researchers. One important reason why is that the Russian government has accelerated its crackdown on civil society in general and academic freedom specifically, as evinced by the (evidently) compulsory signing of a statement supporting the war by more than one hundred university rectors in Russia. With the ratcheting up of prohibitions and penalties for contact with foreign colleagues through revisions of laws on foreign agents and undesirable organizations, as well as specific laws restricting speech related to the war, the military, and government leaders, it will obviously be very hard for Russia-based scholars to conduct research on a wide range of politically sensitive topics or to engage in collaborations with Western scholars without running very real risks of arrest, prosecution, and other forms of repression such as dismissal.

For this reason, among others (such as fear of military mobilization), many Russia-based scholars have fled Russia. Their flight will further the precipitous decline of academic research and university education in Russia. (Of course, the war has also displaced Ukrainian scholars and many academics fled Belarus since its government's post-election crackdowns of 2020. But this study's focus is on the impact of the war on Russian academics and collaboration with Russian institutions.) A senior political scientist in the field put it succinctly: “The war is hurting Russian social science. That is a big problem. Russian work has become a big part of the field, and losing that is going to be a significant risk.”

Apart from Russian government restrictions and the flight of top scholars from Russian institutions, another factor that potentially affects prospects for the continued integration of Russian scholars into Western communities through collaboration and interaction is the stigmatization of Russians on the basis of their ethnicity or nationality. This concern arose in multiple forms in the interviews and focus groups. An anthropologist observed that Russians have been “dehumanized” in reaction to the war. One political scientist focused on scholars who remain in Russia:

“For me the biggest challenge is this ostracism of anybody who is still working at a Russian institution, and the idea that you cannot have an affiliation, or an association, or a collaboration with people who are left in Russia, that if you have not left Russia that means you support the regime. Most of my most successful and well-resourced collaborators in Russia have already left, but most of the people at [an earlier] career stage are still there and cannot leave. There are still opportunities to do research and to collaborate. But there is this aura that’s, like, the worst possible about collaboration, and it’s very destructive. I just want it to be flagged that we have to be better as an academic community, and that even if the rector of your university has come out in favor of the war, that doesn’t disqualify all the people who are working there from interaction with Western scholars and participation in projects.”

A number of scholars originally from Russia echoed concerns that Russian scholars would be stigmatized simply due to their citizenship or ethnicity. A literary scholar heard rumors that *Slavic Review* had adopted a policy of rejecting all submissions from Russia-based authors; although they later learned the rumor to be false, they and their associates did not consider such a scenario to be at all far-fetched, which is telling. While recognizing the tremendous suffering of Ukrainians at the hands of the Russian state and acknowledging that the needs of Ukrainian scholars should be the top priority, some note that many Russian scholars also find themselves in difficult situations due to the war:

“When the war started there was of course a real focus on helping Ukrainian scholars. But many Russian scholars also are affected, there should be some public statements of support for Russian scholars who have been forced to leave. The ASEEEES statement supporting Russian scholars was powerful. It was only ASEEEES who did that, and I really appreciated that.”

As this last statement demonstrates, public expressions of support and sympathy for Russian scholars in exile might be an important component in a broad strategy to maintain their professional integration. Specific concerns were voiced regarding the plight of Russian graduate students in US PhD programs: many have only temporary US visas, yet the prospect of returning to Russia is fraught with risk for them, especially if they are eligible for military mobilization. In part due to the positive trends in the quality of applicants to US PhD programs in recent years that many noted, there are many students and advisors facing predicaments similar to one described by a historian:

“We have been getting over the past 15 years more and more high-quality graduate applications from Russia, from Ukraine, from other former Soviet countries, and as a result we have a large number of graduate students from those countries in our programs. And now, you know, obviously the students from Russia and Ukraine, but also from other places, they are in a very strange situation. For example, I have a student who is from Russia who wants to begin her archival research. She could, in theory, go to Russia. It’s not entirely clear to me that our university will allow it because of State Department limitations, in terms of university use of fellowship money. It is not even clear to me how I should approach advising her, in terms of going back to Russia. And then, you know, very quickly they can become scholars at risk once their visa ends. So there’s a whole set of issues that I think really need answers.”

Some practitioners in the field are not very sympathetic toward Russian scholars, as this statement by a political scientist makes clear:

“It just makes me so angry, it's incredible how Russian scholars from Russia, with some help of Western scholars, keep pulling attention onto themselves, and when it comes to the sanctions. They're able to dominate the discourse throughout the war. During Bucha it was the sanctions, and now, with all the other atrocities, it is the visas; you know, always this self-focus on being the victim, kind of playing the victim here, and it sucks so much air out of out of discussion. There has to be ethical conduct on the part of Russian scholars on how yes, you have no problem, but you should keep refocusing on the real victims here, on the displaced people, and the soldiers who killed children and elderly people in Ukraine, on the people who are starving around the world [due to Russia's actions].”

The emotions behind these comments may well be more the rule than the exception in the broader community of scholars who conduct research on the larger Eurasian region but not (exclusively) Russia in particular. They are a stark reminder that, even as many within the Russian studies community sympathize with individual Russian scholars who have nothing to do with support for Putin or Russia's brutal assault on Ukraine, it is no easy task to advocate policies and platforms to assist Russian scholars, because widespread anger toward the Russian government inevitably extends, for many, into antipathy toward the Russian people. At a practical level, it will be particularly challenging for some time to bring together scholars from Russian and scholars from Ukraine in the same spaces, as noted by a historian who is a Russian citizen:

“A main concern is relations [of Russian scholars] with Ukrainian scholars. I have observed quite a lot of tension that has come up at conferences over the summer [of 2022], and I am kind of dreading that aspect of ASEES. As a community we need to think of ways to support Ukrainian scholars, but without ostracizing, as we have said, people who work for Russian institutions, people who are Russian. This would be my main concern, and it goes beyond the war, it will be a concern after the war ends, one way or another.”

Despite the prevalence of fears that various developments linked to the war would hinder future integration of Russia-based scholars, one political scientist, originally a native of Russia, tried to remain optimistic that at least some ties would continue on the basis of relations already established:

“Oh, I don't think it's going to be impossible, short of a complete official ban. I mean, there will probably be bans here and there. I think a lot of these ties will endure—if there is kind of trust that has been established between an America-based scholar and a Russia-based scholar, I think that trust will probably mean [the relationship will last], especially if, you know, there has been some kind of communication maintained throughout you this time. But it's definitely going to be on a much lesser scale.... But just like you said it's going to be challenging. The Russians have always been kind of on a lesser footing, even though in more recent years there has been a little bit more funding available to them too, for example, to come to work for prestigious universities, to come to American conferences and whatnot. I think right now that's going to be all unavailable, so, in many ways, those scholars will be either at the mercy of foreign collaborators or be, will be kind of monitored and watched, and, you know, fearful for their jobs or—know what I mean?”

In sum, although there appeared to be notable progress in the integration of Russian scholars into Western research communities through either interaction and sharing of work or direct collaboration

prior to the war, February 24, 2022, has radically changed that situation, by damaging Russia-based academic capacity, dispersing Russian researchers far and wide outside of Russia, and provoking global antipathy toward Russians, which inevitably seeps into academic communities. Even scholars now based in the United States who wish to preserve what can be salvaged of Russian research capacity face daunting challenges in their efforts to do so. Advocates for policies to help preserve of decades of progress in Russia humanities and social sciences cannot turn a blind eye to hostility toward Russians in academic circles outside – and even within – Russian studies. Rather, much work needs to be done to make both the ethical case and the practical case for supporting Russian scholars, even while recognizing as legitimate and understandable the strong emotions of those who resent the Russian population for its putative support of the Russian government’s appalling military campaign against Ukraine.

Influence of research on policy discussions and public understanding of Russia

We gained insights into the possible paths whereby academic research about Russia might influence policy circles by interviewing three current US government officials and six representatives of think tanks, consulting firms, and similar organizations in Washington, DC, three of whom have themselves previously worked for the US government. These informants almost uniformly insisted that it is fanciful and “ludicrous” to expect US government officials to read academic research papers or books. Some members of the intelligence community might well do so, but they are more the exception than the rule. One oft-cited reason why is that academic research is geared toward different goals than policymakers have: academics, it is said, value complexity and nuance, theory, and methodology, and “like to hear each other talk,” while policymakers often need to make fast and firm decisions on a short timeline, and they cannot afford the luxury of deliberation and subtlety. Academics are typically not trained to write in the concise, pointed, “bottom-line-up-front” manner that policymakers expect in policy briefs and presentations. Instead, they indulge in what policymakers perceive to be endless hedging, obsessive documentation of claims, and digressive theorizing that bears little relevance to current events and issues. As one government official put it: “There is only so much that can be squeezed out of debates over how to characterize the nature of the Putin regime and so on; we need to understand our vulnerability to different Russian attack scenarios.” The academic publishing process is slow; therefore, academics are typically several steps behind current events and cannot address evolving demands of volatile situations. Academics lack the ability to make assessments or propose courses of action based on intuition and deep background knowledge. They underestimate the expertise of policymakers on the region, erroneously assuming that just because somebody works in government or a think tank, they lack knowledge and expert credentials. They also have “no idea just how busy most government officials are, especially when dealing with a war.”

Another reason for the limited influence of academic research on policy is that policymakers’ sense that their own intelligence services and government analysts provide them with more reliable and relevant information about Russia than academics typically have access to, which produces skepticism that academics have anything valuable or original to bring to the table. Also, many policymakers often already know the actions they wish to take based on a wide range of goals they have (including, in some cases, partisan advantage), and they see academic research as useful solely if it provides “ammunition” to advance their arguments in internal debates between opposing camps in the policy world, not as a potential source of original insight and novel evidence. That is, they tend to simply “cherry pick” findings that serve their purposes of the moment.

For their part, many academics themselves view the prospect of addressing policymakers' concerns directly with suspicion. Some feel that doing so risks compromising their professionalism:

“But my personal view is that historians have kind of abdicated the public space for speaking about the relevance of history to what's going on today, because we're taught to avoid the sin of presentism.”

Others (notably, several different informants in Slavic studies) are generally distrustful of the US government and reject the notion that they should support the pursuit of the narrow national interests of the United States in the name of patriotism. Political scientists naturally stand out as especially keen for their work to have some practical value to policymakers, and some said that since the “perestroika” movement within political science in the early 2000s they sense growing interest in writing op-eds and policy memos, giving briefings to officials, and seeking to influence discussions by translating distilled versions for their research into formats that are readily digestible by both policymakers and the general public. However, while some political scientists said these efforts showed signs of bearing fruit, other informants portrayed them more dismissively, emphasizing that the academic reward system continues to incentivize scholarly writing that is divorced from policy debates and ignores the task of furthering knowledge outside of the narrow specialist communities that academic research tends to address.

In contrast, think tanks focus almost entirely on preparing policy papers and advocating for various approaches, and most employees of think tanks have academic training and/or background. However, by the accounts of think tank representatives themselves, most think tanks quickly become associated with a particular position or slant, because doing so is necessary for them to establish a “brand” and secure funding. Only a handful that are prominent enough to be household names or are designated as “federally-funded research and development centers” have the resources to balance different perspectives, and even in such institutions there tends to be more diversity of views regarding domestic issues than foreign policy. The rest are inevitably driven by competition and the constant pressure to raise funds to specialize and develop a consistent position on key questions like the war.

This, in turn, limits the appeal of think tank work for many academics, who tend to value academic freedom and autonomy and the pursuit of “pure” knowledge and thus brace at political constraints on what they can study and conclude in their research. Therefore, one political scientist whose work addresses very topical issues of concern to international security said they considered applying for think tank positions, but ultimately decided that the limitations on academic freedom intrinsic to the think tank world were too restrictive. Overall, as a think tanker noted, there is “surprisingly little overlap or exchange between academic and think tank research,” and policymakers are more apt to draw on the latter than the former. As one government official put it, policymakers have more “mutual overlap and simpatico” with think tankers (many of whom are former officials themselves), than with academics. Thus, even as think tanks have been, as some noted, “staffing up” with Russia experts since February 2022, they have (with a few exceptions) done so by recruiting from ex-government, consulting, and business analysis circles rather than from among academic Russia specialists.

There are some exceptions to the general rule that academic research never finds its way into policy discussions. One policymaker makes a point of reading academic articles about Russia, while observing that this a highly unusual practice, viewed even with some suspicion by colleagues. The US government has some internal think-tank like structures, such as the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which often host lectures by academics. Some of its staff members read academic papers, many do not. The policymakers and think tank representatives were well-informed about academic debates regarding Russia, such as the “de-colonization” discussion, and they often cited

specific scholars as having made arguments they found useful or, on the contrary, whom they considered compromised by either excessive love of Russia or by Russophobia. Thus, the professed disdain for academic research among officials and think tankers may be over-stated. Analysts in different government positions also solicit the opinions of academic experts at times through personal connections and various networks.

However, many of the policymakers and think tank representatives emphasized that *the main way for academics to influence policy is through education and training*, not research. Several noted that many government officials at all levels of the decision-making processes related to Russia took both undergraduate and graduate-level courses on Russia during their studies, and this is the principal avenue whereby the subtlety, nuance, and depth of academic knowledge can influence policy. This point was also, interestingly, made by an interviewee who teaches Russian literature at a liberal arts college: a number of their former students now work in US government positions related to Russia, and they hope that, as students, they gained something from the broad liberal training small colleges specialize in providing, as well as the linguistic and cultural expertise regarding Russia they acquired during their studies. It is an important point for research-focused academics to bear in mind, and it reminds us how essential it is to continue to offer advanced courses about Russia, including its history, culture, politics, economy, religion, and society, in addition to language. An expert on the topic made a similar point, citing a range of evidence that language instruction and education on the culture and society of Russia is conducted in a far more effective and cost-effective way by universities than by specialized programs often used by the US military and government agencies to train their personnel, an argument that should be made by universities leaders themselves.

Finally, an important and over-riding theme of the interviews with policymakers and think tank representatives was a widely shared sense of stark polarization of views regarding United States policy toward Russia between two discrete and opposed camps. In (overly) simple terms, on one side are what some call “understandists” because they argue that US policymakers should try to understand where Russia’s grievances are coming from and accept that Russia has some legitimate security concerns. Understandists favor relatively more conciliatory policies toward the Putin regime, such as pushing for negotiations to end the war and trying to preserve dialogue. The opposing side, perhaps best described as “confrontationist,” advocates complete rejection of Russian claims, strong and steadfast support for Ukraine, and a clear policy objective of defeating Russia militarily and punishing Russia for starting the war.

Confrontationists view understandists as harboring admiration for Russian culture and history that distorts their perceptions of Russian government policies, adhering to an extreme version of “realist” international relations theory that dismisses weaker and smaller countries’ interests as irrelevant, and catering to isolationist political forces in the United States. Understandists see confrontationists as blinkered by blind idealism like that which (they say) inspired previous failed “democracy promotion” efforts by the United States, lingering “Cold War hatred” of Russia, influential pro-Ukrainian lobbying groups (and their resources), and willful failure to comprehend the threat that confrontation with Russia could lead to dangerous, even nuclear escalation. To be clear: nobody (quite) characterizes the understandists of being “pro-Russian,” and both sides tend to see the other as genuinely motivated by a desire to advance US interests, albeit misguided or naive. They see their disagreements more as tactical than as strategic.

The parameters of the debate shifted due to the war: after Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, nobody could advocate openly for making concessions or seeking rapprochement with the Putin regime:

“We passed a point of no return. There has been too much killing and carnage by Russia. Ukrainians have taken the hit. Russia deserves to be punished.” Rather, the terrain shifted into disputes over whether pushing for a negotiated settlement was desirable or even possible: The understandists were initially put on the defensive, but then they began to rally in early summer 2022 and press their case more forcefully again. Both sides in this divide—and each had its representatives among our informants—tended to agree on several points: this polarization was long in the making, it pertains both to government officials and to think tanks, it had been accelerating since 2014, but it had become far more pronounced since February 2022. Perhaps ironically, both sides also characterized the “other side” as better resourced, more influential, and ascendant, portraying their own side as righteous but increasingly embattled.

From one perspective, this polarization is preferable to a situation where a single conventional wisdom predominates, and it should dispel the notion that “all of Washington” is consumed by “groupthink” consensus regarding policies toward the war and toward Russia. However, some participants in these debates said themselves in interviews that they are frustrated by the lack of new ideas or original perspectives: they perceive the situation as one of “stasis,” where the same arguments are repeated *ad nauseum* by the same people, though sometimes cast in different terms that reflect current tides in policy, the military battlefield, or public opinion. For example, seemingly benign phrases like “we need to understand the Russian perspective” are understood by all participants as code for “we need to negotiate with Putin and try to strike a new deal rather than rely solely on military confrontation.” In the context of intense polarization in the policymaking community, it is difficult to envision how academic experts can truly contribute new ideas, perspectives, and proposals to the debates; instead, to the extent that academics seek to bring research findings and novel approaches based on theory and data into the picture, it seems most likely they can only do so by harnessing their proposals to one of the two sides. As one government official put it: “Nobody in government cites academics with whom they disagree; it just never happens. They just ignore them or dismiss them as compromised or naïve.” But at the same time, they wholeheartedly and uncritically take as gospel statements by academics with which they do agree.

One political scientist who does a fair amount of policy-focused work first observed the polarization in DC circles, and then suggested that one possible new direction, though a hard one to push in the context of the war, is a return to people-to-people diplomacy:

“I think we still know much less about Russian people, especially people from the regions. Because we've been fixated so much and the government, and I think we—the United States—have a shortage of tools outside of democracy promotion, you know, off-the-shelf toolkits, or nation building that has never succeeded. I'm not an expert, but I just see that there is a lack of imagination.... So I think, much more needs to be done with epistemic communities, like you asked the question will there be collaboration. Well, I think we don't know because we haven't really done good analysis, because we haven't had enough empirical evidence, and, you know, we have some interesting case studies conducted on epistemic communities, nuclear epistemic communities, collaboration between the United States and Soviet Union, [between] scientists back during the Cold War. But we really don't have enough empirical data; we haven't put our thoughts together on how it may be used to germinate something bigger. So, all of the “second track” diplomacy, how we wanted people-to-people diplomacy, however you want to call it. We don't like non-sexy, non-military tools, and not even traditional diplomatic tools. I don't think we understand them well. We maybe understand them better generally or with regard to other contexts, but we haven't tried them enough with regard to Russia. And it's hard to promote

something like that, because we haven't really tried, because you know, especially right now in the current situation you can't really go back to the route of diplomacy.”

Perhaps this picture of the many obstacles facing academic experts on Russia who may aspire to bringing their research findings to the attention of policymakers, including possibly through think tanks is too pessimistic. After all, it is based on a relatively small number of interviews with DC-based government officials and think tankers. It is also portrayed here (as noted) in an overly schematic manner, for the sake of brevity. But academics who wish to contribute their expertise to policy discussions, and organizations that encourage them to do so in the name of bringing more diverse and informed perspectives to bear, should have a realistic sense of the serious challenges to being heard. The suggestion of a DC-based political scientist that it is best for academics who wish to influence views outside of the academy to “start small” by writing op-eds and policy memos and trying to cultivate relationships with prominent public intellectuals, pundits, and former officials who work in think tanks, appears sound. So does the advice that the most promising way for academics to transfer their expertise from the ivory tower to the political world is by providing high quality education about Russia to future policymakers and public opinion influencers in the classroom and through advising. One think tank representative spoke positively of several recent initiatives by some universities to establish internal think tank-like centers that bring together academics who do policy-relevant work, think tank experts, and current and former officials in an effort to establish common language and foster collaborations across the three camps.

Meaning and consequences of de-colonization

In all the interviews and focus groups, we asked informants what they think about calls to “de-colonize” Russian studies. Of course, proponents of de-colonization have a wide range of specific objectives in mind, including the following: (re-)interpreting Russian and Soviet history as the history of a colonizing, expansionist empire instead of a project of nationalist state-building, re-balancing research to focus less on ethnic Russians and Russia’s capital cities and more on non-Russian peoples within Russia (including their experiences as victims of colonial oppression by the ethnic Russian majority) and on areas of the country other than Moscow and St. Petersburg, devoting more effort to researching the history, culture, and contemporary societies of countries on Russia’s borders, treating those societies as interesting and important in their own right, not just analyzing them through the lens of what they mean to Russia and its geopolitical conflicts (that is, “de-centering” Russia in the broader field of Slavic or Eurasian studies), giving more voice to scholars and analysts from the ethnic minority and provincial communities within Russia and the countries on its borders that have been neglected, overlooked, even silenced by Western scholars who have excessively privileged the work and perspectives of Muscovite, ethnic Russian scholars, and foregrounding the violence and repression that both the Russian state and ethnic Russians as a people have inflicted historically and continue to inflict on minorities within Russia and on Russia’s neighbors in connection with Russia’s colonial project, while refraining from making positive value judgments about the “greatness” of Russian culture or the “mysteriousness” of the Russian soul. All of these disparate, if related, objectives have been joined under the broad umbrella of de-colonization, making it more of a buzzword that gestures to the need for some kind of major change in the field of Russian studies than an analytical concept or movement whose core meaning is widely agreed upon.

One striking finding from the interviews and focus groups regarding de-colonization is that nearly all the informants claim to support it. Although some do so with caveats and reservations, which we will

discuss, the vast majority expressed at least some support for de-colonization. Consider one typical statement from a political scientist:

“De-colonization is not at all controversial. Of course, we need to broaden the range of voices that can be heard. We need research that calls attention to subtle ways that the previously restricted voices contribute insights. Fields like history and literature have a longer tradition of moving in this direction. The question for [political science] is: how useful is the “colonialism” frame. Framing research questions in new ways is always good. But if it reaches the point that research areas are shut down, then it is bad. There are legitimate concerns that Carnegie and other donors have been too US-Russia focused. You cannot understand places like Kyrgyzstan without understanding Russia, but the opposite is also true. Expanding the scope of “Russian studies” to incorporate other countries has been a goal for a long time. Yet the reality is, [in political science] a paper on Russia can get you into a big journal, but papers on other countries usually don’t.”

Or another from a think tank representative: “I completely agree with the de-colonization perspective. Russia ends up being treated as somehow special because of its history, culture etc. That has led to a profound misunderstanding of Russia as a culture and society.” Or another from a different political scientist:

“Listen to people from [countries on Russia’s borders] whose ideas, very often, will sound so outlandish compared to the mainstream studies on Russia. They will sound outlandish, but these are the kinds of voices, we need to hear, and we need to get accustomed to. Their perspective on Russia will be so, so different from what we understand about Russia, about Navalny, about Kara-Murza even, of course, about this whole quite prevalent imperial structure. We need to be able to understand [their views]—not as marginal to us, but actually we need to make them mainstream, we need to listen to those voices. We have had enough of the Russia of the Moscow and St. Petersburg perspectives.”

Or a more personal and frank statement from a Russian political scientist who left Russia when Putin became president and later became an American citizen who characterized their views of de-colonization as follows:

“[The war] also led me to realize through my conversations with my mom—you know I never really mince my words—that Russians, ethnic Russians, are racist, in a sense that there is this kind of entitlement to be seen as, you know, better, smarter, superior, and really to look at others’ experiences through their own. And I think that not a lot of Russian scholars are going to start studying Ukraine or Central Asia. I mean, I don’t know, I cannot name any [Russian scholar] who studies Central Asia. No wonder they got Ukraine so wrong. And I think there is, maybe, to a lesser extent, a Russian lens continuously coloring how we look at those countries; we’re not looking at [them] in their own right.... So even today, when we talk about Ukraine, it is, you know, it is again about Russia.”

Another political scientist believes, like others, that the limitations on access to Russia in recent years has already been pushing graduate students initially planning to do research on Russia to expand their horizons to neighboring countries, in part thanks to the shift of Russian-language immersion programs to countries in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Baltics:

“I’m writing recommendations for language study programs and sending students [to study Russian] outside of Russia for several years now, with all those State Department travel restrictions. A lot of people go to study Russian outside of Russia, and I also see that this spurs their interest in things that are not necessarily central to Russia. So I’ve seen students who [shifted gears], like one student wanted to study corruption in the Soviet Union and he went to [a Central Asian country] and he decided to study corruption there. So I think that during this time the field will diversify scholarship, and that will help it move away from perpetrating those postcolonial sort of tracks and legacies, where everything is seen through the perspective of Moscow. And, you know, also I see a lot of discussion among my colleagues as to what to do with their graduate and undergraduate courses and their graduate students how to advise, and how to find ways for them to do research on Russia. At this time, a lot of things have been stopped because of the resources and access issues. I see a lot of people re-diverting their interests, and staying within the same sort of theoretical interest while they find other empirical cases so that their work is not necessarily centered in Russia proper. So I think because access to Russia is being restricted, it necessarily will impact the research you will get, and I think that from my perspective it’s actually better. So it’s the lack of access and travel restrictions, both politically- and pandemic-related. And now we really are pushing people to take on research in other neighboring countries. And to expand the horizon of studies on the region in political science—that’d be great.”

Slavists described removing some contemporary Russian authors who have expressed support for Putin and the Russian military campaign from syllabi and replacing them with Ukrainian or East European authors. A historian generally agreed that the Russian history field had had a tendency to conflate national and imperial components of tsarist-era Russian trajectories and to focus too much on Moscow, in part because the field was long dominated by Russian emigres and in part because Western scholars preferred to spend time in Moscow rather than provincial towns, so they spent more time in archives there. Other historians agreed that shifting focus away from viewing Russian history through a strictly national lens was a positive development in the field, though several said they thought this movement had already been gaining steam for some time.

Not everyone wholeheartedly endorsed de-colonizing Russian studies. Some think tank representatives expressed reservations about de-colonization perspectives, at times bluntly: “Russia can destroy us in a matter of hours, Kyrgyzstan cannot. Why should I care about Kyrgyzstan?” This sentiment—that Russia deserves to be the primary focus of US policy and of the expert community because it represents a major threat to the US, unlike other countries in the regions—was also voiced in softer form by others, including a government official who advocated for increasing the attention to other countries and peoples: “Russia can do a lot of damage to us. I would rather raise up awareness of the importance of neighboring countries than decrease focus on Russia.” In fact, as the above-cited comment about the risk of “closing off research fields” shows, support for de-colonization often was qualified by a concern that de-centering Russia and giving more attention to non-Russian peoples and countries should not come at the expense of scholarly research on Russia: rather than shift resources away from work on Russia, instead the goal should be to enhance resources for the study of other countries. As another political scientist put it:

“Comparative politics is driven by more politically neutral questions, so I don’t think the de-colonization discussion is relevant. It is hard to understand what should be done. There might be more focus on ethnic politics in Russia. A decentering of Russia will happen naturally, just because there will be less access to data and also Russia will be diminished. I have seen

maximalist takes on this, such as we should stop studying Russia or we should just focus on Ukraine, but I don't see how you can just stop studying Russia, which is a harsh autocracy and a major nuclear power. The real challenge is how to keep studying Russia while also expanding and broadening perspectives to other regions, attitudes, peoples, etc.”

Another think tanker feels the case for de-colonization is overblown because, in fact, US policy has long opposed Russia's claims of the right to influence its neighbors—not to mention seize their territory—and in fact thinks that anti-Russian voices from the Baltics and Ukraine have long held far more sway in Washington DC than their importance to US strategic interests merits.

Calls to expand the scope of the field also pose some practical concerns for Russian departments, especially in smaller liberal arts institutions. As an interviewee from one such institution explained, it is already challenging to fill Russian language courses and provide staffing to provide advanced Russian language instruction: “Liberal arts colleges tend to have *Russian* departments, and our ability to expand to cover other languages is rather limited.” Those who call on universities to offer instruction in more regional languages other than Russian neglect the fact that demand for such languages tends to be low and scattered across institutions, while universities are continually becoming all the more reluctant to pay faculty to offer courses with low enrollments due to budgetary pressures.

A number of academic informants, while supporting the various goals of de-colonization, said that their fields have already been de-colonizing for decades. One political scientist sees the calls for de-colonization as a politicized movement stemming from anti-Soviet ideology:

“I'm pretty critical [of de-colonization.] Because it is a super political trope from the Cold War, about how the Soviet Union was an empire and “we” [the US] liberated the repressed minorities from the Russians. So that kind of politics is influencing the academic discussion, though it is a discussion worth having. What I really think is legitimate is to say Ukrainian studies, Central Asian studies should reinvent themselves without reference to Russia, in their own right, without seeing the region from the Russian perspective. With that I agree, and it was there in Central Asia, before the war... So that I agree with, that the other regions want to move away from being referred only to Russia, and to exist freely. And that I think is legitimate. But with respect to knowledge of Russia, I think it is already largely de-colonized. I mean, we have a lot of studies of ethnic minorities [in Russia]. And in the 90s, it was a big topic. We already had a lot of discussion about: is Russia an empire, is it not an empire? So it's all there, right? So I don't think we have to change the views of Russia, we have to change the study of the other countries.”

A sociologist feels rather removed from and perplexed by the de-colonization discussion:

“As someone not in Russian studies or Slavic studies, it is hard to know what [de-colonization] is supposed to mean. People who study migration, for example, have always used non-national frames for understanding. So it is not clear what a de-colonization perspective would change. It is not a new idea in my research subfield.”

They also observed that in American sociology, which is highly US-centric, there is so little interest even in Russia that it is hard to make the case that sociologists should care about research on Central Asia. Several anthropologists also felt that much work on indigenous peoples in Russia within their discipline is ignored by some advocates of the de-colonization perspective, who thus exaggerate the supposed neglect by researchers of ethnic minorities in Russia, either purposely in order to advance their parochial interests or because they are too lazy to read the work that is out there.

Overall, nobody appeared willing to defend, aside from a few cavalier statements by think tankers, positions that those who call for de-colonizing Russian studies criticize. Nobody suggested that Russian history or culture is somehow special or “greater” than other cultures, or that historical, cultural, or social science research should only focus on Moscow and St. Petersburg or on ethnic Russians and their perspectives. Nobody, aside from a single think tanker, dismissed the importance of expanding research on non-Russian peoples within Russia or on neighboring countries. But as the quotations above illustrate, we do see some confusion and uncertainty about whether de-colonization is truly a new and pressing concern (as opposed to having been already addressed, at least in some disciplines and research areas), some hesitancy to embrace some of all of its criticisms, and concerns that it not be taken to the point where research on Russia suffers in order to bolster research on other countries. Demurrals were far more likely to take the form of questioning or perplexity than outright dissent from the de-colonization project.

In sum, on this topic as on the others covered, the interviews and focus groups suggest a field in turmoil, whose practitioners are struggling to make sense of the impact of the war, on top of the preceding period of growing US-tensions and the COVID19 pandemic, and who think about these issues in diverse ways. Pessimism about the state of affairs pervades, and there is sense of a field that has only begun to work through identifying the changes and challenges that have been foisted upon it by Russia’s assault on Ukraine. Everyone concurs that a return to business-as-usual is impossible, but there is less agreement about the most pressing issues and the viability of possible solutions. It would, however, be surprising, perhaps even concerning, if less than three to seven months into the full-scale war (when the interviews and focus groups were conducted) that anything like a uniform perspective on the challenges facing the field emerged. The degree to which practitioners are reflecting thoughtfully from different perspectives on the main priorities for their areas of Russian studies in light of the “earthquake” of the war, as articulated by interviewees and focus group participants, is encouraging.

IV. FINDINGS FROM THE INDIVIDUAL SURVEY

BACKGROUND

- The web-based “Survey Assessing Research on Russia in the United States in 2022” was initiated on December 6, 2022 and closed on January 13, 2023.
- Invitations to complete the online survey were sent by email, along with the necessary links, to 5,066 individuals who were currently members of ASEEEES or else had been at some time from 2016 to the present. The link to the survey was also distributed to the PONARS network via its listserv. Several follow-up reminders to complete the survey were emailed to the ASEEEES list. The survey was initially scheduled to close on December 19, but due to a relatively low number of responses, it was kept open until mid-January 2023. The first day elicited the most responses (209), and the last response was recorded on January 3.
- Many members of both ASEEEES and the (much smaller) PONARS network are not part of the target population because they are not based in the United States or they have not conducted research in Russia during 2017-2022. Conversely, there are probably eligible individuals who are not on the ASEEEES or PONARS membership lists and thus were not invited to complete the survey. It is impossible to measure the size of the target population, and reporting a response rate would be misleadingly precise because we have no way to ascertain how many of those directly invited are actually part of the study population. The invitation emails described the eligibility criteria, so those who read them carefully and did not meet the criteria would not have even attempted to complete the survey. Nonetheless, of the 528 individuals who initiated the survey, 90 did not meet the eligibility criteria, based on two initial filter questions, and were therefore immediately directed to the conclusion page. As a result, **438 respondents completed at least some of the substantive questions of the survey.**
- Although we demur from reporting a response rate, it is noteworthy that we received significantly fewer responses than we did for the previous survey, conducted in 2015. In that study, 776 individuals who met the eligibility criteria completed at least part of the questionnaire. Thus, our responses fell by about 44% from 2015 to 2022, a rather substantial decline. The same recruitment procedures were used both years, but the 2022 survey was kept open for about twice as long as the 2015 survey. The same applies to the institutional survey component of this study. Our intuition is that the substantial drop in responses reflects the combined effects of the COVID19 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—both of which have upended the professional and personal lives of scholars who study the region in myriad ways that could reduce both interest in taking a survey about the state of the field and time available to do so—as well as a general increase in “survey burnout” due to the ongoing proliferation of online surveys in the last seven years. Although we cannot test this intuition empirically without conducting a separate study of non-responses, we suspect the significant drop in survey responses we received in 2022 compared to 2015 itself testifies to turmoil in the field.
- Given the length of the survey, which we extended in order to incorporate batteries of questions addressing the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and calls to “de-colonize” Russian studies, it is not surprising that the survey completion rate (among those started the survey) was about 60%, with some questions, especially toward the end, eliciting about 300

responses rather than the maximum of 438. In comparison, about 660 of the 776 eligible respondents who started the 2015 survey provided mostly complete answers. So, the 2022 survey had higher rate of attrition within the survey, though the absolute number who left the survey before completing it was about the same as in 2015.

- The reduced sample size for the 2022 survey limits the extent to which the data can support reliable comparisons of sub-populations within the field. Nonetheless, we follow the precedent of the 2015 assessment by reporting differences in the distributions of responses across three major disciplinary groupings (Slavic studies, history, and social science), and in some case we report variations by decade of highest degree completion (that is, by academic cohort). We also, in most cases, reproduce here the equivalent distributions from the 2015 survey for questions that were included in both studies, in order to provide a sense of both changes and continuities across the two periods. The 2015 data thus serve to benchmark many of the 2022 findings, with the key exception of the results we present toward the end of this part that deal specifically with the impact of the war and “de-colonization.”

EDUCATION

The educational profile of our 2022 sample, in terms of highest degree completed, decade of completion, field of specialization, and time to degree, broadly resembles that of the 2015 sample (Table 1). This is worth noting, because the similarity in key characteristics of the two samples helps to rule out differences in sample composition as a source of variations observed across the two periods.

Roughly four fifths (81%) of the 2022 respondents have PhDs, 12% have Master’s degrees, and the remaining 7% have bachelors, professional, or other degrees (Table 1A). The preponderance of PhDs is to be expected, because our population of interest consists of those who have done research on Russia since 2017, and most research of this nature is conducted by holders of PhDs. The sample 342 PhDs affords is large enough to support separate analyses restricted to PhD holders, which in some cases are justified by the fact that PhDs are generally expected to do considerably more research in their jobs than those whose highest degree attained is an MA or other degree. Also, a majority (63%) of those with MA degrees are currently enrolled in PhD programs, and thus should not be combined with PhDs, most of whom have academic or other positions that require research. Distinctive patterns and tendencies may apply to researchers with credentials other than a PhD who are employed professionally, but there are too few of any one group of them to support more detailed analyses of them. Accordingly, throughout the report we limit some analyses to PhDs only, and in other cases we compare PhDs to non-PhDs.

In terms of decade of degree completion (Table 1B), about 20% of the 2022 sample is in each of the three oldest categories, while nearly one third (32%) received their degrees in the 2010s, and a mere 12% in the 2020s. The latter number is surprisingly high, given that only a few years of the 2020s have elapsed. The high percentage of 2010 graduates is consistent with a pattern observed in the 2015 study, which also had a disproportionately large number of 2010 graduates. The higher proportions of respondents in the youngest cohorts in both surveys could stem from sample selection: the survey perhaps holds greater interest for younger scholars than their older colleagues. But it could also reflect the academic age structure of the Russian studies field. Although somewhat more muted, a similar cohort distribution obtains among PhDs specifically in the 2022 sample.

Historians (40%), Slavists (22%), and Political Scientists (13%) constitute the three largest disciplines represented in the 2022 sample, which likely corresponds to their respective preponderance among members of ASEES, and which nearly mirrors their levels of representation in the 2015 sample (Table 1C). The distribution of social science fields confirms the widely recognized pattern whereby political scientists are more likely to work on Russia than anthropologists, economists, geographers, and sociologists. Henceforward we aggregate respondents from the five social science categories into a single “social science” group, which constitutes the same proportion of the overall sample as Slavists (22%). Only 19 respondents (5% of the sample) have highest degrees in Russian/East European studies; among them 10 have MAs and only 6 have PhDs. There are too few of them to support many systematic comparisons of respondents trained in REES with those with highest degrees in other fields. The “other” category is too heterogeneous and small in numbers to make meaningful comparisons with other groups: most of those who entered specific responses under the “other” category are in humanities such as comparative literature or art history, but there are a handful in science and social science-proximate fields. Therefore, most of our analyses of differences by field of training examine contrasts between historians, Slavists, and social scientists.

One issue of possible concern is whether the average time to degree for PhDs who work on Russia has increased in the last several decades due to declining course offerings and increasing demands for additional training in theory, methodology, and disciplinary knowledge. By comparing average years to degree within each of the three main fields across decades of degree completion we can detect long-term trends. In fact, consistent with the 2015 data, we do not observe any clear patterns (Table 1D). The 2015 data suggested a peak in time to PhD completion in Slavic studies during the 2000s. However, there are no signs of that in the 2022 sample, perhaps because Slavists who took an especially long time to complete their degrees in the 2000s have left the field in disproportionate numbers since 2015. In fact, across all three major disciplines and both surveys, the most notable increase in time to degree took place between the 1980s and 1990s, while subsequent decades have evinced stability or modest and temporary fluctuations.

In sum, there is no evidence in either the 2015 or 2022 surveys that recent decades have witnessed a lengthening of average time to degree for PhDs in different disciplines who conduct research on Russia. That may change as result of COVID19 and the impact of Russia’s February 2022 invasion, but for now time-to-degree should not rank among the primary issues of concern for the Russian studies community.

TABLE 1: Education

| | 2022 | | 2015 | |
|---|------|-----|------|-----|
| | % | N | % | N |
| A. Highest degree obtained to date | | | | |
| Doctorate (PhD, DPhil, Doktor Nauk, or eq) | 81% | 342 | 76% | 578 |
| Master's degree | 12% | 52 | 19% | 142 |
| Bachelor's degree | 2% | 10 | 2% | 17 |
| Kandidat nauk degree | 2% | 8 | | |
| Professional degree (e.g. law degree, policy) | 2% | 7 | 1% | 9 |
| Other (please specify) | 1% | 4 | 2% | 16 |
| | | 423 | | 762 |

| B. Decade received highest degree | overall % | PhDs % | overall % | PhDs % |
|--|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| 1980s or earlier | 18% | 11% | 24% | 14% |
| 1990s | 18% | 20% | 20% | 25% |
| 2000s | 20% | 23% | 26% | 27% |
| 2010s | 32% | 27% | 29% | 19% |
| 2020s | 12% | 9% | | |
| N in column | 418 | 339 | 758 | 575 |

| C. Field of study | overall % | N | large field | | large field | |
|---|-----------|-----|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----|
| | | | % | overall % | N | % |
| Anthropology | 4% | 17 | | 2% | 14 | |
| Economics | 1% | 5 | | 1% | 9 | |
| Geography | 1% | 6 | | 2% | 12 | |
| Political Science | 13% | 53 | | 14% | 106 | |
| Sociology | 3% | 13 | 22% | 2% | 15 | 21% |
| Russian/Eurasian/East European studies | 5% | 19 | 5% | 4% | 31 | 4% |
| History | 40% | 168 | 40% | 37% | 278 | 37% |
| Slavic/Russian language, literature, and/or culture | 22% | 92 | 22% | 26% | 196 | 26% |
| Journalism | 0% | 1 | | 0% | 2 | |
| Fine arts or performing arts | 2% | 8 | | 1% | 9 | |
| Other (please specify) | 9% | 38 | 11% | 10% | 75 | 12% |

D. Average years to degree, PhD recipients by field and decade of PhD

| | 2022 | | | 2015 | | |
|-------|--------|---------|----------------|--------|---------|----------------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | Slavic | History | Social Science |
| 1980s | 5.9 | 6.5 | 5.8 | 7.1 | 6.9 | 6.7 |
| 1990s | 7.1 | 7.3 | 6.4 | 7.1 | 7.5 | 7.2 |
| 2000s | 7.0 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 7.5 | 6.5 |
| 2010s | 7.0 | 6.7 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 7.2 |
| 2020s | 6.7 | 7.2 | 7.4 | | | |

Another concern related to trends in graduate training since the 1980s is that PhDs have been taking fewer courses in Russian language or on other aspects of Russia during their graduate training, which could point to diminishing levels of expertise among those who have entered the field. To test this possibility, we examine the average number of years of Russian language and the average number of courses about Russia that PhDs took during graduate study within the three main fields, comparing across graduation decades within fields and overall (Table 2). With respect to language, while there was

no apparent trend until recently, we do see sharp declines in Russian-language coursework for PhDs in history and the social sciences who graduated in the 2020s, relative to prior years. (Native speakers and heritage speakers of Russian are excluded from the data presented in Table 2A). For both disciplines, the steep drop in Russian-language course-taking during graduate school is statistically significant. Now, it could be that recent cohorts of PhDs in history and the social sciences began their graduate studies with more undergraduate-level Russian language preparation under their belts than prior cohorts. However, it is also possible that recent cohorts of PhDs in these fields simply do not have the same level of Russian language skills as their predecessors. This is a particular cause for concern for the future of Russian studies at a time when enrollments in Russian courses are falling, as the institutional survey results (reported in the next part of the report) suggest may be occurring.

We also observe statistically significant declines in the number of Russia-related (non-language) courses taken by PhD recipients in history since the 1980s and social science since the 1990s (Table 2B), which, in history, show signs of accelerating in the 2020s. These declines could reflect long-term trends of increasing emphasis within these disciplines on methodological, theoretical, and disciplinary training over area knowledge. Changes across the decades in both language and area-related coursework in Slavic studies are not statistically significant.

We do see potentially alarming recent declines in Russian-language coursework by PhDs in history and social science during their graduate studies, as well longer-term and slower declines in Russia-related substantive coursework in the same disciplines.

Table 2. Russian-related content of PhD recipients, by decade of degree and field

| | 2022 Survey | | | | 2015 Survey | | | |
|--|-------------|---------|----------------|---------|-------------|---------|----------------|---------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall |
| A. Number of years of Russian language taken during graduate school | | | | | | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 5.8 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 4.1 |
| 1990s | 6.2 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.6 |
| 2000s | 6.3 | 4.1 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.6 |
| 2010s | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 4.1 |
| 2020s | 6.0 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 3.1 | | | | |
| B. Number of courses with 25% or more Russia content taken during graduate school | | | | | | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 13.8 | 10.5 | 3.4 | 9.6 | 14.3 | 11.0 | 5.6 | 10.6 |
| 1990s | 17.1 | 10.1 | 4.3 | 10.2 | 15.3 | 9.9 | 7.4 | 10.5 |
| 2000s | 13.6 | 7.6 | 4.2 | 8.0 | 14.9 | 8.6 | 4.2 | 9.4 |
| 2010s | 15.6 | 7.2 | 3.1 | 8.0 | 15.8 | 8.4 | 3.9 | 8.3 |
| 2020s | 13.3 | 6.5 | 3.5 | 6.2 | | | | |

We conclude this section by noting that the 2022 data show no evidence that Russia-trained specialists have made recent inroads into the US-based Russian studies community: the percentage of respondents who received their highest degrees in Russian institutions remained stable across the two surveys at

about 2.5%, with the majority in both years having highest degrees in Slavic/Russian studies. This may well change as a result of the emigration of Russian academic specialists following the February 2022 invasion, some of whom may eventually land secure positions conducting research about Russia in the United States. But the late 2022 survey does not provide any indication of such an inflow, and Russian-trained scholars remain a very small minority in US-based Russian studies.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL TRENDS IN RUSSIA-RELATED RESEARCH SINCE PHD

Do scholars who begin their careers with a research focus on Russia tend to gravitate away from Russian studies? They could well do so, perhaps in response to disciplinary pressures to take up other research topics or because, even well before Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, geopolitical tensions were making it more difficult for US-based scholars to conduct research in Russia. As the qualitative component of this assessment demonstrated, Russia's pariah status due to its actions in Ukraine may well create a distaste for specializing on Russia. However, the opposite tendency might also be a factor: perhaps researchers who did not begin their careers with an intense focus on Russia have been drawn into the Russian studies field as, for example, Russia's prominence in international affairs has grown and Russia-based scholars have made inroads in some social science and humanities disciplines.

Declining interest in Russia within US universities and the main disciplines should be manifest in a tendency for Russia specialists to do progressively less work on Russia over time. To assess whether this has taken place, we asked respondents approximately what percentage of their research at three different points in their career has been Russia-related: research they did in preparation for their highest degree (in effect, their PhD dissertation, since here we limit the analysis to PhDs); research they carried out and completed since attaining their PhD; and research they are currently working on. By comparing how much of their research they have devoted to Russia at these three career stages (during PhD studies, immediately following PhD studies, and currently), we can determine what proportion of scholars in our sample do less work, the same amount of work, and more work on Russia over their career life cycle.

The degree to which PhDs focus their research on Russia declines across the three stages of the career life cycle that we measure, and at a more rapid rate when viewed cross-sectionally in 2022 than in 2015, and continually from the earliest to the latest career stage. To see this, consider first how, by their own accounts, the proportions of PhDs who conduct 80% or more of their research on Russia fell across the three stages of the professional life course for 2022 respondents (Table 3A): from 67% during the PhD dissertation phase to 53% in the immediate post-dissertation phase (as represented by projects began and completed after the dissertation), to 47% currently (projects now underway). Although that 47% means that nearly half the PhDs in the 2022 sample still focus heavily on Russia in their research, that number is down from 57% in 2015. (We do not show the full equivalent data from 2015 here, but we do compare several summary measures to those from the 2015 study, and they consistently point to more rapid rates of exit from research about Russia now than seven years ago.)

We gain further insight into the dynamic over time by cross classifying the measures of the degree of concentration at the different points in the career trajectory. First, consider the relationship between percent of research on Russia during the PhD phase and in the subsequent phase (work after PhD which has been completed prior to the survey). The diagonal cells in this table (3B) represent individuals who have not changed the proportion of their work devoted to Russia. The cells below the diagonal (shaded

in light gray) correspond to those who did *less* work on Russia after their PhD than they during in the dissertation stage, while the cells above (shaded in dark gray) correspond to researchers who did more work on Russia in the second stage than in the first. The numbers in each cell indicate the percentage of surveyed PhDs who fall in the cell. Adding up the numbers in each of the three sections yields estimates of the percentages of PhDs in the sample who, respectively, did more, the same amount of, and less research on Russia in the second phase of their career, compared to the first. About two thirds of the PhDs in our sample (65.2%) did about the same relative amount of research on Russia in the phase immediately after their dissertation as they did while preparing their dissertation. However, nearly one quarter of PhDs in sample (24.8%) did less research on Russia in the phase following their PhD, while 12.5% did more research in the second than in the first phase. Moreover, the rate of reducing the percentage of research devoted to Russia in the post-dissertation period had accelerated by 2022 relative to 2015 (from 19.4% to 24.8%). Furthermore, the tendency toward less research focus on Russia becomes more pronounced as careers progress, pertaining to 31.4% when comparing current research projects to the dissertation phase (Table 3C), which is up from 29.6% in the 2015 data. *Not only do research tend more to do less, rather than more, research on Russia over the course of their careers, but they do so at accelerating rates over the years.*

We should not overlook the countervailing tendency: indeed, a steady percentage around 10% of researchers increase their Russia focus after the dissertation, and this remained quite stable from 2015 to 2022. Yet, the prevailing trend of scholars devoting less of their research to Russia over time is considerably more pronounced in magnitude. Moreover, these data by design (due to the eligibility requirement for the survey that respondents have done at least some research on Russian in the five years preceding the survey) exclude scholars who conducted research on Russia during their dissertation phase and/or afterwards but then completely abandoned Russia as a topic more than five years ago. Thus, the data are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate the degree to which Russia-focused researchers tend to do less and less work on Russia over their careers.

Finally, “creeping exit” away from research on Russia varies across discipline and by decade of PhD completion. This becomes evident when we subtract the integer-coded category values assigned to the “quintile” categories measuring the extent of Russia focus for an earlier phase from that for a later phase: a more positive value denotes a greater increase in the relative amount of research devoted to Russia (because it implies a higher quintile in the later than the earlier period), while a more negative value indicates a greater decrease (Table 3D). Restricting the analysis to those who did at least at 40% of their research on Russia at the dissertation phase (to avoid “floor” effects), we observe that the tendency to move away from Russia related research has been generally strongest among social scientists, and grew especially rapidly (until the last several years, for which the estimates should be viewed with caution because they are based on very small sample sizes, especially with the restriction to PhDs who devoted at least 40% of their PhD research to Russia.)

Table 3. Trajectories of Russia content in research, PhDs

A. Percentage Russia content of research reported during the three periods:

| | < 20% | 20-39% | 40-59% | 60-79% | 80%+ |
|--|-------|--------|--------|--------|------|
| <i>Percentage of Russia content in research...</i> | | | | | |
| ... conducted while preparing for PhD | 9% | 3% | 11% | 11% | 67% |
| ... started and completed after PhD | 7% | 8% | 13% | 19% | 53% |
| ... currently underway | 11% | 11% | 15% | 15% | 47% |

B. Within-person change in level of Russia content in research, PhD holders

| | | <i>Started and completed after PhD</i> | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|--|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| <i>While preparing PhD:</i> | | < 20% | 20-39% | 40-59% | 60-79% | 80%+ |
| < 20 percent | | 3.3% | 2.6% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.4% |
| 20-39 percent | | 0.7% | 1.1% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% |
| 40-59 percent | | 0.4% | 1.5% | 5.9% | 1.9% | 0.7% |
| 60-79 percent | | 0.7% | 1.9% | 1.9% | 4.8% | 2.2% |
| 80 or more | | 1.1% | 1.1% | 4.1% | 11.5% | 50.0% |

| | 2022 | 2015 |
|---|-------|-------|
| Doing less work on Russia than during PhD research: | 24.8% | 19.4% |
| The same amount as during PhD: | 65.2% | 69.4% |
| More than during PhD: | 10.0% | 11.2% |

C. Within-person change in level of Russia content in research, PhD holders

| | | <i>Current research:</i> | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| <i>While preparing PhD:</i> | | < 20% | 20-39% | 40-59% | 60-79% | 80%+ |
| < 20 percent | | 3.0% | 2.7% | 1.9% | 0.4% | 0.8% |
| 20-39 percent | | 0.4% | 0.8% | 1.5% | 0.4% | 0.0% |
| 40-59 percent | | 1.1% | 2.7% | 4.2% | 1.9% | 1.5% |
| 60-79 percent | | 1.5% | 2.7% | 1.5% | 4.6% | 1.5% |
| 80 or more | | 4.6% | 2.3% | 6.5% | 8.0% | 43.7% |

| | 2022 | 2015 |
|---|-------|-------|
| Doing less work on Russia than during PhD research: | 31.2% | 29.6% |
| The same amount as during PhD: | 56.3% | 58.9% |
| More than during PhD: | 12.5% | 11.5% |

D. Average change in quintile of Russia content in research, current vs. PhD research, by decade of degree and main discipline, PhD holders whose theses had at least 40% Russia

| | 2022 Survey | | | 2015 Survey | | |
|------------------|-------------|---------|----------------|-------------|---------|----------------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | Slavic | History | Social Science |
| 1980s or earlier | -0.14 | -0.52 | -0.50 | -0.36 | -0.35 | -0.41 |
| 1990s | -0.36 | -0.66 | -0.82 | -0.50 | -0.52 | -0.53 |
| 2000s | -0.55 | -0.46 | -0.86 | -0.05 | -0.58 | -1.06 |
| 2010s | -0.38 | -0.50 | -1.71 | -0.56 | -0.45 | -0.77 |
| 2020s | -2.00 | -1.00 | -0.25 | | | |

*In sum, the degree to which researchers focus on Russia tends to wane over the course of careers, and modest increases in Russia-focus among some 10% of researchers is more than offset by declines in Russia-focus among roughly 30%. The latter number has grown since 2015, while the former has remained stable. The tendency to drift away from doing work on Russia that the survey has detected may reflect a normal and healthy diversification of research interests on the part of scholars in the direction of more comparative work and/or focus on other countries in the broader Eurasian region, two developments likely to enhance the integration of Russia (as a case for research) into broader discussions within the disciplines. It is also possible that Russia’s raging war on Ukraine and its aftermath will spark new interest in Russia and reverse the trend. However, at a moment when other factors discussed in this report, such as the closing off of access to data from Russia, the crisis within Russian universities and research institutes, a general antipathy toward Russia as a result of its actions in Ukraine, the push to “de-colonize” Russian studies, dwindling enrollments in Russian-language courses, and reduced in-flows of young scholars who work on Russia into the disciplines, the fact already we see a decline in Russia-focus among researchers who have already been working on Russia likely *portends a further decrease in the volume of research that will be produced about Russia by US-based scholars in years to come.**

EMPLOYMENT AND CURRENT TRAINING OF GRADUATE STUDENTS IN RUSSIA-RELATED RESEARCH

Our data probably offer a rosier view than the actual state of affairs in employment outcomes for recipients of graduate degrees for research on Russia, because people who left research entirely or abandoned studies of Russia more than five years ago are unlikely to be included in the sample (because they are probably not members of ASEES or PONARS) and possibly ineligible (if they have not done research on Russian in over five years). Nonetheless, the data provide some insight into typical employment situations of those who are actively engaged in research on Russia, and they afford the chance to assess how the situation evolved from 2015 to 2022. In fact, the picture is one of considerable stability, but with a few causes for concern.

A majority of respondents work at research universities (54%), with four-colleges the second most common institution type (23%) [Table 4A]. Thus, three quarters of the 2022 sample work in the two major types of academic institutions. But in the 2015 sample, 61% worked in research universities, so the data indicate that the proportion of the field employed in major research hubs is on the decline. We see the largest uptick from 2015 to 2022 in the percentage of those not currently employed, which more than doubled from 5% to 11%. We should be cautious in interpreting these trends because employment circumstances may affect selection into the sample, and relatively modest differences in sample composition on other variables (such as highest degree) could explain at least some of the fall in employment in research universities and the rise of the proportion of non-employed researchers.

Table 4. Current Employment

| A. Type of Employer | 2022 Survey | | | | 2015 Survey | | | |
|---|-------------|--------|---------|----------------|-------------|--------|---------|----------------|
| | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science |
| Research university | 54% | 57% | 50% | 67% | 61% | 56% | 54% | 67% |
| Four year college | 23% | 28% | 23% | 19% | 24% | 36% | 31% | 23% |
| Two year college | 1% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 0% |
| Government | 2% | 0% | 2% | 4% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 2% |
| Private consulting firm | 1% | 3% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% |
| NGO/non-profit organization | 2% | 0% | 3% | 1% | | | | |
| Research institute | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 2% | 0% | 0% |
| Think tank | 2% | 0% | 0% | 4% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 3% |
| Retired/independent scholar/not currently working | 11% | 7% | 16% | 4% | 5% | 3% | 6% | 3% |
| Other | 5% | 4% | 5% | 1% | 5% | 3% | 6% | 3% |
| N in column | 333 | | | | 659 | | | |

B. Type of position

| | 2022 survey | | | 2015 survey | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------|------|---------|-------------|------|---------|
| | Overall | PhDs | nonPhDs | Overall | PhDs | nonPhDs |
| Tenure or tenure-track faculty | 64% | 77% | 7% | 61% | 76% | 6% |
| Adjunct faculty | 5% | 5% | 5% | 7% | 8% | 4% |
| Academic staff position | 4% | 3% | 8% | 4% | 4% | 3% |
| Post-doctoral researcher | 4% | 5% | 0% | 3% | 3% | 0% |
| PhD student | 11% | 0% | 58% | 16% | 1% | 71% |
| MA student | 1% | 0% | 2% | 2% | 0% | 8% |
| Independent scholar | 5% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 4% |
| Consultant | 3% | 2% | 7% | | | |
| Other research position | 5% | 4% | 8% | 3% | 3% | 4% |
| N in column | 307 | | | 612 | | |

Among the three disciplines, employment in research universities fell the most (54% to 50%) and non-employment rose the most (6% to 16%) among historians, with only minor changes for Slavists and social scientists. The variation and trends by discipline are quite similar if we limit attention to PhDs: from 2015 to 2022 research-university employment was quite steady for social science PhDs (at 66%-67%), while it fell from 54% to 47% among history PhDs and 56% to 50% for Slavists. Non-employment among history PhDs rose from 6% to 16%. *Thus, the 2022 data show that a pattern observed in the 2015 report of declining job opportunities at major research universities for historians and Slavists who study Russia has continued, while social scientists who work on Russia have held their ground and remain better entrenched there.* We do not see any significant trends of employment in other types of institutions, and employment in NGOs and non-profit organizations (a category added to the 2022 questionnaire) is sparse. Thus, the decline in research university jobs for historians and, to

some extent, Slavists, has not been accompanied by expanding opportunities in other arenas; instead, it shows up as a corresponding increase in non-employment.

On the brighter side, a solid majority of our respondents (64%) have tenured or tenure-track positions (Table 4B), and this number is up from 61% in 2015. We do not see a proliferation of adjunct and academic staff positions; rather, they fell from 7% to 5% of positions reported by respondents. When we restrict the analysis to PhDs, more than three quarters have tenure-line jobs, and there is virtually no change from 2015 to 2022. This may reflect our sampling design (if, say, adjunct faculty and academic staff are less likely to join ASEES even if they are doing research on Russia). *But the stability of tenure track employment for US-based PhDs who work on Russia is nonetheless a rare piece of good news.* There is no significant variation in this regard across the three main fields. Among respondents without PhDs, we observe notable declines in the percentages who are current PhD and MA students, with a corresponding rise in the percentages in “other” research jobs from 4% to 15% (including 7% who work as consultants, a category added in 2022.” We should not assign too much weight to this indicator alone, because of the potential role that sampling and the addition of a category play. But, taken together with findings reported elsewhere (see below, and the other sections) it provides further evidence that the inflow of graduate students with expertise on Russia continued to shrink.

Comparisons of tenure-track employment rates across graduation cohorts and within graduation cohorts over time reveal a mixed picture (Table 4C). On the one hand, within each cohort tenure-track employment grew from 2015 to 2022 in all three disciplines, and it did so most impressively for those who received their PhDs in the 2010s. Although this trend most likely reflects, to a considerable extent, attrition from the field (and thus from the survey samples) of non-tenured researchers over time, it also suggests that many scholars in all three disciplines who do not initially receive tenure-track positions eventually attain them. On the other hand, in 2022 tenure track employment rates are especially low for the most recent cohort of graduates. It is premature to assign too much importance to this finding, because the COVID19 pandemic led to hiring freezes in many universities in 2020 and 2021. But it could be the harbinger of longer-term lower access to tenure-track employment in US-based universities for new PhDs who conduct research on Russia. Finally, although differences across disciplines in tenure-track employment for PhDs are minimal for older graduation cohorts, they are more substantial for graduates since 2010, whose social science PhDs have the highest and Slavic studies PhDs the lowest rates of tenure-track employment.

Table 5. Graduate Student Training by Current Tenured/Tenure Track Faculty with PhDs

A. PHD students advised whose dissertations have at least 25% Russia content, by discipline

| | Completed PhD theses last 15 years, primary adviser | Completed PhD theses last 15 years, secondary adviser | Completed MA theses last 15 years, primary adviser | Current PhD theses, primary adviser | Current PhD theses, secondary adviser |
|--------------------|--|--|---|--|--|
| <i>2022 survey</i> | | | | | |
| Slavic/Russian | 1.42 | 1.60 | 0.78 | 0.60 | 0.30 |
| History | 1.42 | 1.23 | 1.42 | 0.60 | 0.25 |
| Social Science | 1.04 | 1.17 | 1.80 | 0.49 | 0.23 |
| REES/other | 0.36 | 1.46 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| <i>Overall</i> | <i>1.23</i> | <i>1.31</i> | <i>1.31</i> | <i>0.53</i> | <i>0.28</i> |
| <i>2015 survey</i> | | | | | |
| Slavic/Russian | 2.91 | 2.74 | 3.25 | 1.63 | 1.55 |
| History | 2.72 | 3.76 | 3.07 | 1.70 | 1.70 |
| Social Science | 1.89 | 2.63 | 3.53 | 1.13 | 0.68 |
| REES/other | 3.78 | 5.00 | 1.91 | 1.36 | 1.60 |
| <i>Overall</i> | <i>2.57</i> | <i>3.24</i> | <i>3.17</i> | <i>1.48</i> | <i>1.38</i> |

B. Number of graduate level courses with at least 25% Russia content taught in last 5 academic years, by discipline

| | <i>2022 survey</i> | <i>2015 survey</i> |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Slavic/Russian | 1.03 | 4.31 |
| History | 1.33 | 3.55 |
| Social Science | 1.34 | 1.74 |
| Other field | 1.21 | 5.00 |
| <i>Overall</i> | <i>1.26</i> | <i>3.33</i> |

The reports from 2015 and 2022 of respondents with PhDs in tenure-line positions regarding graduate training and teaching activities that further Russia expertise portray grim trends in these areas. Throughout the surveys, we set the minimum bar for “Russia-related” research at “25% Russia content.” By this standard, from 2017-2022 tenure-line faculty supervised, on average, 1.2 Russia-related dissertations as primary advisor, 1.3 as secondary advisor, as well as 1.3 Russia-related master’s theses (Table 5A). They currently serve on an average of 0.5 Russia-related PhD committees as primary and another 0.3 as secondary advisor. *By all five of these measures graduate training in Russia expertise fell precipitously from 2015 to 2022, for all three discipline groups and overall.* In most cases, the declines exceeded 50%. If current tenure-line faculty who conduct research on Russia have typically supervised only one Russia-related PhD completed in the previous fifteen years (even by the relative low standard of 25% Russia-related content), and barely half of them currently supervise even one such PhD student

currently, it bodes poorly for the replenishing the ranks of Russia experts in the United States. Although we may have expected some decline in these measures since 2015, given the worsening of US-Russia relations even before the current war and the longer-term trends noted in the previous report, the pitched rate in which graduate training and degree of consistency across different fields in the field has fallen is alarming.

Similarly, far fewer graduate courses with at least 25% Russia-related content have been taught in 2017-2022 by US-based tenure-line faculty with PhDs than were taught in 2010-2015. On average, faculty in all three major disciplines have only offered 1.0-1.3 such courses in the last five years. The declines in graduate-level course offerings have been especially pitched in Slavic studies and history, such that in the last five years those fields no longer differ from the social sciences in terms of offering graduate-level courses about Russia.

Altogether, the 2015 and 2022 surveys point to relative stability in the employment situations for PhDs with Russia expertise in the United States, with some negative trends evident for historians and, to a lesser extent, Slavists, coupled with an across the board and dramatic fall in the number of graduate students being trained and the number of graduate-level courses being offered.

RECENT RESEARCH OUTPUTS AND FUNDING

The 2015 data offer a useful benchmark for assessing the research productivity and grant-making of US-based Russian studies practitioners from 2017-2022. Our respondents were asked how many of each of eleven types of works with at least 25% Russia-focused content they published during the previous 5 years. For the purpose of comparison, here (and elsewhere) we report averages (e.g. publications per respondent) rather than actual counts of outputs, because the latter reflect sample size and thus cannot be used to make comparisons across the two periods. We truncated a small number of implausibly high responses at reasonable maximum values. Also, we limit our sample here to *active publishers*, respondents who reported having produced *at least one* publication (in any of the 11 categories), in order to further standardize the comparison across periods by omitting respondents for whom publications are not normally expected (such as current MA students) from the denominator. In fact, the percentage of such “active publishers” fell slightly across surveys—from 78% in 2015 to 76% in 2022. But this could reflect modest differences in sample composition, rather than a trend toward less productivity.

During the more recent period, scholars in the various disciplines continued to produce work on Russia in a wide range of formats and outlets (Table 6A). Average publications per scholar fell in 2017-2022 compared to 2010-2015 in all but two of the categories. The rate at which respondents published articles in peer-reviewed disciplinary journals—along with monographs, the most important category for tenure, hiring, and promotion in most disciplines—held steady: a decline in that rate for Slavists was offset by an increase on the part of historians, while social scientists maintained about the same rate as in the prior period. Respondents published more reviews and review essays on average than previously. However, publication rates declined in all the other nine categories, substantially in policy memos/op-eds/reports, more modestly in other categories. The COVID19 pandemic, with its attendant disruptions of professional life for scholars in general, is a potential culprit for falling rates of publication, though they could also be another sign of declining focus on Russia. The shift away from memos and op-eds in a

period that includes almost one year of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine while peer-reviewed articles remained steady suggests scholars may be focusing their efforts on forms of publication that yield professional rewards while reducing efforts to contribute to public and policy discussions.

Table 6. Research Output

A. Average publications in the two time periods, at least 25% Russia content (active publishers)

| | 2017-2022 | | | | |
|---|----------------|--------|---------|-------------------|-------|
| | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Social Science | Max # |
| Research monographs | 0.67 | 0.65 | 0.80 | 0.62 | 5 |
| Edited volumes | 0.87 | 0.70 | 1.09 | 0.81 | 10 |
| Popular or general audience books | 0.14 | 0.26 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 5 |
| Articles in (your) main disciplinary journals | 2.59 | 2.41 | 2.67 | 2.66 | 15 |
| Articles in area studies journals | 1.86 | 1.30 | 2.18 | 2.11 | 15 |
| Articles in other disciplinary journals | 0.61 | 0.65 | 0.65 | 0.75 | 9 |
| Book chapters | 2.30 | 2.23 | 2.59 | 2.16 | 20 |
| Policy memos/op-eds/reports | 1.98 | 2.78 | 0.80 | 2.89 | 100 |
| Other article-length publications | 1.81 | 1.49 | 1.79 | 1.80 | 20 |
| Reviews/review essays | 5.82 | 5.54 | 8.44 | 2.06 | 50 |
| Blog posts | 3.28 | 2.15 | 1.02 | 3.08 | 200 |
| | 2010-2015 | | | | |
| | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Social Science | Max # |
| Research monographs | 0.94 | 1.03 | 0.87 | 1.02 | 5 |
| Edited volumes | 1.01 | 1.13 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 10 |
| Popular or general audience books | 0.28 | 0.54 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 5 |
| Articles in (your) main disciplinary journals | 2.59 | 3.24 | 2.40 | 2.58 | 15 |
| Articles in area studies journals | 2.10 | 2.34 | 1.81 | 2.56 | 15 |
| Articles in other disciplinary journals | 0.96 | 1.31 | 0.70 | 1.04 | 10 |
| Book chapters | 2.53 | 2.56 | 2.33 | 3.08 | 20 |
| Policy memos/op-eds/reports | 3.67 | 1.29 | 2.83 | 5.21 | 100 |
| Other article-length publications | 2.42 | 2.57 | 1.86 | 3.11 | 20 |
| Reviews/review essays | 5.28 | 4.94 | 6.51 | 3.38 | 50 |
| Blog posts | 5.59 | 5.42 | 4.29 | 6.36 | 150 |

Note: a small number of implausibly high responses truncated at "Max #" values for some measures, both years.

Table 6. Research Output (cont.)**B. Presentations in the two time periods, at least 25% Russia content (active presenters)**

2017-2022

| | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Social Science |
|--|----------------|--------|---------|-------------------|
| ASEEES | 2.93 | 3.16 | 3.28 | 2.62 |
| Main disciplinary association meetings | 1.55 | 2.46 | 1.04 | 1.76 |
| Other association meetings | 1.78 | 1.45 | 1.61 | 2.17 |
| Special conferences on specific topics | 2.85 | 2.28 | 3.32 | 2.69 |
| Invited academic talks | 3.81 | 2.88 | 4.31 | 3.93 |
| Invited public talks | 3.00 | 2.28 | 3.62 | 3.01 |
| Briefings of officials | 1.16 | 0.24 | 1.73 | 1.37 |
| Media appearances | 4.94 | 2.07 | 3.50 | 8.56 |

2010-2015

| | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Social Science |
|--|----------------|--------|---------|-------------------|
| ASEEES | 2.74 | 3.30 | 2.90 | 2.20 |
| Main disciplinary association meetings | 2.17 | 3.05 | 1.35 | 2.55 |
| Other association meetings | 2.05 | 2.25 | 2.01 | 2.09 |
| Special conferences on specific topics | 3.71 | 3.85 | 3.44 | 4.34 |
| Invited academic talks | 4.21 | 4.37 | 3.90 | 4.96 |
| Invited public talks | 3.60 | 3.14 | 3.37 | 4.85 |
| Briefings of officials | 2.31 | 0.34 | 2.15 | 3.70 |
| Media appearances | 4.59 | 2.71 | 3.30 | 7.59 |

C. How often have you disseminated or publicized your research on Russia via social media? (active researchers)

2017-2022

| | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Social Science |
|--------------|----------------|--------|---------|-------------------|
| Never | 33% | 36% | 37% | 22% |
| Rarely | 26% | 26% | 22% | 31% |
| Occasionally | 13% | 12% | 13% | 17% |
| Sometimes | 15% | 12% | 16% | 15% |
| Regularly | 13% | 14% | 12% | 15% |

2010-2015

| | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Social Science |
|--------------|----------------|--------|---------|-------------------|
| Never | 47% | 54% | 45% | 38% |
| Rarely | 22% | 21% | 23% | 23% |
| Occasionally | 11% | 9% | 12% | 13% |
| Sometimes | 12% | 11% | 11% | 18% |
| Regularly | 8% | 6% | 10% | 8% |

The rates at which *active presenters* (who made at least one presentation in any category during the previous 5 years) presented research with at least 25% Russia content in different categories of lectures, conferences, and workshops also fell from 2010-2015 to 2017-2022 (Table 6B). This most likely reflects a broad decline in participation at in-person events in 2020 and 2021 due to pandemic-related limits on travel. The shift to online presentation formats probably could not fully compensate for postponed in-person events. There were two key exceptions: presentations about Russia at ASEES grew, driven by increased rates among historians and social scientists; so did media appearances, by social scientists in particular. At the same time, briefings of government officials decreased precipitously during latter period, driven by a steep decline among social scientists. Along with the drop in the policy memo category, these patterns suggest that social scientists (in particular) who work on Russia have been shifting away from efforts to directly engage policy makers while focusing more on sharing their results with public audiences (via and with the interdisciplinary Russian studies community (via ASEES)).

Active researchers—those who are either active publishers, active presenters, or both—disseminate their work on Russia via social media at increasing rates (Table 6C). In the 2015 data about 30% said they had done so at least “occasionally” in the previous 5 years; in 2022, over 40%. The overall percentage who report having done so at least sometimes rose from 20% to 28%. Social scientists continue to report higher rates of dissemination via social media, but the biggest increases were on the part of Slavists and historians; overall, the differences by field were no longer statistically significant in 2022, as opposed to 2015.

We gain another perspective on potential trends in rates of publications about Russia in different outlets by considering patterns across graduation cohorts in both 2015 and 2022 for six specific publication categories of particular interest. If younger cohorts of graduates have been socialized in their training to focus more on disciplinary outlets than on area studies journals, for example, we should observe a greater tendency for them to publish in the former compared to their colleagues who received their PhDs in earlier decades. We would expect those who received their PhDs in the 2010s to evince higher publication rates in 2022 than in 2015, as they had more years to make the transition from graduate school to professional positions, and for the youngest cohort in each survey to have the lowest rates of publications across the board. Because the disciplines may vary in terms of these dynamics, we compare patterns for PhD cohorts within each of the three main disciplines.

Although there are no systematic patterns across cohorts or periods that suggest consistent trends favoring some types of publication outlets over others, there are some variations across surveys by discipline and cohort worthy of note (Table 7). The oldest cohort of historians (PhDs received in the 1980s or earlier) reported decreasing levels of monograph publications in 2022 relative to 2015, while the three younger cohorts published monographs at higher rates. All cohorts of historians increased their average output of book chapters, as did Slavists and social scientists who graduated from 2000-2019: the edited volume format continues to be a significant outlet for younger generations of historians and Slavists in the Russian studies field, while the oldest cohort of social scientists reported a large drop in publications in this category. In fact, their publication rates from 2015 to 2022 fell in all categories except monographs, pointing to a generational shift in publication activity for social scientists, with the largest gap between 1990s graduates and older, not younger, graduation cohorts. All cohorts in all three disciplines decreased rates of publishing policy memos/op-eds/reports except Slavists who graduated in the 1990s or 2010s. Social scientists who graduated in the 2010s essentially maintained their average

rate in this category, while their colleagues who graduated prior to 2010 decreased their rates substantially.

Table 7. Average number of publications in selected categories, by survey period, main discipline and decade of PhD (publication-active PhDs)

| | <i>Social</i> | | | | | <i>Social</i> | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | <i>Slavic</i> | <i>History</i> | <i>Science</i> | <i>Overall</i> | | <i>Slavic</i> | <i>History</i> | <i>Science</i> | <i>Overall</i> |
| A. Monographs | | | | | D. Articles in peer reviewed disciplinary journals | | | | |
| | 2017-2022 | | | | | 2017-2022 | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 1.57 | 1.09 | 1.13 | 1.25 | 1980s/earlier | 3.93 | 5.32 | 1.86 | 4.20 |
| 1990s | 0.64 | 1.04 | 0.54 | 0.79 | 1990s | 2.33 | 3.08 | 3.45 | 2.90 |
| 2000s | 0.56 | 1.08 | 0.33 | 0.73 | 2000s | 3.00 | 3.09 | 2.62 | 2.63 |
| 2010s | 0.47 | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0.51 | 2010s | 2.60 | 1.40 | 3.13 | 2.41 |
| 2020s | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.29 | 0.10 | 2020s | 0.33 | 0.73 | 2.00 | 1.13 |
| | 2010-2015 | | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 1.71 | 1.37 | 0.91 | 1.37 | 1980s/earlier | 5.32 | 3.49 | 3.58 | 4.00 |
| 1990s | 1.11 | 0.75 | 1.17 | 0.99 | 1990s | 3.19 | 2.82 | 2.65 | 2.77 |
| 2000s | 1.00 | 1.02 | 1.24 | 1.06 | 2000s | 3.62 | 2.61 | 2.92 | 2.92 |
| 2010s | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0.71 | 0.46 | 2010s | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.59 | 1.25 |
| B. Book chapters | | | | | E. Articles in area studies journals | | | | |
| | 2017-2022 | | | | | 2017-2022 | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 4.15 | 4.12 | 2.25 | 3.63 | 1980s/earlier | 2.38 | 3.65 | 2.77 | 2.98 |
| 1990s | 1.92 | 3.74 | 2.08 | 2.80 | 1990s | 1.22 | 1.65 | 2.54 | 1.79 |
| 2000s | 2.64 | 2.63 | 3.23 | 2.60 | 2000s | 1.83 | 3.46 | 1.83 | 2.46 |
| 2010s | 2.08 | 1.25 | 1.13 | 1.93 | 2010s | 0.75 | 1.44 | 1.71 | 1.40 |
| 2020s | 1.00 | 0.60 | 1.38 | 0.91 | 2020s | 0.50 | 0.80 | 1.14 | 0.81 |
| | 2010-2015 | | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 4.34 | 3.80 | 5.41 | 4.38 | 1980s/earlier | 3.86 | 2.73 | 4.39 | 3.52 |
| 1990s | 3.13 | 2.40 | 3.53 | 3.00 | 1990s | 2.71 | 2.00 | 2.37 | 2.35 |
| 2000s | 2.27 | 2.37 | 2.73 | 2.37 | 2000s | 2.23 | 1.78 | 2.38 | 1.92 |
| 2010s | 0.77 | 1.08 | 0.60 | 0.95 | 2010s | 0.86 | 1.09 | 1.39 | 1.11 |
| C. Policy memos/op-eds/reports | | | | | F. Articles in other disciplinary journals | | | | |
| | 2017-2022 | | | | | 2017-2022 | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 1.31 | 0.71 | 3.82 | 1.73 | 1980s/earlier | 1.20 | 1.06 | 0.80 | 0.97 |
| 1990s | 3.00 | 0.63 | 3.15 | 1.88 | 1990s | 0.80 | 0.73 | 1.62 | 0.94 |
| 2000s | 0.00 | 1.70 | 1.83 | 1.33 | 2000s | 1.38 | 0.78 | 0.50 | 0.73 |
| 2010s | 8.42 | 0.69 | 3.07 | 3.21 | 2010s | 0.25 | 0.57 | 0.42 | 0.39 |
| 2020s | 0.00 | 0.10 | 2.57 | 0.95 | 2020s | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.26 |
| | 2010-2015 | | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 2.14 | 1.54 | 5.83 | 3.07 | 1980s/earlier | 2.00 | 1.00 | 0.81 | 1.31 |
| 1990s | 1.91 | 1.96 | 8.04 | 4.63 | 1990s | 2.00 | 0.80 | 1.58 | 1.49 |
| 2000s | 2.09 | 3.95 | 4.08 | 3.37 | 2000s | 1.31 | 0.67 | 0.80 | 0.82 |
| 2010s | 0.00 | 7.18 | 3.38 | 3.53 | 2010s | 0.33 | 0.53 | 0.42 | 0.50 |

Historians in all four cohorts that can be compared across the surveys published more articles in peer-reviewed history journals, while social scientists who graduated in the 1990s and the 2010s did so in peer-reviewed social science outlets. Slavists tended to reduce their publications in such journals from 2015 to 2022, aside from the youngest comparison cohort. This is consistent with a secular trend toward increasing incentives over time to publish in disciplinary journals. However, the same basic pattern holds for Russia-focused peer-review area studies journals, suggesting that the emphasis is more on peer-reviewed articles than on disciplinary journals per se. The 2000 graduate cohort of social scientists stands out for its declining rates of peer-reviewed article publications, which perhaps dilutes a broader trend across disciplines for growth in that form of publication activity. Changes are minimal with respect to publication of peer-reviewed articles in disciplinary journals outside of one's main discipline.

Russian studies practitioners continued to conduct research on a wide range of topics using a robust variety of methodological approaches (Table 8). The distribution of topics on which researchers in different disciplines, as well as overall, published, shows considerable stability from 2015 to 2022, though we note declines in the percentages who published research on art/literature and religion. Naturally, overwhelming majorities of Slavists publish on art and literature, and historians on history. But almost one quarter of Slavists also work on history, while substantial numbers of historians work on art/literature and, to a declining degree, religion (Table 8A). Social scientists work on the whole gamut of topics, with domestic politics (69%) and foreign policy (46%) the most popular. *However, social science publications on both the Russian economy and on social issues in Russia both waned substantially from 2015 to 2022.*

Russia researchers also continue to use a considerable range of methodological approaches in their studies (Table 8B). Slavists and historians typically analyze texts and documents. The use of interviews, non-literary documents, Russian news reports, and archives by Slavists grew from 2015 to 2022, pointing to more methodological diversity in Slavic studies. Historians used archives in Russia a bit less often. Social scientists reported much lower use of interviews, along with smaller declines in the use of Russian news reports and secondary surveys (conducted by others). They analyzed original surveys, archives, and literary/artistic texts more frequently. Nearly one-fifth of social scientists analyzed some form of big data, a category added to the 2022 survey. Overall, research on Russia maintained a healthy level of diversity in both topic and method during 2017-2022, despite the COVID19 pandemic and growing US-Russia tensions.

Table 8. Topics and Methodology

| | 2017-2022 | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
|---|-----------|--------|---------|----------------|-----------|--------|---------|----------------|
| | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science |
| A. Percent of active publishers who published at least one work on various topics in the preceding five years | | | | | | | | |
| Art/literature | 33% | 77% | 17% | 9% | 39% | 85% | 22% | 7% |
| History | 48% | 23% | 88% | 20% | 49% | 23% | 87% | 25% |
| Religion | 9% | 4% | 14% | 8% | 15% | 14% | 21% | 10% |
| Domestic politics | 22% | 8% | 6% | 66% | 21% | 4% | 11% | 68% |
| Foreign policy | 19% | 8% | 10% | 43% | 15% | 2% | 9% | 43% |
| Economy | 5% | 0% | 1% | 18% | 8% | 1% | 2% | 28% |
| Social issues | 11% | 11% | 2% | 22% | 14% | 6% | 9% | 34% |
| Law | 4% | 0% | 1% | 10% | 4% | 1% | 1% | 10% |
| Other | 13% | 14% | 10% | 13% | 13% | 14% | 8% | 15% |
| B. Percent of active publishers who used various source materials and data collection techniques in their research on Russia during the preceding five years | | | | | | | | |
| Literary texts, films, performances | 50% | 93% | 42% | 18% | 51% | 95% | 40% | 13% |
| Non-literary historical texts (documents, memoirs) | 67% | 69% | 84% | 42% | 64% | 57% | 83% | 43% |
| Current Russian-language news reports | 37% | 44% | 20% | 58% | 35% | 25% | 26% | 68% |
| Current Russian government documents | 33% | 18% | 19% | 66% | 23% | 3% | 15% | 66% |
| Other Russian documents, reports | 36% | 35% | 22% | 57% | 35% | 27% | 29% | 59% |
| Archives research in Archives elsewhere | 42% | 34% | 63% | 22% | 44% | 30% | 72% | 16% |
| Interviews | 45% | 42% | 59% | 23% | 38% | 26% | 60% | 15% |
| Focus groups | 36% | 37% | 27% | 49% | 34% | 23% | 26% | 65% |
| Original surveys | 5% | 4% | 0% | 15% | 4% | 1% | 1% | 13% |
| Secondary surveys | 10% | 6% | 1% | 30% | 7% | 5% | 2% | 21% |
| Big data | 12% | 4% | 4% | 37% | 15% | 3% | 8% | 44% |

Because the time window extends back to 2017, it is too early to assess whether the full-scale war on Ukraine and the crackdown in Russia have had any impact on these aspects of Russian studies.

Grant funding for research on Russia by US-based scholars has held steady, or even increased. In both 2015 and 2022 surveys, 73% of respondents who were active researchers had received at least one grant in the last five years (Table 9A). Research funding for respondents comes from a range of sources. Over half reported of research-active respondents had received seed grants from their institutions in the last five years; almost one quarter had received travel grants in 2015, with that number falling to about 20% in 2022, most likely due to pandemic- and geopolitics-related limitations on travel opportunities from 2017-2022. The “big three” federal agencies (NSF, NEH, and NIH) have funded nearly one in ten research-active respondents in both years, while other federal agencies have supported more than one quarter and private foundations 16% to 20% of them. Russian sources, foreign governments, and international organizations provide relatively little funding for US-based research on Russia, though surprisingly both sources increased the percentages funded from 2015 to 2022. Seven percent of active researchers in 2022 reported having received research grants from ASEES in the previous five years. Among recipients of at least one grant in each category, the average number of grants received within the 5-year window held steady, apart from a modest decrease in grants from the main federal sources.

In the 2015 survey, social scientists tended to receive more grants from different sources, while Slavists received fewer, but these differentials shrank by 2022: Slavists gained most in most categories, while social scientist lost some ground in terms of grants from federal agencies and travel grants (Table 9B). However, social scientists’ advantage in overall funding levels persist, with 17% of active researchers among them reporting at least \$100,000 in awards from 2017-2022 (Table 9C) compared to 10% of non-social scientists combined. The funding disparity between social scientists and others is more pronounced when we limit focus to PhDs (Table 9D). No doubt these disciplinary variations stem from the greater average costs associated with social science data collection.

The overall picture in 2022 remained one of impressive Russia-related research activity by US-based scholars, despite the challenges posed by the COVID19 pandemic and growing US-Russia tensions in 2017-2022. They continued to publish a robust quantity of different types of works about Russia in a variety of venues. While rates of some types of publications did decline—most notably monographs and policy memos/op-eds/reports—peer-reviewed articles in disciplinary outlets remained stable. Apart from a considerable drop in briefings of government officials, rates of presenting work about Russia in different forums persisted. US-based researchers who study Russia cover a wide range of topics and use a broad spectrum of methodologies. Topics and methods vary by discipline in intuitive ways, but there are also substantial numbers in each broad field who study atypical topics and use atypical methods and sources, and the disciplinary distinctions show some sign of waning. Almost three quarters of the active researchers in our sample have received some funding for their work, with the US federal government being the most common source for research grants. Social scientists receive more federal grants and also more grant money overall than researchers from other fields, but those gaps closed somewhat from 2015 to 2022.

Table 9. Extent and Sources of Grant Funding

A. Types and sources of grants received for work on Russia, (active researchers)

| | 2017-2022 | | 2010-2015 | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| | % with at least one | average number (if at least 1) | % with at least one | average number (if at least 1) |
| NSF/NIH/NED research grants | 10% | 1.31 | 9% | 1.70 |
| Other USG progs., agencies (inc. T8) | 24% | 1.67 | 27% | 1.71 |
| Research grants from ASEES | 7% | 1.16 | | |
| Private foundations (research grants) | 20% | 2.13 | 16% | 1.61 |
| Grants from Russian sources | 6% | 1.29 | 3% | 1.35 |
| international orgs. or foreign govts. | 6% | 1.73 | 3% | 1.79 |
| Travel grants from any source | 19% | 2.59 | 24% | 2.03 |
| Seed grants from your institution | 57% | 2.77 | 54% | 2.97 |
| No grants at all | 27% | | 27% | |

B. Percent of active researchers with PhDs with at least one of the following types of grants:

| | 2017-2022 | | | 2010-2015 | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|---------|----------------|-----------|---------|----------------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | Slavic | History | Social Science |
| NSF/NIH/NED research grants | 11% | 9% | 14% | 8% | 6% | 18% |
| Other USG progs., agencies (inc. T8) | 16% | 25% | 26% | 16% | 31% | 41% |
| Research grants from ASEES | 7% | 9% | 6% | | | |
| Private foundations (research grants) | 11% | 23% | 26% | 8% | 21% | 20% |
| Grants from Russian sources | 5% | 6% | 9% | 1% | 2% | 6% |
| international orgs. or foreign govts. | 4% | 6% | 6% | 2% | 2% | 6% |
| Travel grants from any source | 16% | 24% | 17% | 13% | 30% | 30% |
| Seed grants from your institution | 64% | 55% | 60% | 53% | 61% | 56% |
| No grants at all | 28% | 24% | 25% | 35% | 21% | 22% |

**Table 9. Sources of funding
(cont.)**

C. Amount of grant money received for research on Russia, 2010-2015, by discipline (active researchers)

| | 2017-2022 | | | | | Total |
|------------------------|-----------|---------|-------------------|------|-------|-------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES | Other | |
| None | 30% | 24% | 23% | 42% | 42% | 28% |
| Less than \$10,000 | 40% | 26% | 22% | 42% | 22% | 28% |
| \$10,000 to \$49,999 | 19% | 21% | 27% | 8% | 14% | 21% |
| \$50,000 to \$99,999 | 3% | 17% | 10% | 8% | 8% | 11% |
| \$100,000 to \$249,999 | 7% | 8% | 6% | 0% | 8% | 7% |
| \$250,000 to \$999,999 | 1% | 4% | 9% | 0% | 6% | 4% |
| \$1,000,000 or more | 0% | 1% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 1% |

| | 2010-2015 | | | | | Total |
|------------------------|-----------|---------|-------------------|------|-------|-------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES | Other | |
| None | 36% | 22% | 24% | 35% | 43% | 29% |
| Less than \$10,000 | 29% | 29% | 17% | 27% | 37% | 27% |
| \$10,000 to \$49,999 | 28% | 31% | 30% | 27% | 17% | 28% |
| \$50,000 to \$99,999 | 5% | 14% | 12% | 4% | 3% | 10% |
| \$100,000 to \$249,999 | 1% | 3% | 9% | 8% | 0% | 4% |
| \$250,000 or more | 2% | 1% | 5% | 0% | 0% | 2% |

D. Amount of grant money received for research on Russia, by discipline (PhD recipients, big 3 disciplines)

| | 2017-2022 | | | 2010-2015 | | |
|------------------------|-----------|---------|-------------------|-----------|---------|-------------------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | Slavic | History | Social Science |
| None | 32% | 25% | 23% | 34% | 25% | 24% |
| Less than \$10,000 | 42% | 25% | 24% | 26% | 29% | 16% |
| \$10,000 to \$49,999 | 15% | 21% | 27% | 30% | 26% | 28% |
| \$50,000 to \$99,999 | 2% | 17% | 7% | 7% | 16% | 13% |
| \$100,000 to \$249,999 | 7% | 7% | 7% | 1% | 3% | 10% |
| \$250,000 to \$999,999 | 2% | 4% | 10% | 2% | 1% | 6% |
| \$1,000,000 or more | 0% | 1% | 3% | 0% | 0% | 3% |

In sum, the interdisciplinary Russian studies community maintained course in the face of considerable headwinds in 2017-2022. However, given how academic publication and research trends tend to lag behind major events, it is too soon to assess in quantitative terms the impact that Russia's February 2022 invasion will eventually have on research and funding.

PROFESSIONAL TRAVEL TO RUSSIA

Both COVID19-related travel restrictions and growing US-Russia tensions, which made starting cross-national collaborations and obtaining visas more difficult, should be expected to have reduced professional travel to Russia by US-based researchers. Indeed, the 2022 data provide evidence confirming this expectation (Table 10). US-based researchers were less likely to take any trip to Russia in the prior five years (Table 10A) in 2022 than in 2015. Those who did take trips tended to take fewer of them (Table 10B), and they spent fewer days in Russia (Table 10C). The reductions in travel generally affected all three disciplines and all graduation cohorts, though those who received PhDs in the 1980s or earlier experienced the steepest drop-off. There is one exception: social scientists spent more days in Russia in the later period, due entirely to a number of long trips undertaken by recent PhDs.

Nonetheless, over half the respondents (56%) in 2022 had taken at least one trip to Russia since 2017, and those who did travel averaged over three trips and almost 100 days spent there in the past five years. Thus, while confirming an inevitable decline in professional travel to Russia by US-based researchers in the recent period, the 2022 survey also shows that such travel hardly disappeared; rather, it remained more the rule than the exception. This surely reflects the inclusion of the years 2017-2019 in the time period on which respondents reported in 2022: 80% of those who took at least one trip said that they returned from their most recent professional trip to Russia in 2019 or earlier (that is, before COVID19 travel restrictions took effect.) Only 5 respondents (2.7% of those who had travelled to Russia in the last five years) returned from their last professional trip in 2022. *Clearly, the relatively high rate of professional travel to Russia for the larger five-year window was dramatically reduced by COVID19 in 2020, and even more drastically by Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine.*

The external factors disrupted a noteworthy trend of increasing travel to localities outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg, especially evident for younger graduation cohorts and social science PhDs (Table 10D). However, those who received their PhDs in the 1980s or earlier, in addition to reporting particularly steep declines in rates of travel, also reported substantially fewer trips outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg in 2022 compared to 2015. Thus, the overall rates of professional travel outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg fell, but this conceals growth trends (prior to 2022) for social scientists who received their PhDs after 2000 and historians who received their PhDs since 2020.

Travel to village settings became even less typical during 2017-2022 than it had been in 2010-2015 (Table 10E), and there were only minor changes in the percentages of visits for professional purposes to different cities and locality types across the two periods among PhDs who took at least one trip (Table 10F), with Moscow and St. Petersburg remaining the most common destinations by far.

Table 10. Professional Travel to Russia

| | 2017-2022 | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
|---|-----------|---------|---------|--------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|--------------------------|
| | Slavic | History | Science | Social <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Science | Social <i>Overall</i> |
| A. Took at least one professional trip to Russia during period | | | | | | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 47% | 52% | 53% | 51% | 71% | 68% | 70% | 70% |
| 1990s | 64% | 65% | 73% | 67% | 77% | 64% | 76% | 70% |
| 2000s | 45% | 43% | 69% | 49% | 78% | 73% | 83% | 74% |
| 2010s | 50% | 67% | 61% | 54% | 62% | 80% | 65% | 69% |
| 2020s | 50% | 70% | 44% | 61% | | | | |
| Overall | 52% | 57% | 61% | 56% | 73% | 71% | 74% | 71% |

Among PhDs who made at least one trip for professional purposes:

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| B. Average number of trips to Russia for professional purposes | | | | | | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 4.6 | 2.4 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 5.2 | 3.8 | 5.0 | 4.7 |
| 1990s | 1.7 | 2.4 | 4.4 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.9 | 5.7 | 4.3 |
| 2000s | 1.4 | 10.8 | 2.7 | 5.7 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 3.7 |
| 2010s | 1.6 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 2.3 | 2.8 |
| 2020s | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | | | | |
| Overall | 2.3 | 4.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 3.9 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| C. Average number of days spent in Russia for professional purposes | | | | | | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 153 | 57 | 74 | 80 | 106 | 102 | 58 | 96 |
| 1990s | 24 | 37 | 90 | 47 | 73 | 107 | 98 | 93 |
| 2000s | 31 | 89 | 67 | 62 | 174 | 80 | 68 | 102 |
| 2010s | 65 | 196 | 86 | 122 | 158 | 195 | 138 | 162 |
| 2020s | 21 | 293 | 402 | 285 | | | | |
| Overall | 66 | 112 | 117 | 98 | 125 | 117 | 87 | 110 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| D. Percent who traveled to a location other than Moscow or SPB for professional purposes | | | | | | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 57% | 20% | 13% | 28% | 38% | 29% | 43% | 38% |
| 1990s | 44% | 35% | 45% | 40% | 54% | 46% | 46% | 47% |
| 2000s | 60% | 25% | 67% | 43% | 45% | 39% | 58% | 42% |
| 2010s | 25% | 31% | 64% | 41% | 46% | 53% | 60% | 48% |
| 2020s | 0% | 57% | 50% | 50% | | | | |
| Total | 43% | 31% | 49% | 39% | 45% | 41% | 51% | 43% |

Table 10 (cont.) Professional Travel to Russia

| | 2017-2022 | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
|---|-----------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Slavic | History | Science | Overall | Slavic | History | Science | Overall |
| Among PhDs who made at least one trip for professional purposes: | | | | | | | | |
| E. Percent who traveled to a village for professional purposes | | | | | | | | |
| 1980s/earlier | 29% | 0% | 0% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 10% | 7% |
| 1990s | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 4% | 6% | 0% | 3% |
| 2000s | 0% | 0% | 11% | 3% | 17% | 5% | 13% | 10% |
| 2010s | 25% | 0% | 0% | 5% | 0% | 6% | 13% | 6% |
| 2020s | 0% | 0% | 25% | 7% | | | | |
| Total | 13% | 0% | 5% | 4% | 8% | 6% | 8% | 7% |
| F. Cities visited for professional purposes (among those who made at least one trip) | | | | | | | | |
| Moscow | | | | 85% | | | | 88% |
| St. Petersburg | | | | 58% | | | | 58% |
| Novosibirsk | | | | 5% | | | | 2% |
| Ekaterinburg | | | | 9% | | | | 4% |
| Nizhny Novgorod | | | | 2% | | | | 4% |
| Samara | | | | 1% | | | | 1% |
| Omsk | | | | 2% | | | | 2% |
| Kazan | | | | 4% | | | | 9% |
| Other provincial capital (not above) | | | | 28% | | | | 29% |
| Medium sized city (>100k population) | | | | 12% | | | | 12% |
| Small town | | | | 9% | | | | 9% |
| Village | | | | 5% | | | | 7% |

Undoubtedly, many professional trips to Russia undertaken by US-based researchers have been for the purpose of data collection. Formal exchanges have been relatively unusual (Table 11). However, they held steady or increased in terms of the proportion of PhDs in the respective samples who participated in them in the prior five years. Strikingly, nearly one quarter of social scientists with PhDs reported at least one visiting appointment at a Russian institution with a research component in 2022; a substantial increase from 2015. Fewer US-based PhDs taught short courses in Russia in 2017-22 than in 2009-14, especially among historians. Fewer also gave academic lectures and participated in conferences in Russia, but these activities remained fairly common in the more recent period, with 29% and 34% overall (respectively) and half of social scientists (up from 2015) having participated in these activities at least once. In contrast, only 18% gave a public lecture in Russia during the period, and that number was down for social scientists from 2015.

Although, as expected, US-based researchers who study Russia travelled less to Russia for professional purposes in 2017-2022 than in 2010-2015, over half nonetheless made at least one trip during that period. The decline in travel corresponded to the onset of the COVID19 pandemic in 2019, and Russia's

full-scale invasion of Ukraine has practically put an end to professional trips to Russia by US-based researchers. Prior to those events, however, there were trends of increasing travel to locations outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg (though they remained the predominant destinations), particularly by younger cohorts of social scientists, and of high rates of visiting research appointments, academic lectures, and conference presentations by social scientists.

Table 11. Professional Activities in Russia

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall |
|--|--------|---------|----------------|---------|
| Percent who took part in the following in Russia at least once in previous five years(PhDs) | | | | |
| 2017-2022 | | | | |
| Visiting professor appointment involving research | 0% | 7% | 24% | 9% |
| Visiting professor appointment involving teaching | 3% | 4% | 10% | 5% |
| Taught a short course or workshop | 9% | 4% | 16% | 8% |
| Lectured on research, academic audience | 19% | 28% | 49% | 29% |
| Lectured on research, non-academic audience | 14% | 15% | 19% | 16% |
| Participated in a conference | 28% | 31% | 50% | 34% |
| 2010-2015 | | | | |
| Visiting professor appointment involving research | 6% | 5% | 13% | 7% |
| Visiting professor appointment involving teaching | 5% | 2% | 10% | 5% |
| Taught a short course or workshop | 10% | 9% | 17% | 11% |
| Lectured on research, academic audience | 31% | 35% | 45% | 36% |
| Lectured on research, non-academic audience | 15% | 15% | 28% | 18% |
| Participated in a conference | 36% | 44% | 46% | 41% |

COLLABORATION AND CONTACT WITH RUSSIA-BASED SCHOLARS

Rates of direct collaborations with Russia-based scholars hardly changed from 2010-2015 to 2017-2022 (Table 12A). Historians and Slavists tend to collaborate with fewer Russian colleagues because direct collaboration is less common in those fields than in the social sciences. Levels of engagement with Russian researchers through informal discussions and communication also persisted: with about three-quarters of the 2022 sample taking part in them at least “occasionally” (Table 12B). There was a slight decrease in this form of engagement among Slavists, who already lagged somewhat behind social scientists and historians in 2015.

Among US-based scholars reporting at least one recent collaboration with a Russia-based scholar, the average numbers of publications and grants yielded by such collaborations also remained relatively constant between the two periods (Table 13). *The average numbers of peer-reviewed English-language journal articles increased substantially for all three disciplines, suggesting a growing trend of integration of Russia-based scholars in English-language scientific communities via collaboration, at least until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.*

Table 12. Collaborations with Russia-based scholars

| | <i>2017-2022</i> | | | | <i>2010-2015</i> | | | |
|---|------------------|---------|----------------|----------------|------------------|---------|----------------|----------------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Social Science | <i>Overall</i> |
| A. Number of Russia scholars collaborated with on research project, 2017-2022 (PhDs) | | | | | | | | |
| 0 | 69% | 68% | 51% | 62% | 65% | 66% | 54% | 64% |
| 1 | 7% | 7% | 12% | 8% | 12% | 13% | 11% | 13% |
| 2 | 3% | 8% | 10% | 9% | 8% | 10% | 14% | 10% |
| 3 | 5% | 5% | 10% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% |
| 4 | 2% | 1% | 1% | 3% | 3% | 1% | 7% | 3% |
| 5 | 5% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 3% | 1% | 5% | 3% |
| 6 or more | 9% | 5% | 10% | 7% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 3% |
| B. Frequency of communication with Russia-based scholars about research on Russia that did not lead to formal collaboration (PhDs) | | | | | | | | |
| Often | 16% | 23% | 33% | 23% | 18% | 24% | 28% | 24% |
| Sometimes | 25% | 26% | 22% | 26% | 32% | 24% | 24% | 25% |
| Occasionally | 21% | 27% | 24% | 25% | 12% | 23% | 25% | 20% |
| Rarely | 23% | 19% | 16% | 19% | 24% | 18% | 18% | 21% |
| Never | 14% | 5% | 4% | 8% | 14% | 10% | 5% | 10% |

Table 13. Research outputs with Russian content produced in collaboration with Russian researchers (PhDs reporting at least one collaboration)

| | 2017-2022 | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
|------------------------|-----------|---------|----------------|-------------|-----------|---------|----------------|-------------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall |
| Research monographs | 0.39 | 0.03 | 0.09 | <i>0.11</i> | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.16 | <i>0.12</i> |
| Edited volumes | 0.22 | 0.74 | 0.59 | <i>0.52</i> | 0.52 | 0.72 | 0.21 | <i>0.48</i> |
| Peer-reviewed articles | 0.83 | 0.97 | 1.18 | <i>0.90</i> | 0.48 | 0.35 | 0.75 | <i>0.50</i> |
| Russian articles | 0.39 | 0.41 | 0.47 | <i>0.40</i> | 0.46 | 0.48 | 0.34 | <i>0.43</i> |
| Book Chapters, English | 0.39 | 0.31 | 0.35 | <i>0.31</i> | 0.24 | 0.14 | 0.41 | <i>0.24</i> |
| Book chapters, Russian | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.21 | <i>0.22</i> | 0.28 | 0.10 | 0.13 | <i>0.15</i> |
| Policy memos | 0.00 | 0.51 | 0.00 | <i>0.20</i> | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.46 | <i>0.14</i> |
| Reviews | 0.50 | 0.03 | 0.09 | <i>0.13</i> | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.02 | <i>0.07</i> |
| Proposals (submitted) | 0.06 | 0.33 | 0.44 | <i>0.29</i> | 0.30 | 0.24 | 0.50 | <i>0.35</i> |
| Proposals (funded) | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.15 | <i>0.09</i> | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.20 | <i>0.13</i> |

Consistent with the pattern for travel to Russia by US-based researchers, the rates at which they hosted all categories of visitors from Russia fell in 2017-2022 compared to 2010-2015 (Table 14A). Among historians who hosted at least one Russia-based visitor in all categories except journalists/activists/public figures, the average number hosted also fell, while increasing among Slavists and social scientists for graduate students and postdocs, and social scientists for artists and writers (Table 14B). All three disciplines hosted larger numbers of journalists/activists/ public figures, perhaps indicating a growing interest in supporting opposition-minded Russians as the Putin regime’s crackdown on civil society within Russia accelerated in the late 2010s. The numbers of presentations attended by Russia-based visitors fell in all the categories, most likely reflecting limitations on in-person public events as the pandemic raged (Table 14C).

US-based scholars who work on Russia were on a path toward more frequent and more productive collaborations with Russia-based scholars on research projects about Russia until the COVID19 pandemic, conflict between the Russian and US governments, the associated crackdown on civic freedoms within Russia and obstacles to attaining visas, and eventually Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 all conspired to thwart further collaborations and visits. Collaborations have been strongest among social scientists.

Table 14. Contact with Russian scholars in the United States

A. Percent who hosted (for at least 2 weeks) any Russia-based scholar in each category during previous five years

| | 2017-2022 | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
|--|-----------|---------|---------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------|----------------|
| | Slavic | History | Science | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Science | <i>Overall</i> |
| Graduate Students | 24% | 13% | 29% | 18% | 23% | 20% | 28% | 24% |
| Post-docs | 16% | 9% | 18% | 13% | 23% | 28% | 23% | 24% |
| Faculty/researchers | 27% | 17% | 30% | 21% | 49% | 38% | 35% | 39% |
| Writers, artists | 15% | 3% | 3% | 6% | 35% | 9% | 5% | 16% |
| Journalists/activists/ public figures | 16% | 5% | 13% | 9% | 19% | 16% | 21% | 19% |

B. Average number hosted among those who hosted at least one

| | 2017-2022 | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
|--|-----------|---------|---------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------|----------------|
| | Slavic | History | Science | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Science | <i>Overall</i> |
| Graduate Students | 3.13 | 1.64 | 3.17 | 2.65 | 2.21 | 1.90 | 2.81 | 2.26 |
| Post-docs | 2.33 | 2.40 | 3.45 | 2.54 | 1.86 | 2.60 | 1.88 | 2.29 |
| Faculty/researchers | 2.13 | 2.16 | 2.63 | 2.25 | 2.29 | 2.80 | 3.26 | 2.87 |
| Writers, artists | 1.78 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1.60 | 2.30 | 2.13 | 1.33 | 2.59 |
| Journalists/activists/ public figures | 2.22 | 2.80 | 2.88 | 2.25 | 1.64 | 1.56 | 1.29 | 1.96 |

C. Average number of lectures by following type of visitors from Russia attended in the previous 5 years

| | 2017-2022 | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
|--|-----------|---------|---------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------|----------------|
| | Slavic | History | Science | <i>Overall</i> | Slavic | History | Science | <i>Overall</i> |
| Faculty/researchers | 2.63 | 2.04 | 3.41 | 2.40 | 3.61 | 4.27 | 5.09 | 4.28 |
| Writers | 1.84 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 0.91 | 2.44 | 0.97 | 0.93 | 1.52 |
| Journalists/activists/ public figures | 1.33 | 1.07 | 1.17 | 1.18 | 2.06 | 1.81 | 2.49 | 2.18 |

COMPARING SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS OF KEY ISSUES OVER TIME

The subjective assessments by US-based researchers of the state of Russian studies in late 2022 were undoubtedly influenced by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the chorus of calls to “de-colonize” the field that it provoked. We specifically addressed these two related developments with new batteries of questions in the 2022 survey, which we analyze below. However, we first analyze four batteries of questions on perceptions of the state of Russia-related studies we repeated from the 2015 survey, which yield insight into change over time in views on topics that have been discussed in the media and in donor circles for the last decade.

Table 15. Opinions about the state of the field

| | 2017-2022 | | | | 2010-2015 | | | |
|--|-----------|---------|----------------|---------|-----------|---------|----------------|---------|
| | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science | Overall |
| A. "There has been a decline in interest in Russia among graduate students in my field since the early 2000s [in 2022] / early 1990s [in 2015:]." | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 9% | 16% | 28% | 17% | 21% | 28% | 47% | 30% |
| Somewhat Agree | 29% | 18% | 20% | 21% | 33% | 32% | 30% | 32% |
| Neutral | 38% | 36% | 37% | 37% | 29% | 21% | 16% | 23% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 17% | 23% | 8% | 18% | 15% | 13% | 5% | 11% |
| Strongly Disagree | 6% | 7% | 8% | 8% | 2% | 5% | 2% | 4% |
| B. "Most research conducted by American social scientists about Russia these days is biased against Russia" | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 8% | 9% | 8% | 9% | 13% | 7% | 9% | 9% |
| Somewhat Agree | 25% | 18% | 9% | 17% | 20% | 19% | 23% | 21% |
| Neutral | 25% | 29% | 14% | 26% | 38% | 31% | 27% | 32% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 20% | 27% | 22% | 23% | 16% | 23% | 16% | 19% |
| Strongly Disagree | 23% | 18% | 46% | 25% | 13% | 20% | 26% | 19% |
| C. "American mass media reports on Russian government actions during the last year have taken a wide variety of perspectives" | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 8% | 2% | 6% | 5% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 4% |
| Somewhat Agree | 20% | 17% | 23% | 19% | 13% | 17% | 18% | 16% |
| Neutral | 22% | 13% | 10% | 16% | 13% | 9% | 17% | 13% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 36% | 44% | 40% | 38% | 47% | 38% | 35% | 40% |
| Strongly Disagree | 14% | 23% | 19% | 21% | 24% | 32% | 26% | 27% |
| D. "It would help relations between Russia and the United States if there were more academic exchange programs between Russian and American universities" | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 47% | 47% | 43% | 45% | 67% | 65% | 65% | 65% |
| Somewhat Agree | 24% | 27% | 24% | 25% | 21% | 23% | 24% | 23% |
| Neutral | 20% | 14% | 24% | 18% | 8% | 7% | 10% | 8% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 8% | 8% | 4% | 6% | 2% | 4% | 1% | 3% |
| Strongly Disagree | 2% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 2% | 1% | 0% | 2% |

Note: for both surveys, variation by field is statistically significant in Panels A and B, not Panels C or D.

We first asked questions about perceived declining interest in Russia on the part of graduate students; the extent of anti-Russian bias among social scientists and in the media; and whether academic exchange programs might improve US-Russia relations (Table 15).

Nearly 40% of the respondents who answered agree at least ‘somewhat’ that interest in Russia has declined in recent years among graduate students in their field, but this number was significantly lower

than the 62% who agreed with the parallel statement in the 2015 survey (Table 15A). Disagreement rose to about one quarter of the sample. The declining skepticism about the interest of graduate students in Russia could reflect the different time frames: the 2022 prompt stated interest had changed “since the early 2000s” instead of “since the early 1990s” in recognition of the fact that a growing proportion of the sample would have little direct experience of the orientations of graduate students in the 1990s. Agreement with the proposition that graduate student interest has long been on the wane remains more common than disagreement. Yet the trend has clearly been in the direction of relatively less concern that graduate students have been losing interest over the long term. Social scientists were considerably more likely to agree with the assertion than practitioners of other disciplines in 2015, and they continued to stand out as especially pessimistic in 2022, though they also showed the largest decline in agreement (from 77% to 48%). Thus, subjective perceptions of growing disinterest among graduate students have apparently moved in the opposite direction of the actual trend of decrease graduate student engagement with Russia discussed above.

Opinions have been quite divided as to whether social scientists are biased against Russia: “neutral” remained the modal response overall (at 26% in 2022 vs. 32% in 2015), but disagreement grew from 38% to 48% (Table 5B). Perhaps Russia’s actions in Ukraine persuaded some in the field that perspectives previously attributed to “anti-Russian bias” (such as arguments emphasizing the expansionist or authoritarian tendencies of the Putin regime) turned out to be more accurate than biased. Slavists have been especially likely to agree that social science research has been biased against Russia, social scientists themselves least likely to agree, and historians somewhere in between the other two disciplinary groups.

As for United States media coverage of Russia, skepticism declined slightly, but remained the predominant assessment. In 2015 two thirds overall disagreed that a wide variety of perspectives are represented in American news reports on Russia and only 20% agreed; disagreement fell to about 60% and agreement rose to about one-quarter. Differences by discipline were not statistically significant in either year. *Thus, the data suggest a gradual reduction over time in perceptions of anti-Russian bias among social scientists and the US media.*

There is also less agreement that increasing academic exchanges between Russian and American institutions would improve US-Russian relations, though 70% endorsed that view in 2022 (45% “strongly”), compared to 88% (65% “strongly”) in 2015 (Table 15D). Differences by field of study were not significant in either survey. Declining agreement with this statement most likely has more to do with growing skepticism that academic processes can affect Russia’s behavior, more than a decrease in support for such exchanges.

In sum, the 2022 survey indicates that a large majority of scholars in Russian studies still favors more exchanges, robust majorities think interest in Russia has declined among graduate students and the US media lacks diversity of perspectives in its coverage of Russia, and about half overall believe US-based social scientists are biased against Russia. In each case, however, the majority or plurality view shows signs of declining, modestly but consistently, relative to the opposite perspectives. Social scientists have been more likely to perceive a decline in graduate student interest in the past 20 years, and less likely to perceive anti-Russian bias in their research. The shifts are all toward greater diversity, not uniformity, of views on these specific issues.

We next asked respondents to indicate which from a list they consider to be the three most serious gaps in research on Russia within the field. They were divided in their answers, and the distributions of concerns in 2022 roughly mirrored that in 2015 (Table 16A). (Note that in table 16 the “Overall” column pertains to the entire sample with valid responses while the three disciplinary columns pertain to PhD holders.) An insufficiently comparative perspective and the persistence of Cold War assumptions were cited most frequently in both years. Slavists stand out as particularly prone to see these two issues as major gaps in research, even more so in 2022 than in 2015, while social scientists grew notably less concerned about Cold War assumptions over the same period. A category we added in 2022, “insufficient attention to minority populations within Russia,” came in third place, nominated as a top three problem by 30% of respondents, consistently across disciplines. This concern is one of the key arguments voiced by those who call for the “de-colonization” of Russian studies, and its relative salience testifies to the broad popularity and influence of such appeals (see below).

The next three most commonly shared concerns in the 2022 data are failure to use Russian-language sources (23%), excessive focus on disciplinary issues at the expense of accurate depiction of Russia (22%), and lack of fundamental knowledge about Russia (19%). Social scientists were more likely to see disciplinary focus as a problem; however, their degree of concern over this issue fell substantially between 2015 and 2022, as it did in regard to lack of fundamental knowledge about Russia. Overall levels of concern (as measured by what percentage of respondents consider a particular problem to be among the top three facing the field) *fell* most sharply in regard to lack of collaborations with Russia-based scholars, lack of policy relevance, failure to engage disciplinary concerns, and lack of reliable data, with the first three losing salience for historians and the latter two for political scientists in particular. Other concerns, such as lack of policy relevance, poor methodological rigor, and bias against the Russian government, remained at low levels in both surveys.

The broad picture is one of disagreement on the major problems facing the field, and even some contradictory views: lack of comparative perspectives could be construed as the opposite problem of insufficient familiarity with Russia. So can wanting more engagement with theory vis-a-vis less orientation toward disciplinary issues.

The same goes for explanations as to why there are not more collaborations between US-based and Russia-based scholars (Table 16B). The most widespread explanation in 2015—lack of contacts between researchers in the two countries working on similar topics—became somewhat less common in 2022, which is perhaps a bit surprising because it seems likely that such contacts dwindled due to travel restrictions. Most likely, other explanations simply grew in salience. Still, while the percentage citing this factor fell from 54% to 40%, it remained the second most cited in 2022. Blame on the Russian government became the most commonly cited obstacle in 2022, with Slavists shifting most strongly toward this category. A pronounced drop in the percentage of social scientists attributing low levels of collaboration to gaps in training among Russia-based colleagues confirms the long-term improvement on this score. However, social scientists were more likely to cite cultural differences in research styles in 2022, even as Slavists and historians became less likely to do so. In the same vein, the sense that Russians have different (presumably lower) incentives to publish persisted in popularity as an explanation. Political obstacles from the US government rose in prominence as a factor accounting for low levels of cross-national collaborations, no doubt reflecting, at least in part, the more stringent limitations of US visas for Russians. In contrast, language barriers and lack of intrinsic interest in collaborating on the part of US-based researchers shrank in prominence.

Table 16. Perceptions of key shortcomings in research and obstacles to collaboration

A. Three most serious gaps/shortcomings in research on Russia conducted by US-based scholars in your discipline in 2017-2021 / today [in 2015]?

| | 2022 survey | | | | 2015 survey | | | |
|---|-------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------|
| | Overall | Slavic PHDs | History PHDs | Social Science PHDs | Overall | Slavic PHDs | History PHDs | Social Science PHDs |
| Insufficient comparative perspective (i.e. too narrow a focus on Russia) | 32% | 42% | 32% | 29% | 37% | 32% | 44% | 36% |
| Persistent Cold War attitudes among researchers | 30% | 38% | 30% | 10% | 33% | 30% | 33% | 21% |
| Insufficient attention to minority populations | 30% | 32% | 32% | 27% | | | | |
| Failure to use Russian-language sources | 23% | 18% | 16% | 21% | 21% | 35% | 15% | 17% |
| Excessive focus on disciplinary concerns rather than accurate depiction of Russia | 22% | 24% | 19% | 31% | 22% | 23% | 18% | 40% |
| Lack of fundamental knowledge about Russia | 19% | 20% | 11% | 21% | 25% | 23% | 17% | 34% |
| Excessive emphasis on Russian exceptionalism | 16% | 18% | 20% | 5% | 18% | 17% | 25% | 5% |
| Too narrow a focus on current events and policy debates | 16% | 8% | 20% | 21% | 19% | 17% | 23% | 10% |
| None of the above/nothing else | 16% | 18% | 19% | 19% | | | | |
| Insufficient collaborations with Russia-based scholars | 15% | 16% | 10% | 26% | 24% | 27% | 25% | 21% |
| Failure to engage discipline's broader theoretical concerns | 12% | 16% | 9% | 16% | 24% | 21% | 24% | 28% |
| Lack of reliable empirical data | 11% | 0% | 13% | 18% | 18% | 10% | 13% | 34% |
| Lack of policy relevance or other impact outside academia | 10% | 16% | 5% | 13% | 17% | 15% | 18% | 14% |
| Something else (please specify _____) | 8% | 8% | 12% | 6% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 1% |
| Lack of methodological rigor | 8% | 4% | 7% | 10% | 12% | 11% | 11% | 17% |
| Bias against the Russian government | 6% | 6% | 5% | 2% | 9% | 11% | 7% | 10% |

Table 16 (cont.) Perceptions of key shortcomings in research and obstacles to collaboration

B. What are among the top 3 obstacles to more collaboration between US- and Russia-based scholars?

| | 2022 survey | | | | 2015 survey | | | |
|--|-------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| | Overall | Slavic PHDs | History PHDs | Social Science PHDs | Overall | Slavic PHDs | History PHDs | Social Science PHDs |
| Political obstacles from the Russian government | 42% | 44% | 39% | 38% | 36% | 29% | 33% | 42% |
| Lack of contacts between Russian and US researchers working on similar topics | 40% | 46% | 32% | 36% | 54% | 55% | 52% | 48% |
| Cultural differences in research styles | 34% | 37% | 29% | 42% | 41% | 50% | 44% | 32% |
| Systematic national differences in the quality of training and scholarship | 31% | 23% | 33% | 42% | 39% | 32% | 36% | 57% |
| Different incentive structures for publication in Russia and the United States | 31% | 40% | 34% | 29% | 35% | 38% | 41% | 32% |
| Political obstacles from the US government | 28% | 42% | 20% | 21% | 10% | 11% | 9% | 5% |
| US scholars' lack of intrinsic interest in collaborating | 24% | 27% | 26% | 27% | 29% | 32% | 27% | 31% |
| Language barriers | 16% | 10% | 12% | 14% | 25% | 22% | 19% | 26% |
| Other/something else | 13% | 12% | 18% | 12% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% |
| Russians' lack of intrinsic interest in collaborating | 13% | 8% | 15% | 18% | 11% | 16% | 14% | 5% |

C. What would have the most significant positive impact on US-based research on Russia?

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| More funding for faculty research on Russia at American universities | 20% | 14% | 19% | 29% | 19% | 19% | 19% | 26% |
| Improved relations between the Russian and US governments | 24% | 25% | 28% | 20% | 9% | 8% | 10% | 8% |
| More funding for grad student training/research on Russia in US | 17% | 9% | 15% | 19% | 25% | 21% | 24% | 28% |
| Something else (please specify): | 11% | 8% | 9% | 14% | 6% | 4% | 8% | 7% |
| More funding for US scholars to make research and teaching visits to Russian universities | 10% | 16% | 11% | 6% | 18% | 20% | 18% | 14% |
| More funding for Russian scholars to visit American universities | 4% | 5% | 3% | 6% | 3% | 4% | 1% | 3% |
| Increased interest in Russia on the part of the American government | 3% | 3% | 3% | 4% | 12% | 14% | 14% | 11% |
| Increased interest in Russia on the part of the American public | 10% | 20% | 12% | 1% | 8% | 10% | 7% | 4% |

Finally, both surveys asked respondents which of a set of factors would have the single most important positive impact in improving research about Russia in American universities (Table 16C). The impact of

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine is clear in the shift of "improved relations between the US and Russian governments" to the top position, selected by almost one quarter of responses in 2022 (compared to 9% in 2015), and more commonly by Slavists and historians than by social scientists. Funding for faculty and for graduate students remain popular remedies to improve US-based research on Russia, especially among social scientists. However, while the endorsement of funding for faculty remained steady at about 20%, prioritization of graduate student funding, and also of funding for research to travel, declined from 2015 to 2022. Another probable consequence of the full-scale war is the sharp drop in the percentage who see increased interest in Russia on the part of the American government as a key change for improving US-based research on Russia.

IMPACT OF THE WAR AND OTHER EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

While we can infer the impact of the war in our interpretation of the shifts evident in Table 16C, we get deeper insight into perceptions of how the war and other key developments in recent years affected the field from several batteries of questions we added to the 2022 survey. Here we report all valid answers, and, in comparing across disciplines, we include an additional category, "REES/other," in order to maximize our sample sizes.

We asked respondents to assess the impact of six developments on "research about Russia in your discipline," offering them five responses ranging from "very negative" to "very positive," with an intermediate "no impact" category (Table 17). Because "very positive" and "somewhat positive" responses were few in number for all six items, we aggregate them to save space.

Of the six adverse developments we asked about, Russia's war on Ukraine was deemed by the largest percentage of respondents to have had a *very negative* impact on research about Russia in their discipline (89%), followed by the COVID19 pandemic (51%) and the Russian government's domestic policies since 2017 (48%). Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for secessionists in 2014 came next (38%), followed by developments in Russian universities since 2017. Only 14% attributed a "very negative" impact to the foreign policies of the United States government, while 42% considered them to have a "somewhat negative" impact.

There is widespread understanding among practitioners of Russian studies that at least six adverse external developments have negatively affected the field in the last decade. The war has had the most intense effect, but it came on top of five other negative developments: COVID19, Russian government domestic policies, the 2014 events in Ukraine, developments in Russian universities, and US foreign policies all have hurt Russian studies as well, according to majorities of respondents.

TABLE 17. Impact of Key External Developments on Research About Russia in Your Discipline?

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|--|--------|---------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| A. The COVID19 Pandemic | | | | | |
| Very negative | 59% | 56% | 48% | 31% | 51% |
| Somewhat negative | 29% | 38% | 35% | 36% | 35% |
| No impact | 8% | 5% | 15% | 31% | 12% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 5% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 115 | 71 | 42 | 291 |
| B. The Russian government's domestic policies since 2017 | | | | | |
| Very negative | 45% | 50% | 48% | 47% | 48% |
| Somewhat negative | 47% | 35% | 41% | 30% | 38% |
| No impact | 6% | 12% | 10% | 21% | 12% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 2% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 64 | 115 | 69 | 43 | 291 |
| C. Developments in Russian universities since 2017 | | | | | |
| Very negative | 27% | 21% | 37% | 17% | 26% |
| Somewhat negative | 44% | 50% | 39% | 36% | 44% |
| No impact | 26% | 21% | 20% | 45% | 25% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 3% | 9% | 4% | 2% | 6% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 62 | 112 | 70 | 42 | 286 |
| D. The US government's foreign policies since 2017 | | | | | |
| Very negative | 10% | 17% | 12% | 14% | 14% |
| Somewhat negative | 50% | 50% | 33% | 21% | 42% |
| No impact | 33% | 29% | 54% | 60% | 41% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 7% | 4% | 1% | 5% | 4% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 60 | 113 | 69 | 43 | 285 |
| E. Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for secessionists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 | | | | | |
| Very negative | 41% | 35% | 40% | 37% | 38% |
| Somewhat negative | 48% | 41% | 36% | 35% | 40% |
| No impact | 6% | 21% | 19% | 26% | 18% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 5% | 3% | 6% | 2% | 4% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 117 | 70 | 43 | 293 |
| F. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 | | | | | |
| Very negative | 88% | 92% | 89% | 84% | 89% |
| Somewhat negative | 3% | 4% | 0% | 9% | 4% |
| No impact | 2% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 2% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 8% | 3% | 8% | 5% | 5% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 64 | 119 | 72 | 44 | 299 |

Note: Differences by discipline statistically significant *ONLY* in Panels A, C, and D .

At least according to these subjective assessments, these external factors have harmed research in all four disciplines. In fact, variations across disciplines are minimal, and statistically significant only for the pandemic, developments in Russian universities, and US government policies. Scholars in both the

REES/other category and also, to some extent, the social sciences assess all three factors somewhat less negatively than historians and Slavists tend to.

We sought a more detailed picture about specific ways the war has affected research on Russia by asking ten questions about potential effects that came up in the qualitative phase of the assessment and in widespread discussions among colleagues since February 2022 (Table 18). *The impact of the war on the ability to do research on Russia moving forward is assessed overwhelmingly as “very negative” across all disciplines (Panel A)*. Other possible effects are viewed in more mixed terms. For example, a sizable minority (29%) believes the war could have a positive effect on the inflow of graduate students who want to conduct research on research (Panel B), though over twice as many expect the impact to be very or somewhat negative. Similarly, while two-thirds expect the war to have a negative impact on the ability of researchers to address the needs of policymakers for expertise on Russia, most of those fall in the “somewhat negative” category, and one fifth of respondents think the war will have a positive effect in this area (Panel C).

Perspectives are more uniformly grim regarding the likely impact on sustaining collaborations already underway with scholars based in Russia (Panel D), and about half note a *very* negative impact on their own willingness to work with scholars based in institutions affiliated with the Russian government (Panel E). Yet 55% say the war will have either no impact or a positive effect on their willingness to work with Russian scholars at universities unaffiliated with the government (Panel F). This suggests the window might remain open for such collaborations if non-government universities in Russia are able to survive government crackdowns apparent at the time of this writing.

On the brighter side, views on the likely effect of the war on appreciation for research on Russia in respondents’ disciplines is mixed, with equal proportions (42% vs. 41%) seeing a positive vs. negative impact (Panel G). Sixty percent of social scientists fall in the “positive” camp. More than four fifths overall anticipate a positive (48% very positive) impact on appreciation for research on Ukraine in their discipline (Panel H), and optimistic views also prevail, if more in the “somewhat” positive category, with respect to appreciation for research on other countries in the region (Panel I). Finally, we see a wide range of views as to the likely impact on the availability of funding for research on Russia (Panel J): while about half believe the impact will be negative, 31% anticipate a positive impact. Social scientists stand out as especially optimistic that the war will bring more funding to support work on Russia (48% positive).

Moving from more abstract, subjective views about the likely impact of the war on the field, we next posed a battery of questions exploring how the war may have influenced respondents personally (Table 19). Here we observe still more diversity of responses. Although 44% indicated that the war has led them to abandon research projects they had underway about Russia (Panel A), one third (33%) said it had inspired them to begin new research projects on Russia (Panel B). Thus, on balance the war has had more of a negative than positive effect on respondents’ own research on Russia, new projects do somewhat offset the suspension of old projects. Researchers are likely shifting to new topics in studies of Russia, perhaps as old topics can no longer be studied or have been rendered obsolete by recent developments. Roughly equal percentages of respondents (32% and 36%, respectively) said the war had encouraged them to initiate new research projects on Ukraine (Panel C) and on other countries of Eurasia (Panel D). From the perspective of the war’s impact on research agendas covering the entire post-Soviet or Eurasian region, it is therefore far from clear that the net impact has been to curtail the

volume of research projects underway. Although many scholars may have to change their focus and drop projects on Russia that have been underway, those willing and able to shift gears are likely to find new research opportunities sparked as a result Russia’s war on Ukraine. Less than one year into the full-scale war, there was already evidence that such re-tooling had begun to take place.

TABLE 18. Impact of Russia's Full-fledged Invasion of Ukraine on your Discipline in Next 5 Years?

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|---|--------|---------|----------------|-------------|-------|
| A. Ability of US-based scholars to conduct research on Russia moving forward | | | | | |
| Very negative | 81% | 88% | 88% | 82% | 86% |
| Somewhat negative | 19% | 10% | 10% | 14% | 12% |
| No impact | 0% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 1% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 0% | 0% | 1% | 2% | 1% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 64 | 120 | 73 | 44 | 301 |
| B. Inflow of PhD students in coming years who will want to conduct research on Russia | | | | | |
| Very negative | 43% | 31% | 36% | 31% | 34% |
| Somewhat negative | 38% | 31% | 27% | 29% | 31% |
| No impact | 0% | 8% | 3% | 7% | 5% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 19% | 30% | 34% | 33% | 29% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 118 | 73 | 42 | 296 |
| C. Ability of researchers to address the needs of US policymakers regarding knowledge and understanding of contemporary Russia | | | | | |
| Very negative | 27% | 21% | 28% | 26% | 25% |
| Somewhat negative | 48% | 43% | 44% | 26% | 42% |
| No impact | 8% | 13% | 8% | 24% | 12% |
| Somewhat positive | 13% | 20% | 18% | 21% | 18% |
| Very positive | 5% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 3% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 115 | 72 | 42 | 292 |
| D. Ability to sustain prior collaborations between US-based scholars and colleagues who were based in Russia until 2022 | | | | | |
| Very negative | 70% | 61% | 79% | 63% | 68% |
| Somewhat negative | 27% | 33% | 18% | 30% | 28% |
| No impact | 0% | 4% | 3% | 5% | 3% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 3% | 2% | 0% | 2% | 2% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 116 | 72 | 43 | 294 |
| E. Your willingness to collaborate with scholars currently based in Russian universities, research institutes, or other organizations affiliated with the Russian government | | | | | |
| Very negative | 54% | 42% | 49% | 52% | 48% |
| Somewhat negative | 25% | 21% | 29% | 23% | 24% |
| No impact | 17% | 33% | 21% | 18% | 24% |
| Very/somewhat positive | 3% | 4% | 1% | 7% | 4% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 116 | 72 | 44 | 295 |

TABLE 18 (cont.) Impact of Russia's Full-fledged Invasion of Ukraine on your Discipline in Next 5 Years?

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|--|--------|---------|-------------------|----------------|-------|
| F. Your willingness to collaborate with scholars currently based in Russian universities, research institutes, or other organizations <i>not affiliated</i> with the Russian government | | | | | |
| Very negative | 16% | 9% | 14% | 11% | 12% |
| Somewhat negative | 37% | 28% | 40% | 32% | 33% |
| No impact | 37% | 53% | 40% | 34% | 44% |
| Somewhat positive | 8% | 7% | 4% | 16% | 8% |
| Very positive | 3% | 3% | 1% | 7% | 3% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 115 | 72 | 44 | 294 |
| G. Appreciation for research on Russia within your discipline | | | | | |
| Very negative | 22% | 20% | 10% | 23% | 19% |
| Somewhat negative | 29% | 23% | 17% | 16% | 22% |
| No impact | 25% | 17% | 14% | 21% | 19% |
| Somewhat positive | 13% | 31% | 43% | 28% | 30% |
| Very positive | 11% | 9% | 17% | 12% | 12% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 119 | 72 | 43 | 297 |
| H. Appreciation for research on Ukraine in your discipline | | | | | |
| Very negative | 2% | 5% | 3% | 5% | 4% |
| Somewhat negative | 2% | 3% | 1% | 7% | 3% |
| No impact | 14% | 12% | 7% | 9% | 11% |
| Somewhat positive | 38% | 30% | 42% | 27% | 34% |
| Very positive | 44% | 49% | 47% | 52% | 48% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 116 | 72 | 44 | 295 |
| I. Appreciation for research on other countries of Eurasia in your discipline | | | | | |
| Very negative | 0% | 4% | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| Somewhat negative | 2% | 5% | 4% | 7% | 4% |
| No impact | 19% | 26% | 19% | 23% | 23% |
| Somewhat positive | 60% | 49% | 58% | 49% | 54% |
| Very positive | 19% | 15% | 17% | 19% | 17% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 118 | 72 | 43 | 296 |
| J. Availability of grant funding for research on Russia | | | | | |
| Very negative | 33% | 25% | 21% | 33% | 27% |
| Somewhat negative | 35% | 21% | 17% | 16% | 22% |
| No impact | 16% | 26% | 15% | 16% | 20% |
| Somewhat positive | 11% | 24% | 35% | 28% | 24% |
| Very positive | 5% | 4% | 13% | 7% | 7% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 113 | 72 | 43 | 291 |

Note: Differences by discipline statistically significant *ONLY* in *Panels G and J* . No significant differences by PhD vs. non-PhD

Only about 15% of respondents indicate that the war has prompted them to end formal ties to Russian institutions (Panel E). However, because about half did not have any such affiliations (and therefore opted for the “not applicable” response), it is likely the case that about 30% with affiliations ended them. Here too we see something of a countervailing trend, as 21% said they the war has led them to start new collaborations with scholars who have left Russia since the war began (Panel F). In contrast, 12% indicate they have halted an existing collaboration with scholars based in Russia due to the war (Panel G). Doing so appears to be more the exception than the rule. Setting aside the 42% to whom the question does not apply (presumably because they had no collaborations underway with Russia-based scholars in February 2022), most of those who working on collaborative projects at that time said the war did not inspire them to end them at all (40% overall, over three times more than the proportion who said the full-scale war led them to curtail collaborations.)

However, consistent with the patterns described in the previous paragraph, 44% give some indication that due to Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine they have shifted research plans away from Russia (Panel H). *Altogether, the data unmistakably show that indeed the war has pushed some US-based researchers away from doing research on Russia, and that has included some ending of ongoing collaborations with Russian scholars and institutions. These tendencies have been offset, if not completely, by researchers initiating new projects on Ukraine and other countries in the region and by starting new collaborations with Russian scholars who have been displaced from Russian following the launch of the full-scale invasion.* Generally, social scientists and Slavists evince somewhat greater tendencies than historians and researchers in REES or other disciplines to initiate new projects on Russia, collaborations with displaced Russian scholars, and new research on Ukraine.

US-based scholars who work on Russia have been active in sharing their expertise with the public and with policymakers via interviews and media appearances (Panel I), panels and roundtables (Panel J), and briefings (Panel K) about the war. These efforts potentially play a vital role in informing academics and community members outside of the Russian studies field about Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and possibly contribute insight to policymakers who face a broad array of challenging decisions in response to the war. It is noteworthy that social scientists tend to have a greater media presence, while respondents in the REES/other category conduct significantly more briefings of officials (an average of 1.7 per respondent) than those in the “big three” disciplines. The latter difference may reflect a tendency of graduates of MA programs in REES to enter government service or think tanks. Generally, however, although we checked for systematic, statistically significant differences between PhDs and non-PhDs for all the measures of the impact of the war, we only found them in a single case.

The 2022 survey confirms most US-based scholars who study Russia perceive the impact of the war on Russian studies as overwhelmingly negative. Most anticipate adverse consequences such as reduced prospects for continuing research on Russia, maintaining collaborations with Russia-based scholars, and finding funding, both in general and for themselves personally.

TABLE 19. Impact of the War on Your Own Research

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|--|--------|---------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| "To what extent, if any, has Russia's full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had the following specific consequences for your research?" | | | | | |
| A. Led you to abandon or suspend current research projects on Russia | | | | | |
| Very much | 24% | 20% | 28% | 29% | 24% |
| Somewhat | 24% | 19% | 24% | 12% | 20% |
| Not very much | 13% | 14% | 8% | 17% | 13% |
| Not at all | 32% | 38% | 32% | 31% | 34% |
| Not applicable | 8% | 9% | 7% | 12% | 9% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 121 | 71 | 42 | 297 |
| B. Led you to initiate new research projects about Russia | | | | | |
| Very much | 5% | 11% | 14% | 9% | 10% |
| Somewhat | 24% | 19% | 33% | 14% | 23% |
| Not very much | 39% | 14% | 11% | 21% | 19% |
| Not at all | 26% | 46% | 36% | 47% | 39% |
| Not applicable | 6% | 11% | 6% | 9% | 8% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 62 | 118 | 72 | 43 | 295 |
| C. Led you to initiate new research on Ukraine | | | | | |
| Very much | 13% | 9% | 19% | 21% | 14% |
| Somewhat | 32% | 13% | 14% | 16% | 18% |
| Not very much | 13% | 15% | 8% | 26% | 15% |
| Not at all | 30% | 51% | 47% | 21% | 41% |
| Not applicable | 13% | 12% | 11% | 16% | 13% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 118 | 72 | 43 | 296 |
| D. Led you to initiate new research on other countries of Eurasia | | | | | |
| Very much | 11% | 8% | 24% | 16% | 14% |
| Somewhat | 25% | 20% | 17% | 28% | 22% |
| Not very much | 13% | 14% | 8% | 12% | 12% |
| Not at all | 41% | 47% | 42% | 33% | 43% |
| Not applicable | 10% | 11% | 10% | 12% | 10% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 118 | 72 | 43 | 296 |
| E. Led you to end formal affiliation(s) with (one or more) Russian academic institution(s) | | | | | |
| Very much | 5% | 8% | 19% | 9% | 10% |
| Somewhat | 6% | 5% | 8% | 0% | 5% |
| Not very much | 11% | 3% | 1% | 5% | 4% |
| Not at all | 33% | 32% | 29% | 26% | 31% |
| Not applicable | 44% | 53% | 42% | 60% | 49% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 118 | 72 | 43 | 296 |

TABLE 19 (cont.) Impact of the War on Your Own Research

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|--|--------|---------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| "To what extent, if any, has Russia's full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had the following specific consequences for your research?" (cont.) | | | | | |
| F. Led you to initiate new collaborations with scholars who have departed Russia since the war began | | | | | |
| Very much | 11% | 2% | 6% | 5% | 5% |
| Somewhat | 17% | 14% | 19% | 14% | 16% |
| Not very much | 17% | 7% | 8% | 11% | 10% |
| Not at all | 32% | 50% | 53% | 39% | 45% |
| Not applicable | 22% | 28% | 14% | 32% | 24% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 117 | 72 | 44 | 296 |
| G. Led you to stop or suspend an individual or team based research collaboration with a scholar who is currently or recently based in Russia | | | | | |
| Very much | 2% | 8% | 10% | 7% | 7% |
| Somewhat | 3% | 3% | 7% | 9% | 5% |
| Not very much | 11% | 3% | 6% | 9% | 6% |
| Not at all | 40% | 39% | 44% | 33% | 40% |
| Not applicable | 44% | 47% | 33% | 42% | 42% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 118 | 72 | 43 | 296 |
| H. Led you to shift your research interests and plans away from Russia toward other countries or topics | | | | | |
| Very much | 24% | 20% | 28% | 29% | 24% |
| Somewhat | 24% | 19% | 24% | 12% | 20% |
| Not very much | 13% | 14% | 8% | 17% | 13% |
| Not at all | 32% | 38% | 32% | 31% | 34% |
| Not applicable | 8% | 9% | 7% | 12% | 9% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 121 | 71 | 42 | 297 |
| "Please indicate how many times (if any) you have given the following during 2022 (if none, please enter 0)" | | | | | |
| I. Interviews with journalists or mass media appearances about Russia's invasion of Ukraine | | | | | |
| Total | 1.5 | 1.8 | 5.9 | 1.8 | 2.8 |
| PhDs | 1.9 | 2.0 | 6.3 | 2.5 | 3.2 |
| Non-PhDs | 0.0 | 0.5 | 2.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| J. Public lectures, roundtables, or events about Russia's invasion of Ukraine | | | | | |
| Total | 2.3 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 1.7 | 2.3 |
| K. Briefings or communications with US government officials or other policymakers about Russia's invasion of Ukraine | | | | | |
| Total | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.7 | 0.8 |

Note: Differences by discipline statistically significant *ONLY* in Panels B, C, E, F, and I. Differences by PhD vs. non-PhD significant only for Panel I

At the same time, sizable minorities of researchers also see the war as having pushed them to initiate new research on Russia, Ukraine, and other Eurasian countries, and to forge new collaborations with displaced Russian scholars. Meanwhile, they have been quite active in efforts to inform the public, as well as (to a lesser extent) policymakers about the war based on their expertise.

DE-COLONIZATION

Calls to de-colonize Russian studies could be heard before Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, 2022, but the full-scale invasion has added fuel and force to them. As discussed in Section 2 of this report, advocates for de-colonization have a variety of specific goals in mind. To call for de-colonizing a field implies that until now it suffers from a colonial, colonized, or colonialist approach. In public discussions, writings, and conference panels, it has been claimed that Russian studies has been too Russo-centric, in the sense of ignoring both non-ethnic Russian groups and regions within Russia and also other nations, peoples, cultures, and languages of Eurasia. In a similar vein, to the extent that Russian studies scholars have taken non-Russians into account, they have tended to do so in a manner that treats them as important and significant only in so far as they relate to Russia—that is, even if other peoples are considered, they are viewed largely or even entirely through a Russo-centric frame. Another variant of the argument emphasizes how not only (and not so much) an ethnic Russian viewpoint per se, but rather one rooted in Muscovite elites, tends to be adopted whole cloth by Western scholars of Eurasia. Some historians assert that prevailing historical paradigms frame Russian history as one of national state-building while eliding the imperial, colonizing character of the Russian state throughout most of its history, while Soviet historians have tended to dismiss or downplay how the Soviet state promoted and reinforced ethnic Russian domination, exploitation, and control under the guise of the supposedly liberating, modernizing Marxist-Leninist ideology. Still another de-colonization perspective advocates for more validation and resources to be directed to indigenous scholars who belong to the regions and peoples that have been overlooked as a result of Russo-centric approaches and other international academic hierarchies: the voices of such scholars have been silenced and not only they, but also broader knowledge and understanding of the region, have suffered as a result. Scholars in all disciplines who have sought to advance research on non-Russian peoples and regions perceive that research on Russia is privileged as somehow more relevant and valid by editors, funders, and hiring and promotion committees, allowing scholars who study Russia to monopolize the scarce resources available for studies of the broader Eurasian region.

In Part I, we saw that Russian studies scholars who participated in interviews and focus groups generally supported these goals, at times with some reservations. But qualitative interviews cannot be viewed as representative. The survey offers insight into how views of what de-colonization means and also attitudes toward it are distributed within the Russian studies community. Although many of those who call for de-colonization are outside of Russian studies or on its periphery, some de-colonization advocates are themselves long-standing practitioners of Russian studies. Moreover, attempts to de-colonize are more likely to succeed in the long run if there is support for its goals from within their object itself—that is, from within Russian studies. It is therefore of considerable interest how the term “de-colonization” is understood by the Russian studies community and to what extent its members support or oppose its various goals.

TABLE 20. Decolonization: Awareness and Support

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|--|--------|---------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| A. How much, if anything, have you heard about calls by scholars to "de-colonize" Russian/Eurasian studies? | | | | | |
| A great deal | 72% | 60% | 51% | 48% | 58% |
| Something | 23% | 26% | 29% | 30% | 26% |
| A little bit | 3% | 12% | 16% | 16% | 12% |
| Nothing | 2% | 2% | 4% | 7% | 3% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 64 | 121 | 73 | 44 | 302 |
| B. What impact, overall, would "de-colonizing" Russian/Eurasian studies have on research about Russia in your discipline? | | | | | |
| Very negative | 6% | 13% | 8% | 12% | 10% |
| Somewhat negative | 11% | 14% | 7% | 7% | 11% |
| Equal parts negative and positive | 14% | 14% | 14% | 7% | 13% |
| Somewhat positive | 21% | 14% | 25% | 26% | 20% |
| Very positive | 33% | 24% | 24% | 31% | 27% |
| Hard to say | 14% | 20% | 22% | 17% | 19% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 120 | 72 | 42 | 297 |
| C. Which statement do you agree with? | | | | | |
| I do <i>not</i> support special efforts to devote more resources and/or publishing opportunities for research about Eurasian countries other than Russia in my discipline. | 2% | 8% | 7% | 7% | 6% |
| I support [such efforts] but <i>only so long as</i> doing so does not divert resources/publishing opportunities away from research about Russia | 50% | 60% | 50% | 50% | 54% |
| I support [such efforts] <i>even if</i> doing so diverts resources and/or publishing opportunities away from research about Russia | 48% | 32% | 43% | 43% | 40% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 62 | 122 | 72 | 44 | 300 |
| D. Overall, how much would you say you support or oppose "de-colonizing" Russian/Eurasian studies? | | | | | |
| Fully support | 47% | 33% | 38% | 47% | 39% |
| Somewhat support | 23% | 20% | 25% | 14% | 21% |
| Partly support/partly oppose | 17% | 31% | 24% | 19% | 25% |
| Somewhat oppose | 8% | 7% | 6% | 9% | 7% |
| Fully oppose | 5% | 9% | 7% | 12% | 8% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 64 | 121 | 71 | 43 | 299 |

Note: In Panel A, Slavic differs significantly from the other fields combined. No other differences by discipline and none by PhD vs. non-PhD are statistically significant.

We began with a question to ascertain whether respondents had heard about calls to de-colonize Russian studies: only 3% said they had not heard anything about such calls (Table 20A). We then asked a series

of questions designed to ascertain what goals and objectives respondents specifically associate with de-colonization, to which we turn next. But first, we consider how respondents ultimately evaluate the goals of de-colonization: do they support or oppose them?

Although there is evidence of some objections to de-colonization, overall there is far more support for its goals within the Russian studies community than there is opposition to them. To start, about half of respondents said that de-colonization would likely have a somewhat or very positive impact on research about Russia in their discipline (Table 20B), compared to only 20% who perceived a somewhat or very negative impact and 13% who see both positive and negative in equal parts. Only 6% said they do not support allocating more resources and opportunities within their discipline to the study of Eurasian countries other than Russia (Table 20C). However, slightly over half (54%) support that goal, but only so long as it does not divert resources from the study of Russia—that is, they support broadening research on other Eurasian countries and peoples but only if doing so does not come at the expense of research on Russia. The remaining 40% of US-based scholars working on Russia support this goal of de-colonization *even if* it means fewer resources for studies of Russia.

The results for this question suggest that the issue is not whether Russia scholars oppose de-colonization goals—only a small portion of them do. Instead, the issue should be framed as whether and how much they are prepared to sacrifice resources and opportunities for research on Russia in the interest of de-colonization. On balance, 60% of the 2022 sample supports, either fully or somewhat, the goals of de-colonization, while only 15% oppose those goals (Panel D). Thus, it appears that there is little strong opposition within the field to the objectives of de-colonization. But there are concerns that those goals not be pursued at the expense of research on Russia. On balance, notwithstanding the latter consideration, a healthy majority ultimately comes down in support of de-colonization, while only a relatively small minority opposes it. We do not find evidence of much variation by discipline or PhD status in support for de-colonization.

Turning now to the question of how the term “de-colonization” is generally understood: we addressed this question by listing seven specific aims that at least some scholars have associated with de-colonization and asked respondents whether, for each, they consider it a central aim of de-colonization, an important but not central aim, an unimportant aim, or not an aim at all (Table 21). By this measure, the goal most commonly deemed to be a “key, central” aim of de-colonization (identified as such by 69% of respondents) is to “reduce the extent to which research on Russia adopts a Russo-centric perspective” (Panel D), followed by (at 50%) to “increase resources and/or publication opportunities for research on other countries of Eurasia” (Panel B). Encouraging research that highlights Russia’s imperialist and colonizing tendencies (Panel F) and enhancing resources for research on ethnic and linguistic minorities within Russia (Panel C) follow close behind at 47% and 44% respectively. Fewer respondents—36%—see promoting research about Ukraine specifically as a central goal of de-colonization (Panel A). Thus, although the Russian assault on Ukrainian territory and nationhood has given de-colonization considerable momentum, it is not typically viewed as a movement geared solely or even mainly toward advancing a greater research focus only on Ukraine. Only 6% view de-colonization as a ploy to discourage young scholars in their discipline from developing expertise on Russia (Panel E), and only 4% associate it with encouraging research on how Western powers have subordinated Russia (Panel G). Thus, US-based scholars who conduct research on Russia appear to have clear and accurate understandings about various dimensions of de-colonization, as its goals have been voiced by a range of proponents both within and outside of Russian studies.

TABLE 21. Decolonization: Goals

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|---|--------|---------|-------------------|----------------|-------|
| A. Increase resources and/or publication opportunities for research on Ukraine | | | | | |
| A very central, key aim | 44% | 36% | 33% | 28% | 36% |
| An important aim, but not central | 49% | 50% | 50% | 44% | 49% |
| A fairly unimportant aim | 5% | 4% | 3% | 12% | 5% |
| Not at all an aim | 0% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| Hard to say | 2% | 6% | 13% | 14% | 8% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 119 | 72 | 43 | 297 |
| B. Increase resources and/or publication opportunities for research on other countries of Eurasia | | | | | |
| A very central, key aim | 57% | 52% | 50% | 36% | 50% |
| An important aim, but not central | 37% | 37% | 36% | 50% | 39% |
| A fairly unimportant aim | 6% | 4% | 4% | 2% | 4% |
| Not at all an aim | 0% | 1% | 3% | 0% | 1% |
| Hard to say | 0% | 6% | 7% | 12% | 6% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 118 | 72 | 42 | 295 |
| C. Increase resources and/or publication opportunities for research on ethnic and/or linguistic minorities within Russia | | | | | |
| A very central, key aim | 50% | 52% | 35% | 31% | 44% |
| An important aim, but not central | 42% | 37% | 42% | 38% | 39% |
| A fairly unimportant aim | 8% | 6% | 7% | 10% | 7% |
| Not at all an aim | 0% | 0% | 7% | 5% | 2% |
| Hard to say | 0% | 5% | 10% | 17% | 7% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 62 | 116 | 72 | 42 | 292 |
| D. Reduce the extent to which research about Russia adopts a Russo-centric perspective | | | | | |
| A very central, key aim | 65% | 72% | 68% | 68% | 69% |
| An important aim, but not central | 22% | 14% | 15% | 12% | 16% |
| A fairly unimportant aim | 10% | 5% | 6% | 2% | 6% |
| Not at all an aim | 2% | 3% | 3% | 5% | 3% |
| Hard to say | 2% | 6% | 8% | 12% | 6% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 118 | 72 | 41 | 294 |
| E. Discourage young scholars in your discipline from developing expertise about Russia | | | | | |
| A very central, key aim | 5% | 6% | 8% | 7% | 6% |
| An important aim, but not central | 11% | 12% | 4% | 5% | 9% |
| A fairly unimportant aim | 14% | 15% | 11% | 5% | 12% |
| Not at all an aim | 62% | 52% | 68% | 60% | 59% |
| Hard to say | 8% | 15% | 8% | 24% | 13% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 117 | 72 | 42 | 294 |

TABLE 21 (cont.) Decolonization: Goals

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|---|--------|---------|-------------------|----------------|-------|
| F. Encourage more research that highlights Russia's imperialistic and colonizing tendencies | | | | | |
| A very central, key aim | 46% | 47% | 52% | 38% | 47% |
| An important aim, but not central | 32% | 35% | 23% | 36% | 32% |
| A fairly unimportant aim | 11% | 6% | 10% | 14% | 9% |
| Not at all an aim | 10% | 6% | 7% | 2% | 7% |
| Hard to say | 2% | 6% | 8% | 10% | 6% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 116 | 71 | 42 | 292 |
| G. Encourage more research that highlights how the Western and other powers have subordinated Russia | | | | | |
| A very central, key aim | 6% | 3% | 4% | 5% | 4% |
| An important aim, but not central | 11% | 4% | 4% | 12% | 7% |
| A fairly unimportant aim | 21% | 16% | 15% | 17% | 17% |
| Not at all an aim | 51% | 68% | 67% | 48% | 61% |
| Hard to say | 11% | 9% | 10% | 19% | 11% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 116 | 72 | 42 | 293 |

Note: In Panel C Social Scientists differ significantly from all other disciplines combined. No other differences by discipline and none by PhD vs. non-PhD are statistically significant.

To round out the de-colonization theme, we also posed a number of statements pertaining to specific aspects of de-colonization and asked respondents whether they agree with them. Here too, we find a diversity of views among our respondents, but overall support for de-colonization (Table 22). The qualitative interviews showed that some US-based Russia scholars feel that many or all of the goals of de-colonization have already been important concerns in the field for some time. The survey data suggests that this perception is fairly widespread: over half of respondents (52%) agree that de-colonization has been “underway for some time” in their discipline, while one third disagree (Panel A). Respondents are fairly evenly divided over whether it is possible to advance the goals of de-colonization without taking resources and opportunities away from research on Russia (Panel B), with roughly 40% both agreeing and disagreeing.

One third agree that disproportionate scholarly attention to Russia is justified by Russia’s great power status, while half disagree (Panel C). But there is very little agreement with the proposition that Russia deserves more focus because of its putatively richer culture or history (Panel D): fewer than 10% endorse that view while 80% disagree.

TABLE 22. Decolonization: Agree/Disagree with Specific Claims

| | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other | Total |
|--|--------|---------|-------------------|----------------|-------|
| A. De-colonizing Russian/Eurasian studies has already been underway for decades in my discipline | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 5% | 22% | 10% | 0% | 12% |
| Somewhat Agree | 46% | 53% | 22% | 29% | 40% |
| Neither Agree Nor Disagree | 10% | 10% | 22% | 21% | 14% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 29% | 9% | 23% | 29% | 19% |
| Strongly Disagree | 11% | 6% | 23% | 21% | 13% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 121 | 73 | 42 | 299 |
| B. It is impossible to enhance support for research on other Eurasian countries without reducing support for research on Russia | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 11% | 18% | 15% | 14% | 15% |
| Somewhat Agree | 35% | 29% | 21% | 26% | 28% |
| Neither Agree Nor Disagree | 19% | 13% | 18% | 19% | 16% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 19% | 22% | 29% | 31% | 24% |
| Strongly Disagree | 16% | 18% | 18% | 10% | 16% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 120 | 73 | 42 | 298 |
| C. There should be more research on Russia than on other countries in Eurasia because Russia is the most powerful country in the region | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 3% | 9% | 12% | 5% | 8% |
| Somewhat Agree | 26% | 27% | 26% | 17% | 25% |
| Neither Agree Nor Disagree | 15% | 16% | 15% | 33% | 18% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 30% | 26% | 26% | 14% | 25% |
| Strongly Disagree | 26% | 22% | 21% | 31% | 24% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 61 | 121 | 73 | 42 | 297 |
| D. There should be more research on Russia than on other countries in Eurasia because Russia has a richer history and/or culture than other countries in the region | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 3% | 3% | 0% | 2% | 2% |
| Somewhat Agree | 8% | 5% | 3% | 12% | 6% |
| Neither Agree Nor Disagree | 13% | 11% | 14% | 7% | 11% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 18% | 16% | 18% | 10% | 16% |
| Strongly Disagree | 58% | 65% | 66% | 69% | 64% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 62 | 121 | 73 | 42 | 298 |
| E. Had Russian/Eurasian studies been "decolonized" sooner, our field would have better anticipated Russia's full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 27% | 5% | 10% | 19% | 13% |
| Somewhat Agree | 15% | 11% | 19% | 21% | 15% |
| Neither Agree Nor Disagree | 10% | 16% | 21% | 19% | 16% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 16% | 22% | 22% | 10% | 19% |
| Strongly Disagree | 32% | 47% | 29% | 31% | 37% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 62 | 120 | 73 | 42 | 297 |
| F. Proponents of "decolonizing" Russian/Eurasian studies often exaggerate the extent of the problems they identify | | | | | |
| Strongly Agree | 11% | 15% | 14% | 10% | 13% |
| Somewhat Agree | 17% | 31% | 24% | 17% | 24% |
| Neither Agree Nor Disagree | 17% | 20% | 15% | 31% | 20% |
| Somewhat Disagree | 19% | 18% | 15% | 10% | 16% |
| Strongly Disagree | 35% | 17% | 31% | 33% | 26% |
| <i>Column N</i> | 63 | 120 | 71 ⁷⁷ | 42 | 296 |

Note: Differences by discipline are only significant for Panels A and E. Panel C differs significantly by PhD vs. non-PhD, with PhDs more likely to agree somewhat or strongly (36% vs. 19%).

One of the strongest claims in favor of de-colonization asserts that some form of Russo-centric perspective distorted understanding of the current Russian political regime in such a way that led policymakers to underestimate the threat of an aggressive invasion like Putin launched in February 2022. Although a substantial number of respondents (28%) endorse this view, 56% disagree (Panel E). Of course, that disagreement could well have less to do with questioning the goals of de-colonization than with skepticism that academic debates influence policy at all. Lastly, we sought to determine whether broad support for de-colonization is accompanied by a defensive sense that its proponents tend to overstate the extent of the problems that they identify: here, once again, we find a diversity of views, with disagreement (42%) more common than agreement (37%).

Overall, the survey paints a picture of a Russian studies field actively engaging with the discussion over what de-colonization means and how forcefully its goals should be advanced. Unquestionably, the survey data indicate there is more support for de-colonization among US-based Russia scholars than opposition to it. In fact, there is only minimal stated opposition to any of the specific goals of de-colonization. The main areas of disagreement are whether de-colonization goals should be pursued even if doing so means cutting resources allocated to support studies of Russia and whether de-colonization efforts had already been underway prior to February 24, 2022. The question for the field is apparently not whether to promote de-colonization at all, but which aspects of it to emphasize, at what cost (in terms of resources for Russian studies), and how novel or pressing the concerns that have inspired calls to de-colonize the field truly are (with the latter being largely a question of intellectual history, with little practical significance). On these issues, we find a fairly wide distribution of diverse views among Russia scholars. This is to be expected, given the heightened intensity of debates over the issue, which is a natural feature of the wartime context in which these discussions are occurring. It is a sign of the health of the larger field that there remains some disagreement and diversity of perspectives over such core issues.

ENCOURAGING TRENDS?

In light of the general sense of doom and gloom in the Russian studies field, which has been amply documented in this study, we decided to conclude the survey on a more upbeat note by asking respondents to cite up to three trends in the past five years (from a list, ranked in order of importance) that they consider to be the most encouraging for the field. Strikingly, the two trends identified as the most encouraging of all mirror two of the three concerns about the most significant gaps and problems in the field, and are also linked to de-colonization (see Table 16A): the expansion of comparative perspective and increased attention to Russia's minorities and regions outside of Moscow (Table 23A.) The same basic ordering applies when we rank the encouraging trends by the percentages who indicated they are among the top 3 (Table 23B). However, in the latter ranking decreasing emphasis on Russian exceptionalism clearly comes in third place. Here we observe some distinctions by discipline. Slavists stand out for emphasizing greater attention to ethnic minorities in Russia and declining Russian exceptionalism, historians for citing expanding comparative perspective, and social scientists for pointing to increased methodological rigor, engagement with theoretical concerns of the discipline, and policy relevance as encouraging tendencies, as among the three most encouraging trends.

TABLE 23. Which (if any) of the following you consider to be the most, second most, and third most encouraging tendencies in studies of Russia by US-based scholars within your discipline from 2017-2021?

A. Most Encouraging Tendency

| | <i>N</i> | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other |
|--|----------|----------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| Expanding comparative perspective (less narrow focus on Russia) | | 21% | 27% | 26% | 6% | 23% |
| Greater attention to Russia’s ethnic minority populations and/or regions outside of Moscow | | 18% | 23% | 18% | 16% | 13% |
| Growing policy relevance and impact outside academia | | 11% | 8% | 8% | 17% | 15% |
| Deepening of knowledge of Russia on the part of US- based researchers | | 10% | 6% | 8% | 11% | 18% |
| Nothing at all | | 9% | 8% | 11% | 5% | 10% |
| Better engagement with theoretical concerns in your discipline | | 8% | 5% | 7% | 14% | 5% |
| Decreasing emphasis on Russian exceptionalism | | 7% | 11% | 8% | 6% | 0% |
| Increasing use of Russian language sources | | 6% | 8% | 4% | 5% | 10% |
| Retreat of Cold War attitudes/assumptions among researchers | | 6% | 3% | 8% | 5% | 8% |
| Improving methodological rigor | | 6% | 5% | 5% | 8% | 5% |
| Flourishing of collaborations with Russia-based scholars | | 6% | 3% | 6% | 3% | 10% |
| Enhanced access to reliable empirical data | | 5% | 3% | 6% | 5% | 8% |
| Something else | | 4% | 3% | 4% | 5% | 3% |
| Re-orientation of focus away from disciplinary concerns toward accurate depictions of Russia | | 3% | 3% | 3% | 0% | 5% |
| More balanced attitudes toward the Russian government | | 2% | 0% | 2% | 3% | 5% |
| Decreased focus on current events or policy debates | | 1% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 3% |

TABLE 23 (cont.) Which (if any) of the following you consider to be the most, second most, and third most encouraging tendencies in studies of Russia by US-based scholars within your discipline from 2017-2021?

B. Among top 3 most encouraging tendencies

| | Overall | Slavic | History | Social Science | REES/ other |
|--|----------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| <i>N</i> | 285 | 62 | 119 | 63 | 40 |
| Greater attention to Russia’s ethnic minority populations and/or regions outside of Moscow | 49% | 61% | 55% | 32% | 40% |
| Expanding comparative perspective (less narrow focus on Russia) | 47% | 42% | 55% | 38% | 48% |
| Growing policy relevance and impact outside academia | 25% | 26% | 17% | 38% | 30% |
| Retreat of Cold War attitudes/assumptions among researchers | 25% | 27% | 29% | 13% | 30% |
| Decreasing emphasis on Russian exceptionalism | 25% | 34% | 29% | 17% | 10% |
| Deepening of knowledge of Russia on the part of US- based researchers | 23% | 21% | 18% | 27% | 30% |
| Flourishing of collaborations with Russia-based scholars | 19% | 13% | 20% | 19% | 20% |
| Better engagement with theoretical concerns in your discipline | 18% | 13% | 16% | 25% | 23% |
| Increasing use of Russian language sources | 18% | 21% | 14% | 17% | 23% |
| Improving methodological rigor | 17% | 8% | 15% | 29% | 20% |
| Nothing at all | 17% | 15% | 18% | 11% | 25% |
| Enhanced access to reliable empirical data | 14% | 6% | 14% | 16% | 20% |
| Re-orientation of focus away from disciplinary concerns toward accurate depictions of Russia | 12% | 16% | 9% | 6% | 20% |
| Something else | 7% | 8% | 8% | 5% | 8% |
| More balanced attitudes toward the Russian government | 6% | 5% | 7% | 3% | 13% |
| Decreased focus on current events or policy debates | 5% | 3% | 8% | 2% | 8% |

V. FINDINGS FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL SURVEY

Basic data

- The web-based ASEES survey, “Russian Studies in the US: Institutional Survey 2022” was initiated on October 7, 2022 and closed on December 18, 2022.

- Invitations to complete the survey were sent to 44 institutions, all of which met at least one of the following criteria: 1) REES National Resource Center; 2) graduate program in Slavic/Russian language, literature, and/or culture; 3) well-known exchange program with Russia.
- Follow up reminders were sent to those institutions that had not replied within the first two weeks. Personalized emails appealing for participation were sent to key personnel at a handful of institutions that had not replied or had submitted mostly incomplete surveys.
- Overall, 29 submitted at least some kind of response, but only 20 provided sufficiently complete answers to be analyzed, for an effective response rate of 45%. By comparison, the response rate for the 2015 institutional survey was 73%. Thus, there was a large decline in the institutional response rate from 2015 to 2022, despite the investigators sending more reminders and follow-up emails in 2022 than in 2015.
- Such a large drop in the response rate is highly unlikely to have occurred by chance. Therefore, the low response rate for the 2022 institutional survey may itself reflect the state of the field in 2022, compared to 2015. The COVID19 pandemic and its aftermath could well have led to decreased staff capacity (relative to workload) in the centers and departments that were surveyed. Finally, Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022 not only may have further added to their workload, but, together with the ensuing criticisms of Russia and of Russian studies that pervaded the field it also may have lowered staff morale and affected interest in contributing to an assessment of Russian studies. These explanations are speculative, and it could be that other factors were to blame for the steep drop in the response rate from 2015 to 2022. For example, the continuing proliferation of online survey requests may have fostered "survey fatigue" among the staff members who were invited to complete the survey or increases in the volume of emails and enhancements of spam filters could have led to more recipients simply missing the invitations. However, we raise the possibility that both COVID19 and Russia's war on Ukraine could have decreased interest in participating in the study, because that would be consistent with the broadly negative impacts that both have had on the Russian studies field (as documented in this report).
- Unfortunately, the low response rate and small sample size limits the information provided by the institutional survey. Readers should keep in mind that the data reported here represent fewer than half of the institutions surveyed, so the picture they paint is incomplete. It is unclear whether the 20 institutions that provided analyzable data are representative of the larger population of institutions invited to participate.
- However, it is still potentially instructive to consider the responses of the 20 institutions that participate. Also, we are able to compare 2015 and 2022 responses for the subset of institutions that responded in both years, which offers the possibility to trace change over time within institutions. The small sample sizes for these comparisons (which vary depending on patterns of non-response across questions) mean these findings should be viewed with caution; however, they are fairly consistent in direction.

MA programs

- 10 out of the 20 institutions (50%) that responded have MA programs in REES.

- They report having granted 295 MA Degrees from the 2017/18 through the 2021/22 academic years (roughly 60 per annum), of which 202 (roughly 40 per annum) involved theses or major papers on Russia.
- They report 127 current MA students, of whom 76 are working on Russia-related topics (at least 25% Russia content).
- Comparing the number of MAs awarded in the prior five years across the two survey years by institutions that completed surveys both years, we see about a 10% decline in the overall number awarded (from 294 to 261), but stability in the number awarded to students who focused on Russia (181 vs. 182). Thus, the rate of production of Russia-focused MA degrees at US institutions appears to have been quite stable.

Graduate certificates and graduate minors

- 8 out of 20 institutions (40%) report having graduate certificates in REES.
- They have granted 51 certificates since the 2017/18 academic year, with 31 of those going to students with a Russia focus in their studies, for an average of about 6 graduate certificates for a Russia-focused program of study per year.
- 3 institutions (15%) have a graduate minor in REES. They have granted 11 minors since 2017/18, of which 7 included a Russia focus in their course of study, for an average of about 1 to 2 PhD minors in Russia-focused REES studies per year.
- We observe no noteworthy changes in the numbers of graduate certificates and minors awarded for Russia-related research topics in the prior five years from 2015 to 2022 among institutions that completed the survey both years.

Faculty coverage, current PhDs, and PhDs granted

- Slavic/Russian language, literature, and/or culture departments contain by far the most tenure-line faculty working on Russia (89), the most current PhD students (131), and have granted the most PhDs (69) since the 2017/18 academic year (Figure 1).
- History comes next, with 43 tenure-line faculty who specialize on Russia, 46 current PhD students, and 51 PhDs granted, for an average of about 10 per year (Figure 1).
- Political Science comes in third, with 30 tenure-line faculty who specialize on Russia, 23 current PhD students and 16 PhDs granted since the 2017/18 academic year. The number of current Political Science PhDs is 44% higher than the number of Political Science completed PhDs in the last five academic years (Figure 1).

- Coverage in other social science disciplines, such as economics, sociology, anthropology and geography, has been considerably lower. Out of 15 institutions that answered only 3 PhDs in economics, 5 in anthropology and none in sociology have been granted since 2017/18 (Figure 1).
- Professional schools and other humanities or art departments fare a little better, but only marginally so.
- *Comparing the 2015 and 2022 results for institutions that completed both surveys reveals declines across the board, in terms of current PhD students in social science and humanities disciplines, current tenure-track faculty, and PhDs granted (Figure 2).*

Figure 1. Faculty coverage and PhDs granted, by department/field





Figure 2. Faculty coverage and PhDs granted by department/field during respective time periods



Exchange programs and joint degree programs

- 6 institutions report that they have had formal exchange programs with Russian institutions that involve at least some graduate students or faculty members as participants since 2017.
 - 2 of these report 2 or more such programs.
- These institutions included the Higher School of Economics, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Skoltech, and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow, as well as the Derzhavin Institute in St. Petersburg. While the previous 2015 ASEEES report found that institutions were diverse in geographical location and profile, by 2022 this diversity has decreased, with all the reported institutions located in St. Petersburg and Moscow. However, this could possibly reflect non-responses by those institutions that, in 2015, reported exchange programs with institutions based outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg.
- Of the 8 exchange programs for which detailed information was provided (4 institutions provided information on one program and 2 on two):
 - 5 have/had a research component.
 - Three were started 2009-2011, one was started in 2015, and four were started in 2017.
- Roughly the same number of US-based and Russia-based faculty participated in these exchange programs during the period 2017-2022, while more than twice as many US-based than Russia-based graduate students did so.
 - 38 faculty members and 71 graduate students from the US-based institutions have participated since 2017/18 AY.

- 34 faculty members and 32 graduate students from the Russian partner institutions have participated since the 2017/18 AY.
- *According to the respondents, the effect of the COVID19 pandemic was “somewhat negative” for half the programs and “very negative” on the other half. (No responses indicated either a positive or a neutral effect of the pandemic.)*
- Six of the eight exchanges programs (75%) were terminated, all in the weeks following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Of the two programs that were not terminated (by the time of the survey), the impact of the invasion on one was characterized as “somewhat negative” and on the other as “very negative” by the respondents. Thus, as we might expect, the invasion has severely curtailed the number of formal exchange programs between US- and Russia-based institutions.
- None of the 20 institutions that responded reported having had joint degree programs with Russian partners during 2017-2022.

Postdocs and visiting faculty appointments

- There have been relatively few post-doctoral researchers from Russian institutions and from countries outside of the US who work on Russia hosted by US institutions (Figure 3).
- There have been relatively few professors from Russian institutions hosted by US institutions.
- *When comparing the sample of institutions that answered both the 2015 and the 2022 institutional survey, a dramatic decrease in hosting postdocs and visiting professors who work on Russia is observed (Figure 4). Most likely this reflects the impact of the COVID19 pandemic. The rapid increase of US-Russia tensions and corresponding difficulties obtaining visas for prospective Russian visitors may have put additional pressure on the hosting of visitors from Russia. But, in fact, the data suggest stability with respect to postdocs visiting from Russia. Because we do see a sizable drop in the number of visiting faculty from Russia, we suspect the stability in postdoctoral fellowships reflects the investment of Carnegie Corporation of New York in supporting such fellowships for Russia-based scholars at US institutions in the later period.*

Figure 3. Hosted post-docs and visiting faculty working on Russia since the 2017/18 AY





Figure 4. Hosted post-docs and visiting faculty working on Russia for the respective time periods



Academic and public activities

- In the 2021/22 academic year, a large number of lectures and panel discussions were held, but fewer conferences and workshops. Interestingly, except for conferences, there were more public events than purely academic events (Figure 5). This likely reflects a rise in public lectures and panels following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which led many centers to schedule impromptu panels in response to increased public demand.

Comparing the institutions who responded to both the 2015 and 2022 institutional surveys reveals that both the number of public and (especially) academic lectures decreased in the 2021/22 AY compared to the 2013/14 AY, while both academic and public panel discussions increased. Possibly, this reflects the lingering effects of the COVID19 pandemic, as mask requirements remained in place at many institutions through 2021. Academic conferences slightly increased in the 2021/22 AY while public conferences decreased. Both academic and public workshops increased relative to the 2013/14 AY, although the absolute numbers remain low (Figure 6).

Figure 5. Academic and Public Events and Activities During the 2021/22 AY






Figure 6. Total number of academic and public events hosted by institutions during the respective time periods




- Institutions also offer an array of cultural activities, with film showings being among the most prominent.

Figure 7. Total number of cultural events hosted by institutions during the 2021/22 AY



- For the subset of institutions that answered both the 2015 and 2022 surveys, compared to the 2013/14 AY, the number of concerts, film showings and photography/art exhibitions decreased in the 2021/22 AY, while poetry/literature readings and other types of performances slightly increased. Again, we suspect this reflects the lingering impact of COVID19.


Figure 8. Total number of cultural events hosted by institutions for the respective time periods



Enrollment in language classes

- Language enrollments were rather stable across institutions when comparing fall 2021 enrollments to fall 2022 enrollments. *Still, Russian language enrollments did fall (but only slightly) between 2021 and 2022, while Ukrainian language enrollments more than doubled. Most likely these trends stem from the February 2022 invasion, which appears to have modestly reduced student interest in taking Russian and increased interest in learning Ukrainian.* Also, some institutions may have begun to offer Ukrainian instruction in Fall 2022, in response to the invasion. (Figure 9). Enrollments in East-Central European languages remained stable, while enrollments in languages of the South Caucasus and Central Asia fell somewhat, despite such events as the January 2022 outbreak of political violence in Kazakhstan and the renewed military clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia in late summer 2022.


Figure 9. Enrollment in language classes in the fall of 2021 vs. fall of 2022



Programming after Russia's invasion of Ukraine

- All centers increased their programming on Ukraine after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Programming on other countries/regions, including Russia, remained stable (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Centers' relative programming changes after Russia's invasion of Ukraine



VI. CONCLUSIONS

The Russian studies field has been beset by a series of major external challenges since the 2015 assessment. Relations between the governments of the United States and Russia, already plunged into a post-1991 nadir by Russia's seizure of territory in Ukraine in 2014, continued to deteriorate, making cross-national travel and scholarly collaborations more difficult and limiting the ability of US-based scholars to conduct fieldwork and access data from Russia. Russian government crackdowns on civic and academic freedoms within Russia had the same effect and also threatened the ability of Russia-based scholars to research a growing array of topics. The COVID19 pandemic, with its attendant lockdowns, restrictions on international travel, and major financial challenges for universities worldwide, further limited access to Russia for research purposes and undermined collaborations between US- and Russia-based scholars. Even prior to these developments, Russian studies in the United States had been facing longer-term challenges, such as falling enrolments in Russian-language courses, declining numbers of entrants to the field in the form of new PhDs, a lack of academic jobs for scholars focusing on Russia in history and Slavic studies, a growing hostility toward "regional and area expertise" in the social sciences, and a persistent disconnect between academic research and policy discussions. More scholars drifted away from work on Russia as their academic careers proceeded rather than gravitated toward more work on Russia, and this trend grew more pronounced over time.

Despite these significant headwinds, the Russian studies field was able to navigate the troubled waters of the late 2010s and the COVID19 era about as well as could have been expected. Graduate student interest in Russia within the disciplines continued to decline by a variety of measures, and the quantity of research produced about Russia fell, as did the number and duration of research trips to Russia. But the quality of research held fairly steady, while perceptions of anti-Russian bias fell a bit. Slavists, historians, and social scientists continued to expand the scope of research on Russia to new topic areas and comparative analyses, improve methodological rigor, and produce high-impact studies of Russia in top disciplinary outlets. They adopted new approaches to scholarly communication, such as presenting research via social media. Research collaborations and exchanges between US- and Russia-based scholars persisted, and perhaps even grew, despite the many factors opposing them. The widespread adoption of videoconferencing technology in response to COVID19 facilitated scholarly communication across national borders in the absence of face-to-face contact and research travel. Major funding initiatives supported graduate training and research about Russia in the social sciences. In short, Russian studies was weathering a series of heavy storms reasonably well, all things considered.

However, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Russia launched on February 24, 2022, has precipitated by far the most significant crisis in Russian studies since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian government has become a full-fledged pariah state in the eyes of most of the Euro-Atlantic community and its Asian-Pacific allies. Russian society and culture have also been implicated in many circles as bearing some responsibility for the violent military aggression of the Russian government. Within Russia, the invasion of Ukraine has been followed by massive repression of dissent, a devastating exodus of scholars and other highly educated professionals, and a retreat into a world defined by state propaganda, with economic, educational, and cultural ties to the West all but completely severed. These developments have made it practically impossible to collect reliable historical and social science data within Russia, imperiled Russia-based scholars who had been conducting research about Russia in the social sciences and humanities, cast doubts on the ability of US-based Russian experts (most of whom failed to predict the full-scale invasion) to provide insight into Russia's political trajectory, and led to urgent calls to "de-colonize" Slavic studies and "de-center" Russia within them. Among US

policymakers and the think tanks whose purpose it is to provide them with options and perspectives regarding Russia, the full-scale invasion has crowded out all other considerations, and accelerated a long-standing process of polarization of calcified viewpoints, such that many despair of the chances of invigorating policy discussions with arguments rooted in the type of nuanced, deep, and innovative perspectives on Russia that scholars in the field have often aspired to offer.

It stands to reason that the Russian studies field finds itself in considerable turmoil, as its members in different disciplines, professional settings, and stages in the career cycle seek to comprehend the nature and severity of the many challenges confronting it and attempt to forge ahead with strategies to preserve the strengths of field in the face of massive difficulties imposed by forces and events that are largely, if not wholly, external to it. The diversity of perspectives about the achievements and deficiencies of Russian studies in the period preceding the war, the precise effects the war has had on the field, and the suitability of de-colonization as a frame for moving forward, represents a healthy state of affairs, all things considered. US-based scholars of Russia may not agree on the precise diagnoses or on the actual trends in the field leading up to the wartime situation it finds itself in, but they certainly all recognize the very serious nature of the problems confronting Russian studies as war wages in Ukraine, and they engage in thoughtful discussion and debate over what steps should be taken to salvage what can be, despite the turmoil. One thing is certain: *there is no prospect of a return to “business-as-usual.”*

But that does not necessarily imply an inevitable downward spiral of the field. Indeed, even as we have noted a pervasive sense of gloom and despair among Russia scholars based in the US in response to the war, we can also see hints of ways to move forward and respond, as a scholarly community, to the severe challenges we collectively face. Methodologically, the closure of access to data from Russia pushes us to explore new sources and forms of information, and new methodological approaches, including some which are taking hold more broadly in the social sciences and humanities (such as digital ethnography). Calls for de-colonizing Russian studies push us to expand our comparative horizons in new directions, integrate a diverse range of theoretical perspectives into studies of Russia, and engage more effectively with indigenous scholars in areas of Eurasia outside of Russia. And although the war has fostered a distaste for Russian culture, people, and politics in many circles throughout the world (but especially in the United States and the West), it also potentially will have a counter-vailing effect of drawing those interested in international security issues into the field.

Moving forward, donors, scholars, and other stakeholders with an interest in preserving US-based Russian studies may wish to prioritize five objectives and take corresponding actions to pursue them, in order to preserve what can be of what various corners of the field have achieved in recent years, while moving forward to proactively adopt to the emergent challenges.

- 1) *Maintain as much access as possible to data on Russian history, culture, economy, politics, and society by making existing data more widely available and developing new approaches.* A hallmark of the post-Soviet period for Russian studies has been the dramatically expanded access (relative to the Soviet period) to a wide range of data sources that offer insights into Russia’s history, politics, economy, culture and society. Most of those sources – such as archives, surveys, interviews, field work – are now almost completely cut off, and probably will remain so. The closing of access to new empirical data about Russia is arguably the single most significant challenge confronting the broad field. It is vital that both senior and, especially, more junior scholars explore and develop new sources of data if empirical research on Russia is to

survive. Historians need to identify archives outside of Russia and explore other potential sources of historical information (such as life history interviews). Social scientists need to develop techniques such as social media studies, big data and web-scraping analyses, digital ethnography, and virtual interviews and focus groups. Existing data sources such as the surveys and interviews need to be widely shared and analyzed more extensively, to improve understanding of the period preceding February 2022. The opportunities and risks of using “bridge” firms based in Russia to produce data from Russia must be explored and carefully assessed.

Donors and professional organizations can facilitate effective responses to the challenges of producing new data about Russia, despite the slamming shut of a new iron curtain within Russia in terms of research, in several ways. They could support data cataloguing, consolidation, and sharing efforts to compile existing data resources and information and thus improve access to what data are already available, as well as workshops, conferences, and training programs on new methodological and theoretical approaches, including the advantages and limitations of different innovations, research ethics, and fit with different disciplinary considerations. They can incentivize the development of innovative methodological approaches and data collection techniques through targeted grants and support for institutions that might lead the way in such efforts.

- 2) *Protect Russian scholars in exile and provide them with the means to continue their scholarship and teaching.* In the last several decades, researchers based in Russian academic institutions have made great strides toward integrating themselves into international research communities in the humanities and the social sciences, and they remain an important and vital source of insider (“tacit”) understanding of Russia’s history, politics, economy, culture and society. Russia’s massive authoritarian turn, which began well before the current invasion of Ukraine but has been dramatically accelerated by it, now seems certain to destroy research communities in these fields within Russia. Apart from humanitarian considerations that motivate scholars to support their colleagues from any country in time of need, there is a very strong practical reason why Russian scholars who have fled Russia should be supported: they represent a major source of both theoretical insight and also of data and intuition about Russia, which we can ill afford to lose. Supporting Russian scholars in exile may be the best hope for preserving the achievements of Russia academia since 1991 and keeping them ready to return to Russia to rebuild the universities that Putin has degraded over the past eight years, if and when that becomes a possibility. Without sustenance in academic positions, many will inevitably shift to non-academic careers and their contributions to our understanding will be lost. It is unrealistic to expect that Russian scholarly communities can be supported in their entirety outside of Russia, particularly because the invasion has also generated a massive need to support Ukrainian scholars and other displaced Ukrainians, who should receive priority because Russia started the war and inflicted massive damage on Ukraine. However, many disparate efforts have been underway to preserve and protect Russian scholarship in exile. To date, these have largely taken on a short-term, reactive, and uncoordinated character, and many short-term arrangements that have supported Russian scholars will soon expire, creating a massive second wave of needs and demand for new solutions. As a result, while numerous Russian scholars have found temporary shelter in Western institutions or in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, a more coordinated, strategic approach is needed to sustain such efforts moving forward.

Donors can play a vital role by incentivizing scaled-up, cross-institutional, longer-term initiatives. As those who have already involved in efforts to assist Russian scholars in exile have the chance to observe what works well and what does not, conferences, workshops, and active networks to share insights, develop best practices, and better coordinate collective efforts should be supported. In our view, it would be a mistake to continue efforts to forge ties and formal exchanges with Russia-based academic institutions so long as the Putin regime remains in power.

- 3) *Continue to educate the American public and policymaking community about Russia's complexity.* The qualitative portion of this study revealed a hardening of polarized positions about Russia within the policymaking and think tank communities. The Russian studies must strive to continue to bring nuance, intellectual diversity, and depth to policy-related and public discussions about Russia. *This does not mean adopting a "pro-Russian" perspective.* Indeed, the very framing of scholarship in terms of whether it is "pro" or "anti" Russian feeds into the oversimplifying narratives that appear to drive policy discussions and public perceptions. The Russian studies community should make use of its vast store of accumulated understanding of Russia in all its dimensions—not just the foreign and domestic policies of its current regime—to fight against simplistic, essentializing narratives and render Russia's complexity intelligible to policymakers, policy advocates, and the general US public. This is a daunting challenge in the context of a full-scale war, which imposes its own simplification of the situation (into alignments of enemies and allies) and can cast doubt on the motives of those who call for nuance and depth of perspective. But the war will end someday and the time has already arrived to begin discussions about what shape Russia is likely to take after it does. These discussions require open-mindedness, diversity of perspective, and understanding informed by historical and contemporary research on all aspects of Russia.

Donors and professional organizations can support efforts by Russia researchers to highlight Russia's complexity by incentivizing efforts to translate academic research into formats that are readily accessible to the public and to policymakers, providing training in writing for non-academic audiences, and supporting the development of Russia expertise in disciplines where it has remained stubbornly under-represented, such as anthropology, economics, sociology, and media studies. New approaches to bridging the gap between universities and think tanks, such as housing non-partisan policy research institutes within universities and establishing stronger linkages between public policy schools and Russia-focused research centers on campus, should be promoted. Finally, researchers who work on Russia should appreciate and endorse publicly and within their institutions the role that teaching about Russia in universities plays in shaping the understanding of the country that policymakers and government analysts bring to the table.

- 4) *Embrace the various aims of those who call for de-colonizing Slavic/Eurasian studies and work to engage constructively with the corresponding debates and discussions.* It is striking how little opposition there is from within the Russian studies community to the aims and arguments of those calling for the field to be de-colonized. Many disagree with some of the intellectual history underlying some of the stronger claims, on the grounds that these processes have already been underway for some time. Others are concerned that de-colonization might undermine support for research and education on Russia, at a time when broader trends within academia make it highly unlikely that resources diverted from the study of Russia will be allocated to the study of other

countries in the region that pose less of an international security threat to the United States. But few if any practitioners of the field oppose objectives such as devoting more attention to ethnic and linguistic minorities within Russia, to Eurasian countries other than Russia, to scholars from such communities and countries, and to theoretical perspectives that highlight the imperial and colonial nature of Russia's history and its current foreign and domestic policies. In short, the *Russian studies community shows no interest in opposing efforts to de-colonize Slavic/Russian studies and to de-center Russia within it*. The challenge for Russian studies is to preserve expertise and scholarship about Russia while addressing the concerns raised by proponents of de-colonization.

Donors and professional organizations can facilitate efforts to do so by funding research collaborations involving scholars from previously under-represented groups within Russia and under-represented countries outside of Russia, organizing conferences, workshops, and symposia to address the various debates and claims related to de-colonization, and promoting efforts to break down barriers that divide Russia experts from those devoted to the study of other countries and peoples in the region. That includes, specifically, experts on Ukraine and Ukrainian scholars. It may still be premature to contemplate efforts to bring together Ukrainian and Russian scholars in joint research programs. But Ukraine and other countries that have been victimized by Russia's expansionist policies may well eventually decide they have good reason to establish academic infrastructure (such as university-based centers) to provide their governments and populations with internal expertise on Russia, if for no other reason than to anticipate future threats that Russia is likely to continue to pose, and there may be a role for US-based partners and exiled Russian scholars to assist in such efforts. The sooner that scholars, donors, and other stakeholders can begin to envision what shape collaborations might take in the future, the more likely that successful efforts can be initiated when it becomes politically and practically appropriate to do so.

- 5) *Help young scholars entering the field.* A perennial and growing concern for the Russian studies community since the end of the Cold War has been whether a sufficient number of young scholars have been pursuing expertise on Russia and replenishing the ranks, so to speak, of Russia specialists within the various disciplines. Now conditions are more challenging for young scholars seeking to make academic or policy advising careers on the basis of Russia expertise than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not only access to data, but the opportunity to even travel to Russia is highly doubtful and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. The international reputation of Russian culture and society have suffered due to the Russian government's brutal actions in Ukraine. Advocates for de-colonization have called for more attention to countries other than Russia and languages other than Russian. It is especially hard to conjure up reasons to encourage young scholars to enter the field at the current juncture.

Donors and professional organizations should do what they can to continue supporting the cultivation of new generations of academic experts about Russia, its language, history, institutions, and people. Providing financial support to allow especially talented aspirants to enter MA and PhD programs for the study of Russia are one way to help ensure that qualified individuals (and not just those who are able to afford graduate school) are recruited into the field. Non-US citizens (who are excluded from FLAS fellowships, for example, and need resources to

obtain US visas), especially those affected by Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine and other forms of authoritarian repression in the region, should be made eligible for such funding. The Cold War period may offer some lessons about how continue cultivating new generations of scholars with Russia expertise in the context of being essentially shut out of the object of study. Efforts to encourage new approaches to data and methods, support Russian scholars in exile, promote more effective translation of research to public and policymaking audiences, and push Russia experts to take up the study of previously under-studied populations in Russia and countries outside of Russia should all include components specifically designed to support graduate students and recent PhDs in such pursuits.

Promising efforts in pursuit of all five objectives have been well underway, both in the United States and abroad. Here we refrain from pointing to specific individual programs. However, we are encouraged by the resourcefulness and scope of programs and individual initiatives that seek to develop new data sources, support scholars originally based in Russia, share diverse perspectives on contemporary Russia with non-academic audiences, engage with discussions about decolonizing the field and decentering Russia within it, and supporting younger scholars who are developing expertise on Russia in the various disciplines. Although the challenges are vast, the interdisciplinary Russian studies community has demonstrated creativity and resourcefulness in rising to meet them, which gives us reason to hope that the field will evolve and adapt.

It may well be the case that in future decades the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s will be looked back upon as a sort of "golden age" of research and graduate training about Russia in the humanities and social sciences within the United States, never to be repeated. How the field will ultimately respond to the myriad and far-reaching challenges posed by Russia's waging of war on Ukraine remains to be seen. This report has identified the nature of these challenges, as well as other difficulties posed by preceding external developments and long-term trends affecting Russian studies, based on data collected from scholars and analysts working in the field. It has also sought to point to some possible actions and directions that stakeholders within the field who wish not so much to restore the *status quo ante* as to help Russian studies evolve and expand to meet the new conditions may consider taking. It is, however, at best only the start of what can only be a long and difficult conversation within the field, which will have to be accompanied by corresponding dialogues between Russia scholars and others.

VII. APPENDIX

This appendix includes screen shots of the individual and institutional survey instruments implemented for the assessment.

I. Individual survey instrument

Welcome to the Survey Assessing Research on Russia in the United States

The Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies is conducting a survey of United States-based scholars who conduct research on Russia. The survey is part of a study funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York. It seeks data about the current state of research and graduate training in Russian studies comparable to benchmark data collected in a similar survey in 2015, as well as information about how important recent developments affect the field.

The survey should take about 15 minutes of your time. Please complete the survey as thoroughly as possible.

Instructions.

Completing the survey should be straightforward, especially if you keep the following in mind:

- 1) The survey consists of factual questions about your training, research activities, and collaborations with Russia-based scholars, as well as subjective questions regarding your perceptions of the state of the field and the main challenges it faces. You may find it useful to have a copy of your CV on hand when providing some of the information requested.**
- 2) After you complete the questions on a page, click “Next” to go the next page. When you click “Next” your answers on the page you completed are automatically saved. You can also click “Previous” to go to the prior page. You can return to an incomplete survey later, but *only if you use the same browser on the same computer.***
- 3) On the last page of the survey, there is a “Done” button at the bottom. Once you click on “Done” your responses will be stored and submitted.**
- 4) Note that there are automatic skips built into some questions. For example, if you have not traveled to Russia in the last five years you will be automatically sent to the next section after checking no on the question about travel to Russia since the start of 2017, skipping the questions that pertain only to those who did undertake such trips.**
- 5) We guarantee that no individual answers will be shared with the public, ASEEES, the survey’s sponsor, or anyone other than the investigators. None of the questions can be**

used to identify you personally, and the survey is both anonymous and completely confidential.

6) If any aspect of the survey is unclear, please contact Ted Gerber, the primary investigator of the study, at tgerber@ssc.wisc.edu.

7) If you have any technical questions about or problems with the online survey, please contact ASEES at aseees@pitt.edu or (412) 648-9911.

8) This survey will close at midnight on Monday, December 19, 2022.

Thank you for responding to the survey! Your information is vitally important for our assessment of the state of research and graduate training on Russia in the United States.

Ted Gerber, Principal Investigator (Conway-Bascom Professor of Sociology and Director of the Wisconsin Russia Project, University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Michael Zaslavsky, Research Assistant (PhD student in Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison)

1. Have you conducted any research on Russia during the calendar years 2017-2022 (including research on literature, film, and other forms of culture from Russia, as well as comparative research that includes Russia as a case)?

Yes

No

2. Are you currently based in the United States? If not, have you been based in the United States at any time during the period 2017-2022?

- I am currently based in the United States
- I am not currently based in the United States, but I have been at some point during 2017-2022
- I am not currently based in the United States and I have not been during 2017-2022

3. What is the highest degree you have obtained to date?

- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Professional degree (e.g. law degree, policy degree)
- Kandidat nauk degree
- Doctorate (PhD, DPhil, Doktor Nauk, or equivalent)

>

Other (please specify)

4. In what year did you obtain your highest degree?

5. In what country is the institution where you obtained your highest degree located?

- a. The United States
- b. Canada
- c. Russia

>

d. Another country, namely (please specify)

6. For how many years were you enrolled in the program that led to your highest degree prior to completing it (round to the nearest whole number)?

7. What field or discipline is your highest degree in? (Note: if more than one degree of the same level, then choose the field that is closest to the type of work you do currently).

- Slavic/Russian language, literature, and/or culture
- Russian and/or Eurasian and/or East European studies
- Political Science
- History
- Economics
- Sociology
- Anthropology
- Geography
- Journalism
- Fine arts or performing arts

>

Other (please specify)

8. Please indicate which of the following categories best describes you.

- Native speaker of Russian
- Heritage speaker of Russian
- Speaker of Russian, but neither native nor heritage
- Non-speaker of Russian

9. How many *years* of formal university-level Russian language training have you completed during your undergraduate and graduate education to date? (Please enter "0" if you have taken no university-level Russian language courses.)

10. Apart from language courses, approximately ***how many courses*** about other aspects of Russia (at least 25% Russia content) – for example, literature, history, politics, economy, society, religion – did you take during your *graduate studies*? Please include all graduate-level coursework, even if completed at different institutions or different in programs of study, and enter 0 if you took no courses.

11. Now please think about the research you conducted during each of the three different periods described below. Indicate approximately what percentage of your research during each of these periods was/is *about Russia*.

| | | | | | | | |
|--|------------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|--|--|
| | Less than 20% | 20% to 39% | 40% to 59% | 60% to 79% | 80% to 100% | Did not/do not do any research in this period | Not applicable/still working on MA degree |
|--|------------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|--|--|

1. Research you conducted while working on your highest degree to date (e.g. MA or PhD thesis)

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|

2. Research *started and finished* after you obtained your highest degree to date

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|

3. Research started after you completed your highest degree that you are *currently* working on

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|

12. Please indicate *how many* of each of the following types of research outputs you have produced from 2017-2022 as author or co-author (published or in press/accepted for publication) that deal with Russia (at least 25% Russia-related content). Enter "0" if none in a particular category.

a. Scholarly

monographs (as author)

b. Edited volumes (as editor)

c. Popular or general audience books

d. Articles in peer-reviewed journals within your discipline

e. Articles in peer-reviewed interdisciplinary Russian, post-Soviet, or Eurasian "area studies" journals

f. Articles in peer-reviewed journals within other disciplines than your main discipline

g. Book chapters

h. Other article-length publications, not peer reviewed (e.g. magazine articles)

i. Policy memos, op-eds, reports

j. Reviews (of books, films, etc.), review essays

k. Blog posts

13. Approximately how many presentations, if any, about Russia (at least 25% Russia content) have you given in the following settings from 2017-2022 *in the United States*? (Please also include presentations at US-based association meetings such as the American Political Science Association that took place in Canada during the period.) Enter "0" if none.

a. ASEEES annual meeting

b. Annual meetings of your main disciplinary association

c. Annual meetings of other disciplinary, regional, or interdisciplinary associations (e.g. ISA, ASN)

d. Special conferences or workshops organized to address particular topics

e. Invited academic lectures, panels, seminars

f. Invited public lectures, panels, seminars (intended for non-academic audiences)

g. Briefings of policymakers or public officials

h. Media interviews or appearances

14. Please indicate whether you have published any works in 2017-2022 (including in press/accepted for publication) on the following types of topics related to Russia (check the box next to each category in which you have published at least one work):

- a. Russian literature, culture, film, music, or art
- b. Russian history
- c. Religion in Russia
- d. Contemporary domestic politics within Russia (including elections)
- e. Contemporary Russian foreign policy (including Russia/US relations and Russia's war on Ukraine)
- f. Contemporary economic topics involving Russia
- g. Contemporary Russian social problems/issues
- h. Law in contemporary Russia

>

h. Another aspect of Russia not covered by these categories (please specify)

15. Please indicate whether your research on Russia during the period 2017-2022 included the following (check each category that applies):

- a. Analysis of Russian literary texts, art objects, films, musical or theater performances, or other cultural artifacts or events
- b. Analysis of Russian non-literary historical texts (e.g. memoirs, newspaper articles, government documents from the past)
- c. Analysis of contemporary Russian-language news media reports
- d. Analysis of contemporary Russian-language government documents (including speeches of leaders)
- e. Analysis of other contemporary Russian-language texts (scholarly works, blogs, social media)
- f. Archival research in Russia
- g. Archival research outside of Russia
- h. Interviews
- i. Focus groups
- j. Original survey data collection
- k. Analysis of survey data collected by others
- j. Analysis of "big data" from Russian online sources (e.g Google or Yandex searches, Twitter, Facebook, or V Kontakte posts, data from Telegram, etc.)

16. How often, if at all, have you promoted or disseminated your research on Russia via social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) during the period 2017-2022?

- Regularly
- Sometimes
- Occasionally
- Rarely
- Never

17. How many of the following types of grants have you received for your own research on Russia (at least 25% Russia content) from 2017-2022? (Note: please do not include institutional grants such as a Title VI grant to a Center on which you were PI unless a substantial proportion of them goes to fund your own research.) Enter "0" if none in a particular category.

a. Research grants from the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, or the National Endowment for the Humanities

b. Other US government research grants, including Fulbright grants *for research*, research grants from the Department of Education, Department of Defense, State Department, USAID, or other federal department or bureau (Justice, EPA, etc.), and grants funded by Title VIII money (e.g. NCEEER and some SSRC grants)

c. Research grants from ASEES

d. Research grants from private foundations (Carnegie, Ford, Guggenheim, MacArthur, etc.)

e. Research grants from Russian sources

f. Research grants from international organizations (United Nations, World Bank, IMF, European Union) or government organizations based abroad (except for Russia)

g. Travel grants from any external source (not your institution), such as a Title VI grant to your institution's Russian/Eurasian Studies Center, IREX, or Fulbright

h. Seed grants or other small grants provided by your own institution

18. Approximately how much total funding for your own research on Russia (at least 25% Russia content) have you received from the sources listed in the previous question from 2017- 2022? Please count all funds awarded to you as PI or co-PI and, for other grants (e.g. where you were a project participant, consultant) the amount that went to support your research directly.

- a. None
- b. Less than \$10,000
- c. \$10,000 to \$49,999
- d. \$50,000 to \$99,999
- e. \$100,000 to \$249,999
- f. \$250,000 to \$999,999
- g. \$1,000,000 or more

19. Have you traveled to Russia for professional purposes (i.e. excluding trips for vacations, family reasons or tourism) from 2017-2022? If so, then approximately how many trips have you taken?

I have not traveled to Russia for professional purposes from 2017-2022

>

I have traveled to Russia for professional purposes this many times from 2017-2022

20. Have you travelled to Russia for professional reasons prior to 2017? If so, what year did you return from your last such trip?

I have never travelled to Russia for professional reasons

>

My last trip to Russia for professional reasons ended in (enter year)

21. Please indicate which of the following types of localities in Russia you have visited *for professional reasons* from 2017-2022 (check all that apply):

- a. Moscow
- b. St. Petersburg
- c. Novosibirsk
- d. Ekaterinburg
- e. Nizhny Novgorod
- f. Samara
- g. Omsk
- h. Kazan
- i. Other provincial/oblast capitals
- j. Smaller cities (at least 100,000 residents but not provincial capitals)
- k. Small towns (at least 25,000 residents but fewer than 100,000)
- l. Rural villages

22. Approximately how many total days have you spent in Russia for professional purposes from 2017-2022?

23. How many times (if any) have you taken part in any of the following types of activities in Russia during the period 2017-2022? (Please enter "0" if none.)

a. Had a formal visiting professor or equivalent appointment involving research on Russia (at least two weeks)

b. Had a formal visiting professor or equivalent appointment involving teaching on Russia (at least one semester)

c. Gave a scholarly lecture or seminar about your research (for an academic audience)

d. Gave a public presentation about your research (for a non-academic audience)

e. Participated in a conference

f. Gave short-course or similar type of teaching engagement (university level or higher)

24. What month and year did you **return** from your most recent trip to Russia for professional purposes?

| Date | Month | Year |
|------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | <input type="text"/> | <input type="text"/> |

25. Have you collaborated with one or more Russia-based scholar(s) on a joint research project from 2017-2022 (including scholars who were based in Russia at some point during your collaboration but are no longer based in Russia)? If so, then how many have you collaborated with?

No

>

Yes, I have collaborated with this many Russia-based scholars from 2017-2022:

26. How did you first meet the Russia-based scholar(s) with whom you collaborated on research from 2017-22? (check all that apply)

- a. Studied together in graduate school
- b. Met during a research or teaching exchange trip you took to Russia
- c. Met when the collaborator was on a research or teaching exchange at your institution
- d. Met through a professional network
- e. Met at a conference, workshop, or presentation in the United States
- f. Met at a conference, workshop, or presentation in Russia
- g. Met at a conference, workshop, or presentation in another country.

>

- h. Other (please specify)

27. Please indicate how many of the following research outputs pertaining to Russia (at least 25% Russia content) you produced in collaboration with Russia-based scholars from 2017-2022:

- a. Research monographs
- b. Edited volumes
- c. Articles in peer reviewed English-language journals
- d. Articles in Russian-language journals
- e. Book chapters in English
- f. Book chapters in Russian
- g. Policy memos, op-eds
- h. Reviews, review essays
- i. Research grant proposals (submitted)
- j. Research grant proposals (funded)

28. How often would you say you have communicated about research with *Russia-based* scholars (including scholars who were based in Russia at some point during your collaboration but are no longer based in Russia) in ways that have not necessarily led to co- authorship (for example, discussions, email exchanges, providing feedback on one another's work) from 2017-2022?

- a. Often
- b. Sometimes
- c. Occasionally
- d. Rarely
- e. Never

29. How many, if any, of the following types of visiting scholars from Russia have you personally hosted, collaborated with, and/or mentored while they were on extended research or teaching trips (at least two weeks) at your institution from 2017-2022? Please enter "0" if none in a particular category.

- a. Graduate students
- b. Post-doctoral researchers
- c. University faculty members/institute-based researchers
- d. Writers or artists in residence
- e. Journalists, political activists, or other public figures

30. Approximately how many, if any, of the following types of visiting scholars from Russia have given lectures, seminars, or other presentations *that you attended* at your institution from 2017-2022? Please enter "0" if none in a particular category.

- a. University faculty members/institute-based researchers
- b. Writers or artists
- c. Journalists, critics, political activists, or other public figures

31. How would you characterize your current employer? (Note: if you have multiple employers then please answer with respect to the one you consider your main employer).

- Research university
- Four year college
- Two year college
- Research institute
- Think tank
- Private consulting firm
- Government
- NGO/non-profit organization
- Retired/independent scholar/not currently employed

>

Other (please specify)

32. Which of the following categories best describes your current position? *Note: if you are not currently employed, please answer with respect to the most recent research-related position you held.*

- Tenured or tenure-track faculty
- Adjunct faculty
- Post-doctoral researcher
- Other research position
- Academic staff position
- PhD student
- MA student
- Independent scholar
- Consultant

Other (please specify)

33. How many (if any) PhD students have you mentored as primary adviser (thesis chair or co-chair) and as secondary adviser (on the PhD committee but not the chair or co-chair) who defended a dissertation on a topic related to Russia (at least 25% Russia content) in the last *fifteen* years (that is, from 2007-2022)? Please enter “0” if none.

Number mentored as primary adviser

Number mentored as secondary adviser

34. Approximately how many, if any, MA theses have you supervised (as primary adviser) that dealt with a topic related to Russia (at least 25% Russia content) and were completed in the last *fifteen* years (that is, from 2007-2022)? Please enter “0” if none.

35. How many, if any, PhD students are you currently supervising (as chair or as a secondary committee member) whose dissertations deal with Russia (at least 25%)? Please enter “0” if none.

Number of PhD students working on Russia supervising as primary adviser

Number of PhD students working on Russia supervising as secondary adviser

36. How many, if any, *graduate-level* courses have you taught or co-taught that focus(ed) on Russia (at least 25% Russian content) during the last *five* academic years (that is, from AY 2017/18 through the current academic year)? (Please enter “0” if none.)

37. Which of the following organizations or groups are you currently a member of? (Check all that apply.)

- a. ASEES
- b. The main professional association for your discipline (APSA, AATSEEL, AHA, MLA, etc.)
- c. Other professional associations
- d. Closed network of scholars who work on Russia (e.g. PONARS, the Carnegie Forum on US-Russia relations)
- e. Social media group (e.g. Facebook group) devoted to research about Russia

38. Do you identify as male, female, or another gender?

Male

Female

>

Other (please specify)

39. Please indicate whether you agree (and how strongly) with the following statements

Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neutral (neither agree nor disagree) Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree

a. There has been a decline in interest in Russia among graduate students in my field since the early 2000s.

b. Most research conducted by American social scientists about Russia these days is biased against Russia

c. American mass media reports on Russian government actions during the last year have taken a wide variety of perspectives

d. It would help relations between Russia and the United States if there were more academic exchange programs between Russian and American universities

40. Later we will ask some questions about the impact of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine on research. But first we would like to know about your views of the situation during the five years preceding the invasion (2017-2021). Which of the following do you think were the most important, second most important, and third most important reasons why there were not more collaborations in research on Russia between US-based and Russia-based scholars in your field *in 2017-2021*?

| | Most important reason | Second most important | Third most important |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Lack of intrinsic interest in collaborating on the part of US scholars | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Lack of intrinsic interest in collaborating on the part of Russian scholars | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Political obstacles (including visa restrictions) from the US government | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Political obstacles (including visa restrictions) from the Russian government | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Systematic national differences in the quality of training and scholarship | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Language barriers | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Cultural differences in research styles | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Different incentive structures for publication in Russia and the United States | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Lack of contacts between Russian and American researchers working on similar topics | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| None of these reasons/no additional reasons | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |
| Some other reason (please specify in the "other" box below) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

(Please specify which other reason(s) you have in mind, if you selected "some other reason," the last row above.)



41. What do you consider the three most serious gaps or shortcomings in research on Russia that was conducted by US-based scholars in your discipline *during 2017-2021*?

| | Most serious gap/shortcoming | Second most serious | Third most serious |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Lack of fundamental knowledge about Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Failure to use Russian-language sources | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |
| Bias against the Russian government | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Lack of methodological rigor | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Failure to engage broader theoretical concerns in your discipline | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Lack of policy relevance or other impact outside academia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Insufficient comparative perspective (i.e. too narrow a focus on Russia) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Excessive emphasis on Russian exceptionalism | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |
| Insufficient attention to Russia's ethnic minority populations and/or regions outside of Moscow | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Lack of reliable empirical data | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Persistence of Cold War attitudes/assumptions among researchers | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Too narrow a focus on current events and policy debates | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |

Excessive focus on disciplinary concerns at the expense of accurate depiction of Russia



Insufficient

collaborations with
Russia-based
scholars

None of the above/no
additional
gaps/shortcomings

Some other
gap/shortcoming
(please specify in the
"other" box below)

(Please specify which other gap(s)/shortcoming(s) you have in mind, if you selected "some other reason," the last row above.)

42. Which of the following do you think would have the *most* significant positive impact in improving research on Russia that is conducted in American universities in the next few years?

- Increased funding for faculty research on Russia at American universities
- Increased funding for graduate student training and research on Russia at American universities
- Increased funding for American scholars to make research and teaching visits to Russian universities
- Increased funding for Russian scholars to visit American universities
- Increased interest in Russia on the part of the American public
- Increased interest in Russia on the part of the American government
- Improved relations between the Russian and American governments

>

Something else (please specify):

43. What overall impact, if any, would you say each of the following have had on research about Russia in your discipline?

| | Very negative impact | Somewhat negative impact | No impact | Somewhat positive impact | Very positive impact |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| The COVID19 pandemic | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| The Russian government's domestic policies since 2017 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Developments in Russian universities since 2017 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| The US government's foreign policies since 2017 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for secessionists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Russia's full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

44. In your opinion, what will be the impact of Russia's full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022 in the coming 5 years on the following aspects of academic research on Russia in your discipline in the United States?

| | Very negative impact | Somewhat negative impact | No impact | Somewhat positive impact | Very positive impact |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Ability of US-based scholars to conduct empirical research on Russia moving forward | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Inflow of PhD students in coming years who will want to conduct research on Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Ability of researchers to address the needs of US policymakers regarding knowledge and understanding of contemporary Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Ability to sustain | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

prior collaborations
between US-based
scholars and
colleagues who were

based in Russian institutions until 2022

Your willingness to collaborate with scholars who are currently based in Russian universities, research institutes, or other organizations *affiliated* with the Russian government

Your willingness to collaborate with scholars who are currently based in Russian universities, research institutes, or other organizations *not affiliated* with the Russian government

Appreciation for research on Russia within your discipline

Appreciation for research on Ukraine in your discipline

Appreciation for research on other countries of Eurasia in your discipline

Availability of grant funding for research on Russia

45. To what extent, if any, has Russia's full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had the following specific consequences *for your research*?

| | Very much | Somewhat | Not very much | Not at all | Not applicable |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Led you to abandon or suspend current research projects on Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Led you to initiate new research projects about Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Led you to initiate new research on Ukraine | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Led you to initiate new research on other countries of Eurasia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Led you to end formal affiliation(s) with (one or more) Russian academic institution(s) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Led you to initiate new collaborations with scholars who have departed Russia since the war began | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Led you to stop or suspend an individual or team- based research collaboration with a scholar who is currently or recently based in Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Led you to shift your research interests and plans away from Russia toward other countries or topics | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

46. Please indicate how many times (if any) you have given the following during 2022 (if none, please enter "0"):

Interviews with
journalists or mass
media appearances
about Russia's
invasion of Ukraine

Public lectures,
roundtables, or events
about Russia's
invasion of Ukraine

Briefings or
communications with
US government
officials or other
policymakers about
Russia's invasion of
Ukraine

47. Recently a growing number of scholars who conduct research on Russia and other Eurasian countries have called for "de-colonizing" Russian or Eurasian studies and/or "de-centering" Russia within them. We now have some questions about these proposals, which we will refer to as "de-colonizing Eurasian studies" for short. First, how much, if anything have you heard about calls by scholars to "de-colonize" Russian/Eurasian studies?

- I have heard *a great deal* about calls to "de-colonize" Russian/Eurasian studies
- I have heard *something* about calls to "de-colonize" Russian/Eurasian studies
- I have heard *a little bit* about calls to "de-colonize" Russian/Eurasian studies
- I have heard *nothing* about calls to "de-colonize" Russian/Eurasian studies

48. Please indicate, in your view, how central each of the following specific aims is for those who call for "de-colonizing" Russian/Eurasian studies.

| | A very central, key aim | An important aim, but not central | A fairly unimportant aim | Not at all an aim | Hard to say |
|---|----------------------------|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Increase resources and/or publication opportunities for research on Ukraine | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Increase resources and/or publication opportunities for research on other countries of Eurasia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Increase resources and/or publication opportunities for research on ethnic and/or linguistic minorities within Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Reduce the extent to which research about Russia adopts a Russo-centric perspective | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Discourage young scholars in your discipline from developing expertise about Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Encourage more research that highlights Russia's imperialistic and colonizing tendencies | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Encourage more research that highlights how the Western and other powers have subordinated Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

49. What impact, overall, would "de-colonizing" Russian/Eurasian studies have on research about Russia in your discipline?

- Very negative impact
- Somewhat negative impact
- Negative and positive impacts in roughly equal measure
- Somewhat positive impact
- Very positive impact
-

Hard to say

50. Which of the following statements do you agree with most?

- I *do not support* special efforts to devote more resources and/or publishing opportunities for research about Eurasian countries other than Russia in my discipline.
- I support special efforts to devote more resources and/or publishing opportunities for research about Eurasian countries other than Russia in my discipline, but *only so long as* doing so does not divert resources and/or publishing opportunities away from research about Russia.
- I support special efforts to devote more resources and/or publishing opportunities for research about Eurasian countries other than Russia in my discipline, *even if* doing so requires diverting resources and/or publishing opportunities away from research about Russia.

51. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree (and how strongly) with the following statements:

Strongly agree Somewhat agree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree

De-colonizing Russian/Eurasian studies has already been underway for decades in my discipline

It is impossible to enhance support for research on other Eurasian countries without reducing support for research on Russia

There should be more research on Russia than on other countries in Eurasia because Russia is the most powerful country in the region

There should be more research on Russia than on other countries in Eurasia because Russia has a richer history and/or culture than other countries in the region

Had Russian/Eurasian studies been "de-colonized" sooner, our field would have better anticipated Russia's full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in February 2022

Proponents of "de-colonizing" Russian/Eurasian studies often exaggerate the extent of the problems they identify

52. Overall, how much would you say you support or oppose “de-colonizing” Russian/Eurasian studies?

- Fully support
- Somewhat support
- Partly support and partly oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Fully oppose

53. Finally, to end on a positive note, please indicate which (if any) of the following you consider to be the most, second most, and third most encouraging tendencies in studies of Russia by US-based scholars within your discipline from 2017-2021?

| | Most encouraging | Second most encouraging | Third most encouraging |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Deepening of knowledge of Russia on the part of US- based researchers | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Increasing use of Russian-language sources | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |
| More balanced attitudes toward the Russian government | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Improving methodological rigor | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Better engagement with theoretical concerns in your discipline | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Growing of policy relevance and impact outside academia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |
| Expanding comparative perspective (less narrow focus on Russia) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Decreasing emphasis on Russian exceptionalism | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |
| Greater attention to Russia’s ethnic minority populations and/or regions outside of Moscow | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Enhanced access to reliable empirical data | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |

Retreat of Cold War
attitudes/assumptions
among researchers



Decreased focus on current events or policy debates

Re-orientation of focus away from disciplinary concerns toward accurate depictions of Russia

Flourishing of collaborations with Russia-based scholars

None of the above/no additional encouraging developments

Something else (please specify in the "other" box below)

Please specify the other encouraging tendency/tendencies you have in mind if you selected "something else," the last row above

54. Thank you for completing this survey. Please let us know if there is anything you would like to add about the state of Russian studies in the United States or about the survey.

II. Institutional survey

Welcome to the ASEEEES Survey, Assessing Russian Studies in the United States: Institutional Survey

The Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies requests your participation in a survey of 45 university-based Russian Studies centers (including centers covering broader areas such as “Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies” or “Russia and Eurasia,” or “Eurasia and Central Asia,” etc.) in the United States. The survey is part of a study, funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York, assessing the current state of research and graduate training on Russia in the US. An earlier benchmark study of a similar nature was conducted in 2015, and the results are published on the ASEEEES website (see https://www.aseees.org/sites/default/files/downloads/FINAL-ASEEEES-assessment-report_0.pdf). By participating in this follow-up study, you will provide invaluable assistance in the form of updated data on US institutions, which will allow us to both assess the current situation and identify major trends since the period covered in the earlier study.

Instructions

Completing the survey should be straightforward, especially if you keep the following in mind:

1) The survey consists largely of factual questions about your program activities and staffing. You may need to consult with colleagues or staff to obtain some of the information requested. We recommend first reviewing the survey by scrolling through it using the “Next” and “Previous” buttons to get an idea of the information we are seeking. Please try to answer all the questions to the best of your knowledge; if you are unsure of some specific numbers, for example, it would be preferable to offer an informed estimate rather than leave the question blank

2) After you complete the questions on a page, click “Next” to go the next page. When you click “Next” your answers on the page you completed are automatically saved. You can also click “Previous” to go to the prior page. You can return to an incomplete survey later, but *only if you use the same browser on the same computer*. Unfortunately this means you cannot begin the survey, then send it to someone else to complete.

3) On the last page of the survey, click “Done” at the bottom to store your answers. You can return to revise your answers until the survey closes, *but only if you use the same browser on the same computer*.

4) Automatic skips are built into some questions. For example, if your institution has no MA program in Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies, then after you

answer “no” to the question about whether you have such a program you will be sent automatically to the next section, skipping questions relevant for institutions with such MA programs.

5) We guarantee that your institution’s particular answers will never be released or shared with the public or the survey’s sponsor. We do, however, ask you to name

your institution so we can keep track of who has responded and who has not and also analyze aggregate within-institution changes using the data from 2015. While not anonymous, the survey is fully confidential: no individual institution's answers will be shared.

6) If any aspect of the survey is unclear, please contact Ted Gerber (PI) at tgerber@ssc.wisc.edu, Michael Zaslavsky (Research Assistant) at mzaslavsky@wisc.edu or Lynda Park (ASEEES Executive Director) at lypark@pitt.edu.

7) If you have any technical questions about or problems with the online survey, please contact ASEEES at aseees@pitt.edu or (412) 648-9911.

8) This survey will close on October 21, 2022.

Thank you for responding to the survey! Doing so provides a valuable service to the field.

1. Please write in the name of your institution.

2. How many full years of Russian language instruction are offered at your institution?

2 or fewer

3

4

5

6 or more

3. Approximately what percentage of Russian language courses at your institution are taught by tenure-track/tenured faculty?

Enter a percentage
from 0 to 100

4. Does your institution offer any graduate-level programs (MA, PhD, professional degrees, etc.) in humanities, social sciences, or related fields?

Yes

No

5. Does your institution have an MA program in Russian, Eurasian, and/or East European studies (REEES)?

Yes

No

6. How many MA degrees in REEES has your program granted in the last five academic years (AY 2017/18 to AY2021/22)? How many recipients of these degrees wrote theses or major papers about **Russia** (at least 25% Russia-related content)?

Number of MA degrees
in REEES since AY
2017/18:

Number of recipients of
them who wrote
thesis/major paper on
Russia:

7. How many MA students in REEES are currently enrolled at your institution, and approximately how many of them will write a thesis or major paper about **Russia** (at least 25% Russia content)?

Number of MA
students in REEES
currently enrolled:

Approximate number of
these who will write a
thesis/major paper
about **Russia:**

8. Does your institution offer graduate certificates in Russian, East European, and/or Eurasian studies (REEES)?

Yes

No

9. How many students received graduate certificates in REES in the last five academic years (AY 2017/18 to AY 2021/22)? Of these, approximately how many specialized in **Russian** society, culture, politics, history and/or language?

Number of graduate certificates in REES granted since AY 2017/18:

Number of those to students who specialized in **Russia**- related topics:

10. Does your institution offer a graduate minor in Russian, East European, and/or Eurasian studies (REEES)?

Yes

No

1. How many graduate students have graduated with a graduate minor in REEES in the last five academic years (AY 2017/18 to AY 2021/22)? Of these, approximately how many specialized in **Russian** society, culture, politics, history and/or language?

Number of graduate minors in REEES since AY 2017/18:

Number who specialized in **Russia**- related topics:

2. How many tenured/tenure track faculty are there at your institution who currently do substantial research on Russia (i.e., at least 25% of their research is on Russia) in each of the following departments? *(Please enter 0 if there are none.)*

a. Slavic/Russian language, literature, and/or culture

b. Political Science

c. History

d. Economics

e. Sociology

f. Anthropology

g. Geography

h. Other humanities or arts department(s)

i. Other social science department(s)

j. Professional schools (law, policy, library/information science, etc.)

3. How many current PhD students are there at your institution working on Russia (at least 25% Russia content) in the following departments? (Please enter 0 if there are none.)

- a. Slavic/Russian language, literature, and/or culture
- b. Political Science
- c. History
- d. Economics
- e. Sociology
- f. Anthropology
- g. Geography
- h. Other humanities or arts department(s)
- i. Other social science department(s)
- j. Professional schools (law, policy, library/information science, etc.)

4. How many PhDs have been granted at your institution to students whose dissertations included research on Russia (at least 25% Russia content) during the last five academic years (AY 2017/18 to AY 2021/22) in each of the following departments?

a. Slavic/Russian language, literature, and/or culture

b. Political Science

c. History

d. Economics

e. Sociology

f. Anthropology

g. Geography

h. Other humanities or arts department(s)

i. Other social science department(s)

j. Professional schools (law, policy, library/information science, etc.)

5. Did your institution have any formal research and/or educational exchange programs with one or more Russian institutions (including language training programs) in which *graduate students* and/or *faculty* have participated *at any time* during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

Yes, two or more exchange programs in which graduate students and/or faculty have participated Yes, one formal exchange program in which graduate students and/or faculty have participated

No

6. Please answer the following questions about your institution's formal exchange program with a Russian institution in which graduate students and/or faculty have participated in AY2017/18-AY2021/22.

a. Which Russian institution is (or was) your partner?

b. Is (or was) there a research component to the program?

c. How many faculty members (if any) from your institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

d. How many graduate students (if any) from your institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

e. How many faculty members (if any) from the Russian institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

f. How many graduate students (if any) from the Russian institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

g. What year did the program start?

7. What impact, if any, did COVID-19 have on participation in this program?

Very negative

Somewhat negative

Minimal or no impact

Somewhat positive

Very positive

8. Did your institution discontinue the exchange program just described since 2017?

Yes

No

9. What month and year did your institution discontinue the exchange program just described?

Month and year (specific day unimportant).

Date

MM/DD/YYYY



10. What overall impact, if any, would you say that the Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had on this program?

- Very negative
- Somewhat negative
- Minimal or no impact
- Somewhat positive
- Very positive

11. Please answer the following questions about your institution's *largest* (in terms of number of participants from your institution) formal exchange program with a Russian institution in which *graduate students and/or faculty* have participated since AY 2017/18.

a. Which Russian institution is (or was) your partner?

b. Is (or was) there a research component to the program?

c. How many faculty members (if any) from your institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

d. How many graduate students (if any) from your institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

e. How many faculty members (if any) from the Russian institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

f. How many graduate students (if any) from the Russian institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

g. What year did the program start?

12. What impact, if any, did COVID-19 have on participation in this program?

Very negative

Somewhat negative

Minimal or no impact

Somewhat positive

Very positive

13. Did your institution discontinue the exchange program just described since 2017?

Yes

No

14. What month and year did your institution discontinue the exchange program just described?

Month and year (specific day unimportant).

Date

15. What overall impact, if any, would you say that the Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had on this program?

- Very negative
- Somewhat negative
- Minimal or no impact
- Somewhat positive
- Very positive

16. Now please answer the following questions about your institution's *second largest* (in terms of number of participants from your institution) formal exchange program with a Russian institution in which *graduate students* and/or *faculty* have participated since AY 2017/18.

a. Which Russian institution is (or was) your partner?

b. Is (or was) there a research component to the program?

c. How many faculty members (if any) from your institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

d. How many graduate students (if any) from your institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

e. How many faculty members (if any) from the Russian institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

f. How many graduate students (if any) from the Russian institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

g. What year did the program start?

17. What impact, if any, did COVID-19 have on participation in this program?

Very negative

Somewhat negative

Minimal or no impact

Somewhat positive

Very positive

18. Did your institution discontinue the exchange program just described since 2017?

Yes

No

19. What month and year did your institution discontinue the exchange program just described?

Month and year (specific day unimportant).

Date

20. What overall impact, if any, would you say that the Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had on this program?

- Very negative
- Somewhat negative
- Minimal or no impact
- Somewhat positive
- Very positive

21. Does your institution have a joint degree program with one or more Russian institutions in which *graduate students and/or faculty* have participated in the last five years?

Yes

No

22. Please answer the following questions about your institution's *joint degree* program with a Russian institution. If your institution has more than one *joint degree* program with a Russian institution, then provide information regarding the largest program (in terms of number of participants from your institution).

a. Which Russian institution is (or was) your partner?

b. Is (or was) there a research component to the program?

c. How many faculty members (if any) from your institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

d. How many graduate students (if any) from your institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

e. How many faculty members (if any) from the Russian institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

f. How many graduate students (if any) from the Russian institution participated in the program during the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22)?

g. What year did the program start?

23. What impact, if any, did COVID-19 have on participation in this program?

Very negative

Somewhat negative

Minimal or no impact

Somewhat positive

Very positive

24. Did your institution discontinue the joint degree program just described since 2017?

Yes

No

25. What month and year did your institution discontinue the exchange program just described?

Month and year (specific day unimportant).

Date

MM/DD/YYYY



26. What overall impact, if any, would you say that the Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had on this program?

- Very negative
- Somewhat negative
- Minimal or no impact
- Somewhat positive
- Very positive

27. How many of each of the following types of visiting appointments has your institution hosted in the previous five academic years (AY2017/18-AY2021/22) for scholars doing social science or humanities research about **Russia**? (Please consider scholars whose teaching or research during their visiting appointment had at least 25% Russia content.)

a. Post-doctoral researchers from United States institutions

b. Post-doctoral researchers from Russian institutions

c. Post-doctoral researchers from institutions in other countries

d. Visiting professors from United States institutions

e. Visiting professors from Russian institutions

f. Visiting professors from institutions in other countries

28. Approximately how many of the following types of academic events (i.e. designed for academic participants/audiences) did your institution hold in the 2021/22 academic year that focused significantly (at least 25%) on Russia?

a. Conferences

b. Workshops

c. Lectures

d. Panel discussions

29. Approximately how many of the following types of *public* or *outreach* events (i.e. designed for general public audiences or specialized non-academic audiences such as high school students, alumni groups, or teachers) did your institution hold in the 2021/22 academic year that focused significantly (at least 25%) on *Russia*?

a. Conferences

b. Workshops

c. Lectures

d. Panel discussions

30. Approximately how many of the following types of *cultural* events did your institution hold in the 2021/22 academic year that focused significantly (at least 25%) on *Russia*?

a. Concerts

b. Film showings or series

c. Photography or art exhibitions

d. Poetry or other literary readings

e. Other performances or cultural events

31. Which of the following languages were offered at your institution during the fall 2021 semester? Check all that apply

- Russian
- Ukrainian
- Polish
- Other language(s) of East Central Europe
- Language(s) of the South Caucasus and/or Central Asia

>

- None of the above

32. How many students are enrolled in each of the languages offered in fall 2021? Answer all that apply.

Russian

Ukrainian

Polish

Other language(s) of
East Central Europe

Language(s) of the South
Caucasus and/or Central
Asia

33. Which of the following languages are currently offered at your institution (during the fall 2022 semester)? Check all that apply.

- Russian
- Ukrainian
- Polish
- Other language(s) of East-Central Europe

- Language(s) of the South Caucasus and/or Central Asia

>

- None of the above

34. How many students were enrolled in each of the languages offered in fall 2022? Answer all that apply.

Russian

Ukrainian

Polish

Other language(s) of
East-Central Europe

Language(s) of the South
Caucasus and/or Central
Asia

35. We would like to know whether your center’s programming (i.e. public lectures, panels, symposia, and other events) has shifted, in terms of the countries/regions covered, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Would you say that your center’s relative amount of programming content on each of the following countries/regions has increased, decreased, or stayed the same since the start of the invasion?

| | Our center increased programming on this country/region | Our center made no change in the relative amount of programming on this country/region. | Our center decreased programming on this country/region. |
|---|--|---|---|
| Russia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Ukraine | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Other Country/Countries of East Central Europe | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Country/Countries of the South Caucasus | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Country/Countries of Central Asia | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Other countries | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |



36. Finally, is there anything else you wish to add about your institution or about this survey?